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Interest in the cultures of organisations and their effects on management practices goes back many years and 
there is an extensive body of scholarship on this topic. Yet this interest has increased dramatically in the period 
since 2008. The debate is led by the world of practice, particularly in the !nancial services sector. Furthermore, a 
new twist in the vocabulary of culture has taken place and companies, advisors and regulators now seem to have 
a speci!c focus on something called risk culture.
What is this new object that features so prominently in discussion about !nancial regulation, at many industry 
events and on numerous blogs? Is it a single thing or does it have many faces? How do companies understand 
and operationalise it? Do they do this in similar ways? How do !nancial regulators in"uence conceptions of risk 
culture? Is the demand to improve risk culture at all coherent? Can it – whatever it is – be consciously managed? 
Is it auditable? Is there a single desirable risk culture or are there diverse and plural approaches? If so, are there 
any limits to this diversity?
In this report we provide some answers to these questions based on our investigations over a period of 18 
months. Our research into a constantly developing !eld is however necessarily incomplete and raises as many 
questions as it answers. We are also conscious that the debate about culture and risk culture is a very crowded 
one, with regulators, advisors and trade bodies seeking to provide thought leadership. We therefore offer this 
report as another contribution to the extensive public debate about the future of !nancial services. 
There have been many efforts to de!ne risk culture and this multiplicity tells us something, namely that it is 
conceptually rather fuzzy. We decided to go out and listen to the way that different organisations – banks, 
insurers and their advisors – think about and  operationalise risk culture change programmes. We think that this is 
where the action is – where risk culture becomes, or does not become, an organisational reality. Our report paints 
a rich picture and we have attempted to provide some intellectual structure to the diversity we have observed. 
To aid the readability of this report we have shifted a large body of material on methods and other matters to a 
series of appendices. 
In the next section we summarise our !ndings and provide some prescriptive ideas which different actors in 
!nancial services may !nd useful. The main body of the report begins with an overview of the institutional 
background to the risk culture debate – which will be familiar to many readers. This is followed by a more detailed 
account of our approach to the study, including our methods and our own working conceptualization, based on 
a reading of academic and practitioner studies. We then detail our !ndings, organised in terms of a number of 
different themes. Our research positions risk culture as the outcome of a series of trade-offs across a number of 
dimensions. How our participating organisations approach and think about these trades-offs also suggests an 
interesting difference between what we call organic and engineered styles of intervening in risk culture. We make 
no judgement about whether one style is superior to another but we note a paradox: while many individuals will 
openly support the former, it is the latter which is more visible. We explore the reasons for this.
One of the big unanswered questions in our study is the extent to which individual organisational efforts in the 
space of risk culture are in fact overshadowed by a trans-organisational regulatory culture with some interesting 
properties. We make some speculations in this regard but the topic warrants further work.
Finally, we hope that this report will be of interest and use to banks, insurers and other !nancial organisations; 
to regulators – both policy makers and supervisors; and to advisors. Rather than make a series of explicit 
recommendations, we have outlined a number of challenges and questions for senior risk personnel and CEOs, 
which arise naturally from our research !ndings. 
Introduction
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It is widely agreed that failures of culture, which permitted excessive and uncontrolled risk-taking and a loss of 
focus on end clients, were at the heart of the !nancial crisis. Many of!cial reports, analyses, commentaries and 
blogs go further to focus on the cultural dimensions of risk-taking and control in !nancial organisations, arguing 
that, for all the many formal frameworks and technical modelling expertise of modern !nancial risk management, 
risk-taking behaviour and an absence of ethics were poorly understood both by companies and regulators.
From this point of view, we regard the explosion of interest in risk culture in !nancial organisations since 2008 as 
being symptomatic of a desire to reconnect risk-taking and related management and governance processes to a 
new moral narrative of organisational purpose. 
The primary aim of our research extending over 18 months and involving several banks and insurers in the 
United Kingdom, was to discover and analyse how the risk culture change agenda was taking shape inside 
different organisations. From this grounded and bottom-up point of view we decided not to de!ne risk culture 
in advance but to observe and understand its manifestations within organisations. We interacted mainly, though 
not exclusively with personnel from the risk function. Whilst this may be seen as limiting the generalizability 
of our results, it was clear to us at an early stage that risk culture change programmes were being led by risk 
functions and that the reshaping of the organisational footprint of risk management was at the centre of these 
programmes. We supplemented this approach with a formal survey of CII and CIMA members and also engaged, 
for comparative purposes, with personnel from two non-!nancial companies – an airline and a large industrial 
company. 
Our desk research of academic and practitioner literature on risk management, management control, culture and 
safety issues suggested strongly that risk culture is a way of framing issues of risk and culture in organisations and 
not a separate object. In addition, risk culture is itself a composite of a number of interrelated factors involving 
many trade-offs. We approached the research with a number of additional prior assumptions:
 Risk culture is not a static thing but a continuous process, or processes, which repeats and renews itself, 
 but may be subject to shocks
 Risk culture will be a mixture of formal and informal processes. The former are easy to observe. The latter 
 are harder to observe since they involve a myriad of small behaviours and habits which in the aggregate 
 constitute the state of risk culture at any one point in time
 We do not assume that an organisation necessarily has a single risk culture and we accept that risk 
 cultures may be trans-organisational. Conceptually we would prefer to speak of ‘risk cultures’ which may 
 be unevenly distributed within organisations (e.g. in retail as compared with investment banking) or across 
 the !nancial industry as a whole (e.g. insurers as compared with banks)
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The most fundamental issue at stake in the risk culture debate is an organisation’s self-awareness of its balance 
between risk-taking and control. It is clear that many organisational actors prior to the !nancial crisis were either 
unaware of, or indifferent to, the actual trade-off or risk pro!le of the organisation as a whole. A combination 
of control functions being ignored or fragmented and of revenue-generating functions being given star status 
rendered the actual trade-offs involved in this balance institutionally invisible, both internally and externally, until 
disaster struck.
For this reason, the prescriptions arising from our research essentially point towards recovering the organisational 
capability to make visible, to understand, and to accept or change the actual control-risk trade-off. Many 
practitioners now articulate this in terms of organisational clarity about the nature and enforcement of risk 
appetite and we observe that this plays a large part in many risk culture reform agendas.
Our research reveals that, underlying this fundamental question of balance, our participant organisations were 
also grappling with several other signi!cant trade-offs as they sought to address risk culture. Unlike a number 
of consulting frameworks, we do not regard one side of these trade-offs as necessarily ‘healthier’ than another. 
Rather they provide a conceptual framework, arising out of our data, which allows us to describe the variety of 
approaches by our participant organisations. 
These trade-offs also provide a way of framing some of the challenges that CROs, CEOs and Boards need to 
consider.
The swing back to the centralisation of risk management
Our research suggests that the risk culture debate is symptomatic of a desire to make risk and risk management 
a more prominent feature of organisational decision-making and governance. The pendulum has swung towards 
an increase in the centralisation of risk management within !nancial organisations. This is understandable given 
the events of 2007-9. We observe three interrelated dimensions of this shift. 
Greater structural formalisation of a ‘Three Lines of Defence’ (TLD) model
The creation of new risk oversight units and capabilities
Increased attention to risk information consolidation and aggregation
Underlying this general change in the regulatory and organisational climate are a number of speci!c trade-offs 
which de!ne and are fundamental to the way organisations think about and seek to act upon their risk cultures. 
We have documented the variety of ways in which organisations have consciously and unconsciously addressed 
these six trade-offs, often mixing approaches. We outline some key challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards arising 
from these trade-offs.
Business partner or independent advisor?
The authority of the risk function is a core attribute of risk culture. We observed two approaches to increasing the 
footprint of risk within organisations. Partnership builders sought to engage directly with the business, seeking 
to position themselves as trusted advisors. Partnering overseers looked to in"uence the business via risk training 
programmes and general awareness-raising activities. The former approach involves acting on the capabilities 
of the risk function and in developing greater business "uency and credibility. The latter involves acting on 
the capabilities of the business itself. Both approaches, which are often mixed together, confront ‘Three Lines 
of Defence’ (TLD) frameworks which value and promote the independence of the second line risk function. 
Managing this trade-off between business partnering and structural independence is one among several key 
challenges.
Executive Summary
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Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 How would you monitor changes in the internal authority of the risk function? 
 If you don’t want to do this, why not?
 Is the current balance between informal relationship building and formal training of the business in risk
 understood and consciously chosen? Does the risk function have a role in the design and implementation 
 of risk training programmes? 
 Are you recruiting and training risk managers in the different languages of the business or is there still 
 an underlying mono-culture within the risk function? In the latter case, have you ever discussed your 
 perception of such culture with colleagues in the risk function? 
 Do you generate stories of risk management success and value creation and ensure that they circulate 
 within the organisation and with regulators? Considering the last year, how many of these success 
 stories can you recall?
Informal network building or formal processes?
Regular interaction and ‘touch points’ between risk functions and the business are widely agreed to be important 
and not only in !nancial services. We observed interaction enthusiasts and realists. The former are wary of formal 
tools on their own, and invest time and resource in building informal internal networks. Realists suggest that too 
much interaction can inhibit decision-making. They also support the role of technology in mediating interaction - 
as did our comparator airline. Realists have more respect for TLD models than enthusiasts who continually work 
across !rst and second lines. Despite accepting its salience, none of our participant organisations tried to measure 
risk-business interaction and there seemed to be little ambition to do so.
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 Can you name one or two individuals doing risk culture relevant work in your organisation? If yes, where 
 are they (e.g. risk, audit, business)? How often have you talked to them? Do you feel you give them
 enough support? 
 Would you be interested to know whether and how interaction between your risk function and the 
 business is changing? If so, how could you !nd this out?
 Do you track how many times business functions approach Risk for advice and partnering? If not, why not?
 If you have implemented a TLD approach in your organisation, do you think this has made interaction 
 between the business and Risk more or less likely? 
 Are you worried about a lack of interaction between Risk and the business? If yes, why? Can you think 
 of concrete examples of situations where more interaction would have helped to address business 
 problems? Or examples where too much interaction has slowed decision-making?
 Do you consciously translate risk appetite issues into a language which business units can understand 
 and own?
Executive Summary
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Between risk and control?
We observed that the clarity and enforcement of trading limits was regarded as a core feature of risk culture 
across all our participant organisations. However, we detected subtle differences in approach and attitude to 
limits. ‘Sandbox guardians’ (a phrase we heard during our research) position limits as a means to an end and 
have a business decision facing approach to the enforcement of limits. In contrast, for what we call ‘gold-platers’ 
(another term we heard used frequently), limits and related risk management policies and rules unintentionally 
become a system in their own right. Speci!c organisational inclinations one way or another were strongly 
in"uenced by their own histories and collective memories of bad practice. From the comparator airline it also 
became apparent that the propensity to invest in knowledge of risk is a risk appetite and risk culture issue.
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 How do you get assurance that the risk function is focused primarily on supporting business decisions?
 Do you know which areas of the business are ‘gold-plated’ in terms of risk management and control? 
 If not, how will you !nd this out and what will you do about it?
 When risk limits and tolerances are changed, is the risk function a leader or a follower in this decision?
 Do you understand the appetite for acquiring risk knowledge in your organisation? 
 Have you ever discussed internally the implications for risk-taking and/or for your desired level of risk 
 appetite in acquisition strategies, particularly if you plan to buy entire teams from other organisations?
Internal change or the use of advisors?
Under pressure to engage in some kind of risk culture change programme, many organisations have had to 
make decisions about whether to use advisors or not. We discerned a difference between consulting sceptics and 
enthusiasts. Sceptics had a mixed set of attitudes: a recognition that change processes must be owned internally 
to be effective over time, scepticism about formal survey instruments in the market; and a feeling that advisors 
were primarily selling regulatory compliance. Enthusiasts were also mixed: some were driven by regulation, while 
others sought leverage to develop new performance management systems with a risk component. Advisors 
themselves found risk culture a problematic consulting object. They were generally dissatis!ed with existing 
approaches and recognised the need for a mix of skills. They were also searching for new ways to advise on 
decision-making processes.
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 Does your organisation essentially have respect for advisors? Are you open to advisory propositions? 
 How often have you been contacted by advisors in relation to risk culture in the last three months? How 
 often have you found their proposals novel or of any interest?
 Do you have processes to discuss the kind of expertise you may need, internally and externally, to 
 progress risk culture change? Do you have an appetite for benchmarking with external entities? If yes, 
 what have   you done about it?
 Have you ever approached the topic of risk culture in meetings attended by people from both HR and 
 Risk?  If you are a member of Risk, do you have access to raw data from internal staff morale surveys or 
 customer satisfaction surveys?
 Is your organisation open to exchanges with research organisations like universities? If not, are you sure
 of the reasons why? If so, when was the last time there was such an exchange?
Executive Summary
RISK CULTURE IN F INANCIAL ORGANISATIONS |  A RESEARCH REPORT 08
Own risk culture or regulatory culture?
Regulation has undoubtedly been a big driver of risk culture change programmes. Risk culture features in many 
regulatory speeches. We found that attitudes to regulation were mixed. Frustrated organisations talked about 
excessive documentary demands, how regulation was interfering with business decisions and how it was crowding 
out attention to the softer dimensions of risk culture. Co-operatively disposed organisations accepted the new 
regulatory climate and sought to work with this more actively. A key issue is whether !nancial organisations 
understand the extent of the regulatory footprint on their business. The trade-off between their own approach 
to risk culture and that of the regulator is not even visible to many organisations. It also became apparent to us 
that there is a regulatory sub-culture in the sense of a network spanning parts of regulators, parts of !nancial 
organisations and parts of advisors who share common values. More research into the characterictics of this 
network is needed. 
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 Does your organisation genuinely respect the public objectives of the regulatory function? Do you have 
 positive ‘regulation conversations’ internally? How often? Who is participating in such conversation (e.g.
 business, risk, compliance; senior or junior members of staff)?
 Do you push back and challenge the regulator? If not, do you know why not? 
 If you think regulatory demands for documentary evidence are excessive, do you have a clear conception 
 of what you would require in the absence of regulation?
 Do you have ways of tracking the extent to which regulation is ‘inside’ your organisation? Do you have 
 any processes to track the impact of regulation on work habits and internal attitudes to risk? Would 
 you like to know?
 Do you know how compliance experts are regarded in your organisation? If so, do you want to change 
 that? If not, do you want to know?
Levers on behaviour: ethics or incentives?
Behaviour modi!cation is another key issue for risk culture change programmes. We noted two generically 
different approaches to behavioural risk. The !rst we call ethics or mission-based. It involves renewed corporate 
narratives for focusing on clients along with respect for internal control processes. Interestingly, risk management 
is being re-positioned as a carrier of organisational ethics. In contrast, organisations also invest in disciplinary and 
incentives-based levers with greater short term purchase over behaviour in the form of risk metrics within the 
performance management system. 
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 Do you understand where in the organisation behavioural change is most necessary? 
 If not, how will you get it?
 Which combination of levers is most likely to be effective in bringing about that change? Is such a
 combination different in different parts of the organisation (e.g. functional areas or hierarchical levels)?
 How are you monitoring and measuring ‘respect’ for internal control and risk management?
Executive Summary
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Conclusions
Despite the apparent cynicism of the general public, our research demonstrates that !nancial services !rms are 
engaged in extensive programmes of internal reform with a view to changing their culture of risk-taking and 
control.
The different trade-offs which emerge from our data are not mutually exclusive. Issues about the authority of risk 
expertise, the extent of interaction between risk and the business, the clarity of risk appetite, the use of advisors, 
the commitment to ethical change and whether regulation casts a more signi!cant shadow over risk culture 
than is commonly acknowledged are all connected. At the same time organisations implicitly choose a balance 
between longer-term, organic processes of cultural change and shorter-term, more engineered and visible levers 
over behaviour. Our report also suggests that the TLD model, which has been promoted as a solution to the 
!nancial crisis, should be examined at more carefully and critically for its side-effects.
Any research report is limited in time and space, by its methods and by data availability. It is part of the culture 
of !nancial organisations that they are not naturally open to external researchers and we have been unusually 
fortunate with our participant organisations for the access they have afforded us, for their trust in our processes 
and for their candour in interacting with us for the public good. This is very much their report.
We hope that our study will provide additional awareness of the complex challenges facing CROs, CEOs and 
Boards who genuinely wish to in"uence the cultural conditions under which risk-taking and control activity 
happens in their organisations. Our principal prescription is that there is a need for !nancial organisations to be 
aware of the many trade-offs we have identi!ed – including what kind of relationship to have with the regulator 
- to monitor these trade-offs, and to make explicit decisions about them where possible, rather than allowing 
them simply to happen to the organisation. When it comes to risk culture, our report suggests that it is not only 
the level of risk-taking that was deviant in many organisations. It was also the lack of this organisational self-
knowledge and the authority to act upon it. 
We have documented a number of questions arising from our work as a pathway to achieving this awareness. We 
have not sought however to position our work as another advisory offering. The fact that the questions we pose 
are not easy to answer in a familiar practical way does not mean that they are not important. Indeed, we think 
they require the closest consideration.
Executive Summary
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Risk culture in !nancial organisations
Interest in the concept of culture has grown signi!cantly since the global !nancial crisis. The inevitable search for 
underlying causes and lessons learned has led certain in"uential commentators to conclude that culture had a 
key role to play in causing the crisis and that culture change, whatever this might be, is necessary to restore trust 
and to ensure that a similar crisis can never happen again (e.g. Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 
2013b; Walker, 2009; House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009). As Marcus Agius, chairman of Barclays, 
stated in October 2010: 
“…the leaders of industry must collectively procure a visible and substantive change in the culture 
of our institutions, so as fundamentally to convince the world once again that they are businesses 
which can be relied on.” (FT.com, 2010a) 
This view was reiterated by Stephen Hester, the then CEO of RBS, in 2012: 
“Banks must undergo a wholesale change in their culture and refocus their behaviour on meeting 
the needs of customers to restore trust in the industry.” (Reuters, 2012)
Equally it has been observed that culture is not just an industry level problem or one con!ned to the global 
!nancial crisis. Post-mortems on the failures of speci!c banks and other !nancial organisations, both following 
the !nancial crisis and in the light of more recent events such as payment protection insurance mis-selling, 
rogue trading and the LIBOR scandal (see Salz, 2013; Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2013a; 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2013; Ashby, 2011), have highlighted a range of micro-level cultural 
‘weaknesses’ within speci!c !nancial organisations. In"uential associations such as the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF) have even gone as far as to state that the:
“…development of a ‘risk culture’ throughout the !rm is perhaps the most fundamental tool for 
effective risk management.” (IIF, 2008)
Despite this widespread interest in the concept of culture, coupled with a growing acceptance of the fact that 
there is a relationship between the cultures of !nancial organisations and their risk management decisions, there 
remain more questions than answers. How does the culture of a !nancial organisation commonly in"uence its 
risk-taking and control decisions? What are the key factors that help to translate a !nancial organisation’s culture 
into tangible risk management and governance decisions (i.e. is it remuneration, reporting structures, professional 
ethics or something completely different)? Is it really possible to separately delineate ‘risk culture’ from culture 
in general? Can a distinction be made between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ risk cultures and, if so, what can !nancial 
organisations practically do to strengthen their risk cultures? And crucially, what can regulators and supervisors 
do to facilitate this strengthening process, if anything?
Chapter 1:
Background
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Therefore, while there is no doubt that culture, and more speci!cally risk culture, is the dominant aspect of the 
diagnostic discourses on recent !nancial crises and scandals (see Box 1 and Figure 1) it is not at all clear what 
!nancial organisations or their regulators should do in this space. It is not even clear whether changes in speci!c 
elements of risk culture in certain organisations will facilitate more effective risk-taking and control decisions; 
decisions that should ultimately lead to a better balance between needs of a diverse array of stakeholder groups 
(such as customers, shareholders, creditors, regulators, etc.) and the achievement of an appropriate level of 
!nancial return.
Box 1: Risk culture searches
To obtain a broad overview of the risk culture debate, searches were performed using a news media research tool 
(Nexis) along with site-speci!c searches. Speci!cally searches were performed of the following: 1) UK national 
and regional newspapers (this included results related to the !nancial services sector only) 2) an online magazine 
covering risk issues (Risk Magazine) and 3) The websites of a range of regulatory agencies, professional bodies 
and consultancy !rms. In the case of 3 we not only used Google to help identify relevant sites, but also targeted 
the sites of key !rms/agencies (e.g. the ‘Big 4’ accounting !rms, the FSA, the Financial Stability Board, etc.).
The graph in Figure 1 summarises the ‘hits’ that we obtained for this phrase from each source (Nexis, and site 
speci!c ‘Practice’ searches). This con!rms a signi!cant expansion in the use of the term over the last ten years.
Figure 1: Risk culture searches
A practical understanding of risk culture 
Although many unanswered questions remain, there has nevertheless been considerable activity on the topic of 
risk culture. For some years now consulting organisations have developed and re!ned a range of white papers 
and survey instruments which seek to make risk culture more visible and therefore more manageable. 
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More recently professional and industry level institutes have also developed guidance (notably: IRM, 2012; IIF, 
2009) and even regulators are beginning to make some tentative policy and supervisory steps in the area (e.g. 
Adamson, 2013; FSB, 2013a; Group of 30, 2012; PRA, 2013aandb; Basel 2011). We cover all of this work in more 
detail in our practitioner literature review (see Appendix C).
What is also notable is that, during the life of this project (from May 2012 to July 2013), there were several 
inquiries into speci!c !nancial organisation failures, speci!cally: the bail-out of HBOS (Parliamentary Commission 
on Banking Standards, 2013a), the JP Morgan Whale Trading case (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 
2013) and the Barclays LIBOR scandal (Salz, 2013). 
In each report, detailed analyses were conducted of the underlying causes of these events of the lessons that 
need to be learned. Risk culture was a key theme in each report although some very different weaknesses in the 
risk cultures of these organisations are identi!ed, ranging from the presence of deviant sub-cultures in the cases 
of Barclays and JP Morgan to a strong, but over-con!dent corporate risk-taking culture in the case of HBOS. 
However there are also striking similarities in their chosen themes, such as weak federal governance models with 
marginalised central risk functions, a systemic tolerance of limit breaches and ‘brash’ and aggressive ‘tones from 
the top’. For example, Salz observed: 
“The institutional cleverness, taken with its edginess and a strong desire to win, made Barclays 
a dif!cult organisation for stakeholders to engage with. Barclays was sometimes perceived as 
being within the letter of the law but not within its spirit. There was an over-emphasis on short-
term !nancial performance, reinforced by remuneration systems that tended to reward revenue 
generation rather than serving the interests of customers and clients. There was also in some parts 
of the Group a sense that senior management did not want to hear bad news and that employees 
should be capable of solving problems. This contributed to a reluctance to escalate issues of 
concern.” (Salz, 2013: 7)
Reports into HBOS and JP Morgan reached similar conclusions regarding their cultural dispositions towards 
aggressive performance objectives and an apparent disregard for risk:
“The strategy set by the Board from the creation of the new Group sowed the seeds of its 
destruction. HBOS set a strategy for aggressive, asset-led growth across divisions over a sustained 
period. This involved accepting more risk across all divisions of the Group. Although many of the 
strengths of the two brands within HBOS largely persisted at branch level, the strategy created a 
new culture in the higher echelons of the bank. This culture was brash, underpinned by a belief 
that the growing market share was due to a special set of skills which HBOS possessed and which 
its competitors lacked.” (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2013a: 8)
“In contrast to JPMorgan Chase’s reputation for best-in-class risk management, the whale trades 
exposed a bank culture in which risk limit breaches were routinely disregarded, risk metrics 
were frequently criticised or downplayed, and risk evaluation models were targeted by bank 
personnel seeking to produce arti!cially lower capital requirements.” (Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations, 2013: 7)
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Interestingly, the same period also saw the publication in the United Kingdom of a damning report into the Mid 
Staffordshire National Health Trust which observed that:
“Culture has played a signi!cant part in the development of the problems to be seen in this Trust. 
This culture is characterised by introspection, lack of insight or suf!cient self-criticism, rejection 
of external criticism, reliance on external praise and, above all, fear....from top to bottom of this 
organisation. Such a culture does not develop overnight but is a symptom of a long-standing lack 
of positive and effective direction at all levels. This is not something that it is possible to change 
overnight either, but will require determined and inspirational leadership over a sustained period 
of time from within the Trust.” (Francis, 2013: 184)
Similarly the January 2011 US Presidential Inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon spill concluded:
“Absent major crises, and given the remarkable !nancial returns available from deepwater 
reserves, the business culture succumbed to a false sense of security. The Deepwater Horizon 
disaster exhibits the costs of a culture of complacency... There are recurring themes of missed 
warning signals, failure to share information, and a general lack of appreciation for the risks 
involved. In the view of the Commission, these !ndings highlight the importance of organisational 
culture and a consistent commitment to safety by industry, from the highest management levels 
on down.” (National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 
2011: 9)
So it would seem that (risk) culture is not a ‘problem’ which is unique to !nancial services. Instead it is increasingly 
recognised that the culture of any organisation can affect its risk-taking and control decisions in both positive and 
potentially negative ways. Yet perhaps the cultures of organisations in no other sector have the ability to affect 
the economic health of nations in such a signi!cant way as that of the !nancial services institutions.
In summary, problems of culture in organisations have become a prominent form of diagnosis in the period since 
2009 and not only in the !nancial sector (see Atkins et al., 2012). In our view, risk culture is not a separate kind 
of thing to culture in general. It is rather a speci!c kind of framing of the culture problem, allowing general 
concerns about culture to focus on risk-taking and risk control activities. Accordingly, we think the search for a 
clear distinction between culture and risk culture is pointless. Semantics aside there is no doubt that a risk culture 
industry has been generated in recent years, fuelled by a mix of advisors, regulators and professional associations 
all generating thinking and guidance in a new practice space. We include more details of this explosion of 
practitioner literature in Appendix C. In the next chapter, on our approach to studying risk culture, we draw 
attention to some of its intellectual foundations. 
Chapter 1: Background
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Whilst there is a copious practice literature on risk culture (Chapter 1 and Appendix C), we noticed the lack of 
explicit academic research on the topic (Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998, Simons, 1999, Power, 2007: 175-8; Ashby 
et al., 2013 are the notable exceptions). This is not surprising since practice often precedes academic analysis 
because of lengthy publishing lead times. Nonetheless, there is a substantial body of academic literature that 
is relevant to our investigations and which has shaped our approach and prior beliefs about the nature of risk 
culture. We critically review work in the area of ‘organisational culture’, which, as we explain below, seems to 
have informed many of the practice outputs (Appendix C). In addition, we review insights from research on 
safety and organisational incidents, accounting and culture and management control systems. We think that 
these strands of academic work add signi!cant insights to the analysis of risk culture as a complex organisational 
phenomenon. 
Review of the literature outlined below has shaped our research approach to the study of a relatively unexplored 
and emerging !eld of practice. It has also allowed us to build an understanding of speci!c organisational issues 
and themes that provide a good point of entry to explore risk culture in !nancial organisations. 
In the following sections we report key insights from our literature review and how they informed our approach 
to risk culture, data collection and analysis. A complete list of references is provided in Appendix A. We should 
also re-emphasise at the outset our underlying assumption that culture and risk culture are not two separate and 
distinct things which must be de!ned separately. Rather, the interest in risk culture is a way of framing cultural 
issues from a risk point of view. In other words it is a way of thinking about the cultural dimensions of risk-taking 
and control.
Organisational culture and risk culture
The topic of organisational culture started to become popular in academic writings from the early 1980s onwards. 
Barley and colleagues (1988) noted an exponential rate of growth in the total number of papers published 
annually on organisational culture, from less than twenty in 1979 to about 130 in 1985. 
Unsurprisingly, different perspectives and research approaches emphasise different aspects and implications 
of organisational culture. Culture can be related to leadership, learning and performance, but also to control, 
ideology and oppression. Table 1 provides key insights on selected de!nitional work on organisational culture. 
Chapter 2:
Our Approach
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Chapter 2: Our Approach
Contributions on organisational culture can be presented in a 
continuum where, on the one hand, we have those that take 
a more objectivist and functionalist perspective, anchoring 
culture to the concrete experiences of groups of individuals 
facing internal and external problems (e.g. Schein, 2010, 
Quinn and Cameron, 2011) while, on the other hand, we 
have those that take a more subjectivist and non-functionalist 
perspective, shifting the focus from actual practices to 
mindsets and expectations (e.g. Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Put in a very schematic manner, the !rst approach sees 
culture as ‘how we do things around here’ while the second 
sees culture as ‘what we expect around here’ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007: 115). The former approach puts great 
emphasis on the capacity for action of organisational leaders and top managers. The well-known work by Schein, 
for instance, presents ‘leadership’ and ‘culture’ as interlinked phenomena. The latter approach is by contrast much 
more sceptical in relation to the centrality of top managers in driving organisational culture within organisations 
(see Box 2).
De!nition
Pettigrew, 
1979
“In order for people to function within any given setting, they must have a continuing 
sense of what that reality is all about in order to be acted upon. Culture is the system 
of such publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a given group at a 
given time ... The offspring of the concept of culture are symbol, language, ideology, 
belief, ritual, and myth.” (p. 574)
O’Reilly and Chatman, 
1986
“A system of shared values (that de!ne what is important) and norms that de!ne 
appropriate attitudes and behaviors for organisational members (how to feel and 
behave).” (p. 160).
Kunda, 
1992
“When applied to organisational settings, culture is generally viewed as the shared 
rules governing cognitive and affective aspects of membership in an organisation, and 
the means whereby they are shaped and expressed.” (p. 8)
Alvesson, 
2002
“Culture is not primarily ‘inside’ people’s heads, but somewhere ‘between’ the heads 
of a group of people where symbols and meanings are publicly expressed, e.g. in work 
group interactions, in board meetings but also in material objects.” (p. 3-4)
Schein, 
2010 [1985]
“The culture of a group can now be de!ned as a pattern of shared basic assumptions 
learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to 
be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation 
to those problems” (p. 18)
Cameron and Quinn, 
2011
“An organisation’ s culture is re"ected by what is valued, the dominant leadership 
styles, the language and symbols, the procedures and routines, and the de!nitions of 
success that make an organisation unique.” (p. 22)
Box 2:  An “anti-management” perspective
“What is pretended to be a technical, 
practically oriented knowledge interest is 
really often an ideological one: the appeal 
lies in appealing to fantasies of being in the 
elite, of being grandiose and omnipotent.” 
(Alvesson, 2002: 172)
Table 1: De!nitions of organisational culture
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The design and implementation of new tools to help organisations engineer a ‘good’ organisational culture 
have become increasingly popular, especially among contributions that embrace an objectivist and functionalist 
perspective. These tools take the form of technocratic instruments of diagnosis and intervention such as surveys, 
frameworks and scorecards. A good example of this approach to the analysis and management of organisational 
culture is the work by Cameron and Quinn (Diagnosing and Changing Organisational Culture, 2011). According 
to the authors, organisational culture is “the most important competitive advantage” that companies have. They 
assert that “it is dif!cult to name even a single highly successful company, one that is a recognised leader in its 
industry, that does not have a distinctive, readily identi!able organisational culture” (p. 5). Many organisational 
changes do not work because companies do not explicitly address organisational culture as part of the change 
projects. Hence, their book aims to help individuals and organisations to adopt effective ways of diagnosing and 
changing culture in order to enhance performance. They propose a comprehensive framework that helps with 
organising and highlighting the congruence of various aspects of managerial and organisational behaviour. They 
also work on culture pro!ling, providing a tool that helps in understanding how an organisation compares with 
comparable companies and how change in organisational culture may be targeted. 
Besides this speci!c example, frameworks and surveys that are supposed to help organisations to change and 
manage their culture are particularly popular in the academic (and practice) literature. It is possible to distinguish 
so-called ‘typing’ surveys, which classify organisations into particular taxonomies, and pro!le surveys, which 
are concerned primarily with the description of an organisation’s culture and which categorise organisations 
in terms of multiple categories of norms, behaviours, and values or beliefs (see, for review, Ashkanasy et al., 
2000). These instruments are used with the intent to highlight the congruence of various aspects of managerial 
and organisational behaviour. They explore differences and similarities between comparable organisations and 
indicate how risk culture change might be targeted. 
Comparing these views on organisational culture and our review of the practice literature (Chapter 1 and Appendix 
C), we notice how most of the practice literature on risk culture tends to adopt an underlying conception of 
culture that is objectivist (culture is anchored in systems, structures, and other objective features), functionalist 
(‘good’ culture promotes the effectiveness and performance of the organisation) and pro-management (‘good’ 
culture can be changed and engineered by leaders). Understandably, this practice-based literature views culture 
from a management perspective, describing it as something that an organisation has (just like any asset) and 
which has a limited number of (usually) measurable and tangible dimensions. From this it seems to follow that 
there are some ideal elements of an ‘effective’ risk culture, towards which !nancial organisations should strive 
(e.g. IIF, 2009).
Indeed, many advisory !rms offer risk culture project management services to help ensure improvements – based 
on gap analyses between an organisation’s current culture and the perceived ideal. We observe in many instances 
a desire to reduce risk culture to some kind of multi-factor personality pro!le, which is then used to both analyse 
the collective risk attitudes and risk management behaviours of an organisation’s decision makers, and also to help 
change these behaviours for the ‘better’, whatever this might mean. To this end, there are substantial overlaps 
between the frameworks and tools illustrated in practice outputs and survey-type instruments illustrated in the 
academic literature on organisational culture (see, for review, Ashkanasy et al., 2000). An indicative example is 
the recent work on risk culture promoted by the Institute of Risk Management (IRM). A component of the so-
called IRM risk culture framework uses the instrument developed by Goffee and Jones (1998) to measure how 
individual values, beliefs and attitudes towards risk contribute to and are affected by the wider overall culture of 
an organisation. 
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In general, the practice literature on risk culture draws heavily 
on comprehensive frameworks, diagnostic tools and pro!ling 
instruments. This emphasis on pro!ling organisations or 
groups of individuals also made the so-called Cultural Theory 
of Risk, developed by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), an 
appealing reference point within the practice-based literature. 
Although this work has different conceptual foundations 
from organisational culture survey instruments, it shares 
an ambition to categorise different types of cultures. The 
Cultural Theory of Risk identi!es four possible types of culture 
– hierarchical, individualistic, egalitarian and fatalistic – suggesting that each cultural type pays attention to risks 
in different ways. The message that is often picked up in practice outputs is that it is important for companies 
to recognise the presence of these four cultural types in order to explain the disagreements that may arise as 
adherents of the different cultures defend their perspective. Box 3 provides an excerpt from the IRM report on risk 
culture, which illustrates the application of cultural theory.
The ambivalence of risk culture(s)
It is clear that if risk culture is to be ‘managed’ in any ordinary sense of that term, then it must necessarily be 
reduced and simpli!ed to some observable properties that can be acted upon and audited by others, such as 
regulators (Power, 2007). However, this reductivist approach to risk culture is also rather narrow. Both culture and 
risk are complex multi-dimensional concepts, so while certain organisations may !t the narrow risk culture pro!les 
that have been identi!ed, many others will not. This issue is likely to be especially acute in the !nancial services 
sector, where there is a wide variety of organisations (large-small, domestic-international, proprietary-mutual, 
etc.) working in a range of markets (retail, commercial, investment, insurance, etc.). 
Moreover, equating managing culture with changing culture may underestimate organisational complexity (see 
Alvesson, 2002). First, change can have negative cultural consequences (for instance, consider organisational 
change initiatives stressing downsizing and delayering); second, explicit cultural change initiatives are likely to 
arise while other continuous changes are taking place (e.g. new persons replacing others, people getting older 
and retiring) which are culturally relevant. Hence, a carefully planned project management approach to cultural 
change may not work since it addresses a moving target.
Speci!cally, we are somewhat sceptical of the strong practical focus on ‘new’ tools to measure and manage risk 
culture even though we understand why this approach is adopted. First, the tool-making space seems to be 
highly populated and therefore we assume organisations can already !nd tools that suit their needs rather than 
adopt a new kind of management product. Indeed, many risk culture products are adaptations of existing tools 
and techniques. Second, prior work (Power, 2007, drawing inter alia on Weick, 1993) suggests that risk culture 
tools (e.g. surveys, measures, frameworks) inevitably reduce complexity up to a point where risk culture measures 
become the primary focus of managerial and regulatory attention, rather than being used as proxies and stimuli 
for organisational conversations.
This complex relationship between objects of measurement and measurement tools is explored in a range of 
studies in the accounting literature (e.g. Dent, 1991; Ahrens, 1997; Bhimani, 2003). This work shows how
Chapter 2: Our Approach
Box 3: Hierarchists vs. fatalists
Hierarchists will focus on establishing risk 
systems that de!ne risk appetite and clear 
risk-reward relationship. On the contrary, 
fatalists will have little faith in such initiatives 
as any risk system simply impedes them from 
reacting as circumstances change (IRM 2012)
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management accounting and performance measurement tools are not mere objective representations of an 
external reality, but that they actively contribute to changes in the organisational contexts in which they operate. 
So, new measurement tools do not just measure; they are the vehicle for new cultural values such as ‘pro!t-
oriented’, ‘"exible’, ‘customer- oriented organisations’, etc.
For example, the study by Dent (1991) shows how the idea 
of a ‘business railway’ became progressively concrete within 
an organisation operating in the transport sector in the UK. 
This happened through a combination of coincidental and 
gradual organisational changes, including the appointment 
of ‘business managers’ outside the main line-management 
hierarchy of the railway (see Box 4). The business managers 
started with a vague concept of a ‘business railway’, but over 
time they gradually secured increasing contexts for interaction, 
leveraging formal accounting systems and procedures that gave them the rights to participate in and in"uence 
decisions. The key point is that accounting systems embody particular assumptions about rationality, organisation, 
authority and expertise, and their use contributes to cultural changes in organisational knowledge and meanings.
In the context of our research approach, academic contributions such as these have two implications. First, they 
emphasise the episodic and coincidental nature of cultural change, a concept of organisational change that 
differs strikingly from the grand technocratic projects (drawing on the terminology used by Alvesson, 2002, Ch. 
8) described in some academic and practice work on organisational culture (e.g. Cameron and Quinn, 2011). 
Second, they suggest that decisions on the types of tools and approaches embraced to measure, manage and 
account for risk culture may not themselves be risk culture-neutral. Choosing both whether and how to measure 
is itself a culturally signi!cant decision which will shape how organisational actors think about and act upon their 
(perceived) risk cultures. Hence our starting position is that risk culture tools cannot be seen as detached from, 
or outside, the risk culture they promise to measure. They will instead contribute to shape risk culture as part of 
a wider organisational reality made of multiple and changing processes, actors and episodic events. In short, the 
adoption and use of risk culture tools can be revealing of risk culture(s), although not in the functionalist and 
objectivist sense envisaged by some academic contributions and by most of the practice outputs.
From this point of view, our approach differs from most of the prior contributions on risk culture. Like Alvesson 
(2002), we believe that academic work on (risk) culture can be signi!cant not in the form of providing ‘new’ 
tools to enhance organisational performance, but as a way of exploring organisational life in all its richness 
and variations. Rather than providing yet another formula or tool to assess what a good (risk) culture is and 
prescriptive rules to engineer it, our approach begins by examining how organisations think about risk culture, the 
reasons that led them to an increased preoccupation with risk culture, and the concrete work streams and change 
programmes that they put in place to make risk culture a visible and manageable issue in the organisation.
Consistent with the work of prominent organisation studies scholars (e.g. Weick, 1979; Alvesson, 2002), we 
approach (risk) culture by facing its ambivalence head on. Speci!cally, we frame this ambivalence in terms of 
how organisations deal with a number of trade-offs and tensions related to multiple and changing cultural 
manifestations, and the organising efforts that happen around them. As noted by Weick (1979), almost any 
system needs to incorporate ambivalence in order to remain both adaptable ("exibility) and to maintain its
Box 4:  Cultural acclimatisation
“We introduced it in an evolutionary way. 
We said: ‘Let’s appoint Business Managers 
and then let it evolve. Be patient and let 
it evolve’.” (Quote of a Chief Executive in 
Dent, 1991: 716)
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current adaptation (stability) (see Box 5). For example, as 
Alvesson (2002) suggests, organisational culture can provide 
a sense of meaning and direction, but, in so doing, it reduces 
autonomy and discretion. In other words, culture is useful for 
making complex interaction and coordination possible, but it 
is, at the same time, constraining and repressive. This is one 
of the many ambivalent manifestations and contradictions 
of culture and cultural change initiatives. A concrete 
example relates to the use of notions of decentralisation 
in organisational change initiatives. Alvesson (2002: 183-
184) notes that when senior managers give a speech before 
organisational redesign, they often invoke values such as 
‘decentralisation’ and ‘participation’. But, in giving speeches 
such as these, they paradoxically reinforce their hierarchical 
position and dominance over the organisation’s fate.
Risk culture as multiple trade-offs
The necessity of trade-offs in organising around (risk) culture 
is reinforced by issues raised in a number of different bodies 
of literature on safety, organisational incidents and crises, and 
management accounting and control. 
Beginning with the safety literature, a foundational text on the 
management of the risks of organisational accidents (Reason, 
1997) outlines the key tension between ‘production’ and 
‘protection’. The argument is that the operations of almost 
any organisation are bounded by two dangerous extremes. 
Where protection exceeds the dangers posed by productive 
hazards, an organisation risks going out of business because 
protection consumes too many resources, i.e. people, money and materials. Later in this report, we refer to 
a similar notion – that of ‘gold-plating’ control. On the contrary, where protection falls short of the required 
productive safety, an organisation faces the risk of suffering a catastrophic accident (and again going out of 
business). Therefore the survival of an organisation depends on the balance between production and protection 
concerns. However, this balance is likely to be constantly subject to changing local circumstances and pressures, 
such as prior incidents and the "uctuating availability of !nancial resources (see Box 6). 
A practical example of a trade-off that characterises decisions around safety-related arrangements can be found 
in an analysis of the BP Texas Re!nery disaster (Hopkins, 2009). The author suggests that decentralisation, which 
in most cases is seen as a ‘good’ thing, as it allows decisions to be taken at the site or local business level, in fact 
undermined process safety. The argument is that decentralisation makes it dif!cult to hold individual business 
units accountable for process safety performance, since major accidents are rare events. As individual sites rarely 
experience a major accident, managers naturally become complacent with respect to the management of major 
hazards. 
Box 5: Ambivalence and banking
“’To make money you have to lend it rather 
than store it.’ Having realised this, the bank 
then acts as if that knowledge is both true 
and false. It acts as if the statement is true by 
continuing to select from enacted inputs those 
occasions where there is an opportunity to lend 
at a pro!t. It acts as if the statement is false by 
urging customers to be thrifty and use the bank 
as a repository for the results of that thrift. It 
is good to save and bad to borrow, it’s good 
to borrow and bad to save. That complicated 
de!nition is something that a bank must 
manage as a continuous routine matter.” 
(Weick, 1979: 222)
Box 6: Production vs. protection in practice
“Almost every day, line managers and 
supervisors have to choose whether or not to 
cut safety corners in order to meet deadlines 
or other operational demands. For the most 
part, such short cuts bring no bad effects and 
so can become an habitual part of routine 
work practices. Unfortunately, this gradual 
reduction in the system’s safety margins 
renders it increasingly vulnerable to particular 
combinations of accident-causing factors.” 
(Reason, 1997: 5)
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Moving to work on organising under conditions of crisis, the work of Weick and colleagues (Weick, 1990, 1993; 
Weick and Roberts, 1993) emphasises the ‘necessity for talk’, continuous interaction and abandoning hierarchy 
during a crisis. From this point of view, risk management can be seen as an on-going organisational conversation 
sustained among key actors. More interaction, open communication and ‘speaking up’ are seen as a good 
thing that should be encouraged. So in relation to the need 
for interaction it would seem that there is less disagreement 
between the non-functionalist academic literature and 
practitioner work on risk culture, which is also in favour of 
more communication, raising red "ags, openness to ‘bad 
news’, etc. However, Weick and colleagues importantly qualify 
the value of interaction. They develop concepts of ‘heedful 
interrelating’, ‘collective mind’, and ‘respectful interaction’ to 
characterise the type of interaction that can be bene!cial. This 
is in fact opposed to a more simple view of ‘let’s just talk more’ 
(see Box 7). Therefore, it is not only the level of interaction 
about risk but also the type of interaction, how and when it 
happens that matters to risk culture.
The emphasis on the right kind of interaction about risk can 
be seen in partial contrast to the emphasis on a consistent 
‘tone from the top’ or the ‘heroic’ risk champion (e.g. a CEO 
changing the culture) that is often idealised in the practice 
literature on risk culture. A culture that encourages individualism, survival of the !ttest and ‘can do’ reactions will 
often neglect attentive practices of representation and interaction (Weick and Roberts, 1993) – an observation 
which seems to have prima facie relevance for the !nancial services industry. Finally, risk management as a 
sustained and on-going conversation also poses challenges of documentation, accountability and auditability, 
which became in the last decade prominent issues within the regulatory and managerial spheres (Power, 2007). 
So even where interaction is regarded as an important dimension of risk culture, there are trade-offs between the 
right kind of attention and ‘mere talk from the top’, and between interaction as continuous and on-going, and 
the regulatory need for documentary traces.
The authority and expertise of risk personnel is another 
theme that presents relevant trade-offs and tensions. A 
growing body of the literature has explored the role of the 
risk managers in !nancial and non-!nancial organisations 
(e.g. Power, 2007; Mikes, 2011; Mikes et al., 2013). This 
body of work suggests a shift in the role of the risk manager, 
from the ‘technical expert’ of one or many sub-disciplines 
of risk management to the ‘business partner’ and ‘change 
facilitator’. Recent work (Mikes et al., 2013) shows that 
risk personnel can get the attention of top management 
in different ways, ranging from continuous personal 
interaction to the development and dissemination of new 
tools (see Box 8). The key point for our trade-off approach 
is that these choices are far from being uncontested. Whilst 
some may praise closer contacts
Box 7: Respectful interactions
Three imperatives for social life (Weick, 1993: 
640-643):
Respect the reports of others and be
      willing to base beliefs and actions on them
      (trust)
Report honestly so that others may use 
      your observations in coming to valid 
      beliefs (honesty)
Respect your own perceptions and beliefs 
      and seek to integrate them with the 
      reports of others without deprecating   
      them or yourselves (self-respect)
Box 8: How do risk experts gain in"uence?
Four types of risk experts (Mikes et al., 2013):
Compliance champions play an important
      regulatory role
Business partners “gain the ear of decision
      makers” through continuous personal 
      involvement
Technical champions make their tools 
      easily understandable (e.g. consultant-like 
      approach)
Engaged toolmakers develop new tools 
      that embody their expertise
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between risk functions and front-line business, others 
(regulators in particular) may be more sceptical, stating that 
risk people should maintain their independence.
Finally, the relevance of trade-offs is also evident in the 
literature on management accounting and control systems. 
Simons (1995) addressed the problem of how managers 
can exercise adequate control in organisations that demand 
"exibility, creativity and innovation. The problem is that 
employee initiatives that exploit opportunities and address 
customer demands should be welcome. But, at the same 
time, the pursuit of some opportunities can create excessive 
risk exposures and lead to corporate failure. To manage this 
tension, Simons suggests that managers can draw on four 
‘levers of control’. Traditional diagnostic controls, which 
emphasise the alignment of results to expected targets, 
can be complemented by: interactive controls that open 
organisational dialogue to encourage learning, belief systems that communicate core values and mission of the 
organisation and boundary systems that specify and reinforce rules to be followed and risks to be avoided. Simons 
(1999) expanded his work on the levers of control by introducing the so-called ‘Risk Exposure Calculator’ (see 
Box 9). This tool suggests that ‘risk culture’ may be analysed in terms of three key variables: the balance between 
entrepreneurial risk-taking and demands for control, how organisations deal with executive resistance to ‘bad 
news’ and the degree of internal competition and performance pressure. In relation to the trade-off idea, it is 
signi!cant that high and low scores can be seen as equally problematic. As put by Simons (1999: 87), “innovative, 
successful companies invariably create risk pressure. If your business scores in the safety zone, perhaps it’s time 
to take some calculated gambles.”
To summarise, borrowing from insights and !ndings of different literatures (safety, accounting, risk management, 
organisational crises), our approach to the investigation of risk culture is primarily oriented towards the different 
trade-offs, tensions and contradictions which are at stake in making it operational. Figure 2 suggests that what 
may be seen as indicative of a good ‘risk culture’ (e.g. more protection and controls, more and closer interaction) 
may have a number of unintended consequences. A key issue for !nancial organisations to be explored in this 
report is the extent to which they are aware of these different trade-offs and therefore explicitly decide to be 
where they are or whether the trade-off is arrived at implicitly and unintentionally.
Box 9: How risky is your company?
Simons’ Risk Exposure Calculator (1999) is 
composed of 12 keys that re"ect different 
sources of pressure for a company. Managers 
should score each key from 1 (low) to 5 (high). 
‘Alarm bells’ should be ringing if the total score 
is higher than thirty-!ve. The keys are: pressures 
for performance, rate of expansion, staff 
inexperience, rewards for entrepreneurial risk-
taking, executive resistance to bad news, level 
of internal competition, transaction complexity 
and velocity, gaps in diagnostic performance 
measures, degree of decentralised decision-
making.
Yes, but what about
innovation, creativity and
entrepreneurship?
Avoid reckless risk taking:
More control on individuals'
risk taking is ‘good’...
Risk Expertise
Entrepreneurial
Risk-Taking
Yes, but what about
independence, authority and
expertise?
Risk managers as business
partners: Closer relation to the
front line is ‘good’…
Interaction
Yes, but how does more
interaction relate to ‘can do’
cultures? Which has implications for
documentation and accountability?
Risk management as on going
organisational conversation:
More interaction is ‘good’…
Production vs
Protection
Yes, but can too much
protection consume too
many resources?
Limit the dangers posed by
productive hazards. Increasing
protective measures is ‘good’…
Figure 2: Trade-offs
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Thinking risk culture(s): our approach
In the previous sections we argued that we !nd current approaches to the study of risk culture narrow because 
of their focus on the measurement of risk culture, the pro!ling of a limited set of organisational variables and 
the prescription of a set of rules for ‘good’ risk culture. We also drew on several different academic literatures 
to reveal the signi!cance of the numerous trade-offs related to organising efforts around risk culture. Building 
on this analysis, we can summarise our approach and focus in the following way. Our approach to the study of 
(risk) culture can be de!ned as functionalist-neutral (we have no ambition to de!ne ‘good’ or ‘bad’ risk culture 
although our report is prescriptive in a number of other respects) and ‘bottom-up’ (we focus on how !nancial 
organisations think about risk culture and organise change processes). At the heart of this bottom-up investigation 
is the attempt to reveal the tensions and trade-offs related to different ways of organising around risk culture. Our 
assumptions about risk culture are minimal and modest (see Box 10) and re"ect ideas of ‘plurality’ (risk cultures 
as opposed to risk culture) and ‘drifting’ (change is continual in organisations and may be more or less loosely 
connected to speci!c risk culture change programmes).
There is a fundamental trade-off at stake in risk culture between risk control and risk-taking activities. This 
overarching trade-off is the basis of our simple visual conceptual model of risk culture in Figure 3. In a similar way 
to the tension between production and protection (as highlighted in the safety literature, see Reason, 1997) and 
the tension between entrepreneurial risk-taking and control (from the management control literature, see Simons, 
1995, 1999), the basic idea of our conceptualization is that both too much control and too little control can lead 
to mediocrity or lost opportunity (risk of bankruptcy) and catastrophe or value destruction (risk of catastrophe) 
respectively. This is a bandwidth model of risk culture, meaning the operational space between organisationally 
speci!ed levels of control and risk-taking. Reckless organisations are not necessarily high risk-taking organisations 
as such. They are rather those which violate their authorised bandwidth limits. In a similar vein, precautionary 
organisations may in fact operate beyond their authorised control propensity (i.e. the level of control - ‘gold-
plating’ - may hinder the achievement of business objectives). While the risk culture debate is primarily motivated 
by the spectre of reckless risk-taking, the bandwidth model is more neutral and symmetrical. It applies equally to 
the organisational violation of risk-taking and control boundaries.
Box 10: Our assumptions about risk culture
 Risk culture is not a static thing but a continuous process, or processes, which repeat and renew 
 themselves but may be subject to shocks.
 Risk culture will be a mixture of formal and informal processes. The former are easy to observe; the latter 
 are harder to observe since they involve a myriad of small behaviours and habits which in aggregate 
 constitute the state of risk culture at any one point in time.
 We do not assume either that an organisation has a single risk culture or that a risk culture may not be 
 trans-organisational. Conceptually we would prefer to speak of ‘risk cultures’ which may be unevenly 
 distributed within organisations (e.g. retail as compared with investment banking) or the !nancial 
 industry as a whole (e.g. insurers as compared with banks).
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Figure 3 is not intended as a prescriptive model of good risk culture in the sense of a speci!c balance between risk-
taking and control, but it is prescriptive in another sense. The model suggests that a good risk culture essentially 
involves clarity about the organisation’s target bandwidth or what might be called the desired net risk position. 
In the example in Figure 3, in both organisation A and organisation B there is a gap between the aspired and 
actual position in terms of risk control / risk-taking. Figure 3 is a simpli!cation but it suggests that what happens 
at both the aggregate organisational level and in speci!c settings matters. It also tries to recognise that in some 
organisations there may be greater homogeneity between different organisational units (e.g. organisation A 
in Figure 3) than in others (e.g. organisation B). Speci!c areas and hot spots may drive a business outside its 
prescribed ‘safe’ zone (e.g. unit B is leading organisation B beyond its target bandwidth). It follows from Figure 
3 that risk culture is partly a problem of clarity about, and commitment to the enforcement of bandwidth limits, 
which may be de!ned in risk appetite or tolerance policies.
Figure 3 also suggests it may be more useful for organisations to focus on the speci!c ‘stress points’ in risk 
cultures which might lead to a violation of bandwidth boundaries (e.g. hiring and promotion, performance 
planning and rewards, relations with regulators, new product development), rather than imagine that risk cultures 
matter equally in all parts of the organisation. 
From our desk research, literature reviews and preliminary !ndings (see our interim report, Ashby, Palermo and 
Power, 2012) we looked for further speci!c areas of investigation as good ‘bottom-up’ entry points to uncover 
the variety of cultural manifestations of risk culture around risk-taking and its control. The areas which emerged 
were: risk culture organisational change initiatives, risk personnel authority and expertise, internal touch points 
between risk functions and the business, interactions with external actors (e.g. consultants, regulators), and 
different investments in levers over behaviour. Table 2 summarises the intellectual origins of the !ve areas of 
investigation, outlining how they are potentially productive of insights about the trade-offs involved in organising 
around risk culture.
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Key insights, trade-offs and tensions Key Questions
Risk culture is often seen as part of 
organisational change initiatives. But 
organisational changes to modify culture 
can have unintended effects (e.g. 
decentralisation and process safety). 
Moreover, cultural change processes can 
be gradual, fortuitous and accidental 
rather than the rational deployment of a 
‘grand technocratic project’
What reasons lead organisations 
to an increased preoccupation 
with risk culture? What are the 
concrete work streams put in 
place to manage risk culture? Do 
these work streams emphasise 
technocratic change projects or 
organic change processes?
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Safety culture (Reason, 1997; 
Hopkins, 2010)
Organisational culture (e.g. 
Alvesson, 2002)
Accounting and culture (Dent, 
1991)
Literature (References)
Risk managers and chief risk of!cers 
can be seen as promoters of risk 
culture change initiatives. However, 
their authority and expertise is far from 
consolidated and uncontested.
What are the roles and ambitions 
of risk personnel in relation to risk 
culture? What type of expertise do 
risk managers use to work on risk 
culture?Ri
sk
 p
er
so
nn
el
 
au
th
or
ity
 a
nd
ex
pe
rt
ise
Risk management and 
accounting (Power, 2007; 
Mikes, 2009, 2011; Mikes et 
al., 2013)
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Interaction is seen as an important feature 
of risk and crisis management. Open 
communication and interaction can be 
seen as dimensions of ‘good’ risk culture. 
Yet the literature on organisational 
crisis suggests that what matters is the 
respect built through interaction between 
individuals. Moreover, continuous 
interaction may have dysfunctional 
consequences in terms of information 
overload and lack of accountability. 
What does the level of internal 
interaction tell us about respect, 
authority and cooperation between 
front-line and staff functions 
(including risk)? How does 
interaction change with respect 
to internal and external shocks? 
How is information escalated and 
information overload managed?
Management studies of 
organisational crises and 
accidents (Weick, 1990, 1993)
Management accounting 
and levers of control (Simons, 
1995, 1999)
Risk culture work can hardly be seen 
as separate from the distribution and 
changes in fashionable ideas driven 
by mass media, higher education, 
management books and consultants. 
Notably, whilst internal risk cultures will 
tend to expand organisational complexity, 
tools supplied by external agents may 
reduce complexity so that risk culture 
becomes a visible object of managerial 
and regulatory attention.
What types of tools are used by 
practitioners? Are they purchased 
externally or built in-house? How 
do consultants and regulators deal 
with issues of risk culture visibility 
and manageability?
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Risk management, 
accountability, auditing 
(Power, 2007)
Organisational culture 
(Alvesson, 2002)
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The literature on management control 
and organisational culture has described 
different levers to act on risk culture. 
Much of the recent discussion in the 
practice and regulatory literature is 
centred on diagnostic controls, rewards 
and sanctions. But the notion of 
organisational culture emphasises the 
relevance of values, norms and ethics. 
What are the pressure points in 
risk cultures? How do they affect 
risk cultures? What are the levers 
used by organisations to trigger 
behavioural change? What does 
trigger behavioural change?
Organisational culture (Schein, 
2010; Cameron and Quinn, 
2011)
Levers of control and pressure 
points (Simons, 1995, 1999)
Table 2: Areas of investigation
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Methods
Our methods are elaborated further in Appendix B. We decided at an early stage that our point of entry into risk 
culture was via corporate risk functions, working jointly with CROs and other relevant actors. We accept that this 
starting point is a limitation of our approach but we took the view partly on pragmatic grounds – these were 
the easier points of entry to organisations – and partly from a prior view that the risk function was most likely at 
the centre of risk culture change programmes and re"ective of them. In line with our bottom-up approach, we 
interviewed relevant actors in sixteen organisations, including consultants and often involving follow-ups. The 
interviews were unstructured other than being informed by the !ve themes in Table 2 above. The organisations in 
our small sample range from large providers of various types of !nancial services (e.g. insurance, investment and 
retail banking) operating on a global scale, to much smaller organisations operating locally in the UK. A total of 
more than sixty individuals have been met, of which most hold a senior position in the risk management area of 
the organisation (e.g. CRO or deputy CRO) (see Table 5 in Appendix B).
As a follow-up to the interview process we customised a short survey instrument to capture different aspects of 
risk-taking and risk control activities, which was administered in three organisations (two insurers and one bank). 
We then discussed the survey results with key staff in each of the three organisations within focus group settings 
with different organisational representatives present. These focus groups involved senior managers in a range of 
positions, including CEOs, CROs, Heads of Business Units, Internal Auditors and Compliance Of!cers.
An extended version of our questionnaire was also developed and administered within the membership of 
the Chartered Insurance Institute (CII) and the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA). These 
surveys enabled us to obtain extensive data from across a signi!cant sample of individuals working in the !nancial 
services sector. However, because of limitations of space we have not reported extensively on the results of these 
surveys in this report but they have been used to inform the analysis of some of !ndings from the interviews and 
focus groups.
Overall, our research approach has adopted mixed methods, being primarily informed by desk research of 
pertinent publicly available documents (see Appendix C), and interviews with relevant actors within !nancial 
organisations, consultancy !rms and regulatory bodies. Any research approach like this is necessarily imperfect 
and limited by the constraints of access, time and resources. Indeed, it is part of the culture of !nancial services 
that it is typically dif!cult to access for external researchers – although insurers and banks differ somewhat in this 
respect. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, we think our !ndings as detailed in the remainder of this report 
will be of interest and add to the richness of the current debate.
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As noted above, our approach combines insights from existing work on organisational culture with a bottom up 
approach to investigating the work streams that organisations have been undertaking in order to understand and 
enhance the cultural strength of their risk management activities. There has been unrelenting general pressure on 
!nancial organisations to pay more attention to their risk cultures – especially with the publication of a sequence 
of in"uential reports in 2012 and 2013 (as discussed in Chapter 1) – and the main body of our report documents 
some of the considerable variety of approaches visible in the work of our participant organisations. However, one 
theme seems common to, and underlies, all these change programmes – increased centralisation both of the risk 
function and of management control more generally. In the next section, we outline our !ndings with respect to 
this theme of increased centralisation. We then introduce the various trade-offs which will be explored in more 
depth in subsequent chapters.
Risk culture: the swing to centralisation
It might be reasonable to expect that an analysis of risk culture would begin by looking at ethics or incentives. 
And yet structural changes, including the increasing prominence of the ‘Three Lines of Defence’ model were a 
signi!cant aspect of our conversations about risk culture in !nancial organisations. Structures change over time 
and organisations go through cycles of centralising control and authority and then decentralising it again. As our 
background section above suggests, many of the problems experienced at !nancial organisations (e.g. Barclays, 
HBOS and UBS) could be traced in part to a fragmented risk management function with little capability of taking 
an aggregate view or exercising central organisational oversight. So it is not surprising that a reaction to these 
issues, both by organisations and their regulators, has been to strengthen central risk oversight and to have 
organisation-wide standards of risk management and control centrally enforced. Indeed, when it comes to risk 
culture the !rst moves seem to be structural in nature. 
However, centralisation has different faces and we observe that !nancial organisations have pursued this structural 
change agenda in three interrelated ways: 
1. by paying more attention to, and reproducing the so-called ‘Three Lines of Defence’
2. by creating new ‘risk oversight’ functions
3. by redesigning risk information and related "ows
Chapter 3:
Findings Overview
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The Three Lines of Defence (TLD)
As one interviewee put it, the mistake of the regulator in the past was to focus too much on ‘risk management’ 
and not enough on ‘risk oversight’. Since 2009, there has been much more focus on de!ning and operationalising 
‘risk oversight’ both as a responsibility of the Board and of central risk management functions. This view implies 
that risk management is primarily the job of the business lines themselves – the so-called ‘!rst line of defence’. 
Every other control function, such as audit and the risk management group itself, has a relationship of ‘oversight’ 
to the !rst line. This is the essence of what has come to be called the Three Lines of Defence model (TLD), 
although the board, external auditor and regulator might well be fourth, !fth and sixth lines of defence. The !rst 
line is the business itself with its own supervisory capacity to manage risks. The second line is broadly the central 
risk management function in a policy setting and advisory role, and the third line is the internal audit. 
Although TLD has become something of an orthodoxy, especially amongst regulators and consultants, we met 
few practitioners who thought about it in its pure form. This suggests that the model is not fully descriptive of 
organisational realities. It was clear to us that, while it provided some kind of ideal reference point or benchmark, 
it often did not !t the kinds of structure that many organisations wished to use. For example, one insurer identi!ed 
a tension between the !rst and second lines – the business and risk management – where information demands 
by the latter are sometimes perceived as excessive and non-value adding by the former. From this point of view it 
is better to load more risk management into the !rst line and reduce the oversight burden. At another insurer, the 
TLD was in an early stage of development in 2012 and the position of a Group CRO had only just been created. 
This CRO aimed to develop divisional CROs who would be !rmly embedded in the front-line management team 
but who would maintain independence by virtue of strong ‘dotted-line’ reporting to the central CRO. Similarly, 
another insurer wanted to place risk ‘players’ within businesses perceived as having looser controls, for instance 
acquisitions in which controls were more decentralised. At a regional building society, we also found challenges 
to TLD model and a richer conception of the role of the risk management function. The interviewee questioned 
herself: “So what am I? Am I the policeman, am I the friend, am I a critique?” 
An advisor to an Australian based bank noted the potential for con"ict between !rst line and second / third line 
control functions. This potential was especially relevant in periods of change, where there may be a misalignment 
between the expectations of these two groups. At the time of our discussion we learned that “lever of control 
functions” were being used to drive the shift towards a lower level of risk appetite. However not everyone in the 
front-line was ready for this change. This led to tensions while the two lines of defence went through a process 
of alignment. 
It was also acknowledged that a degree of tension between the !rst and second lines is healthy, if the second 
line is exercising an appropriate amount of challenge (something widely considered to be important to risk 
culture). But this challenge process involves a delicate balancing act. Too aggressive an approach can alienate 
the risk function from the business units; too much friendliness and they can become captured and end up ‘in 
bed with the business’. Another common pressure point between the !rst and second lines is, as we suspected, 
new product development. The group risk function at this bank has the power to block the development of new 
products, which creates tension with the front-line - who clearly do not appreciate having their ideas blocked. 
The problem here is that assessments of risk and return for new products are inherently subjective and open to 
cognitive bias - the risk function being more pessimistic about risk and return, relative to the front-line. These 
tensions suggest that risk culture is not only a question of structures and TLD. It also depends crucially on key 
individuals with the capabilities to operate credibly at the !rst / second line interface in hybrid ways. But this may 
not always be attractive to regulators who prefer a much more black and white distinction between these two lines.
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To summarise: TLD has become a norm by which the quality of risk management and risk oversight is being 
evaluated and judged. This despite the fact that this norm is not based on any clear evidence. In the case of 
HBOS there is even evidence to the contrary. According to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
(2013a), the presence of a centralised risk management function and apparently strong risk governance did 
nothing to prevent disaster. Furthermore, role tensions and ambiguities at the interface between the !rst and 
second line seem to be inherent in all the risk culture change programmes we encountered. While the distinction 
between !rst and second lines of defence was highly institutionalised in regulator and advisor thinking, it seemed 
to be unhelpful in addressing some of these more fuzzy issues. Rather than forcing key organisations into a 
standardised binary system like this, the policy issue may be to have greater awareness that this interface is 
a key space in which risk culture is enacted and that potential con"icts of interest and risks of capture should 
be managed with awareness, rather than blended out in the name of an ideal. This seems more in line with 
the operating reality of organisations, particularly those with large group structures, where unitary systems and 
processes can be in"exible and hard to enforce. We shall return to the TLD at several junctures in the analysis 
in later chapters but the discussion so far suggests that organisations face a decision about how to balance the 
purity of the TLD model which preserves the structural and perceived independence of the risk function, and the 
pragmatic modi!cation of this model to embed some risk capability in the business units.
Risk oversight
A number of advisory organisations have promoted the creation of new risk oversight functions. Although these 
new central units were in their early days of operation and the process was not without frictions, they were seen 
by their proponents as very important for enhancing risk culture. BANK_2 experimented by creating an entirely 
a new risk oversight function reporting directly to the board in the UK and headed up by a new, additional 
CRO with a greater degree of separation from the local CEO. In the UK the changes involved a long process of 
discussion with the regulator (the FSA) to position this new CRO as a pure risk oversight function. While the bank 
saw this restructuring as positively rebalancing the cult of the CEO which had been problematic at other banks, 
the idea of two CROs was harder to sell to the regulator. In many respects the new oversight structure was a 
kind of risk supervisory board. The new senior CRO now reports directly to the main (Group-level) board with 
the support of a small oversight team of experienced risk people, with diverse skills and knowledge, including in 
front-line business operations. The example suggests that structural changes and changes in expertise often go 
hand in hand. Indeed, structural changes may only work when they are supported by the right capabilities (see 
Chapter 4).
This speci!c initiative is of interest because its structural and role innovations cut across the TLD model and 
created tensions with the regulator. It also illustrates one particular path of centralisation – the creation of a new 
kind of oversight unit – which a number of other organisations have taken. Elsewhere, centralisation involved 
enhancing existing risk management functions. At the subsidiary of a global bank, we heard that a recent increase 
in risk management centralisation and control by the global head of!ce (especially in relation to operational risk) 
had taken place. Similarly, at the UK subsidiary of a major insurer, which had enjoyed more independence in the 
past, there was also an increase in group level control from overseas. Another insurer expressed the view that this 
kind of centralisation can be perceived as too bureaucratic, especially when new acquisitions must be absorbed 
in to the business.
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At INS_3 we heard that their own local crisis had preceded the !nancial crisis and resulted in a change of 
leadership at CEO level. Leading up to the organisation’s crisis there had been signi!cant offshore exposure and 
red "ags were raised, but overridden. The result was a decision to completely revamp the governance framework 
from 2010. The experience led naturally towards greater centralisation of governance and standard setting, 
particularly around integrated capital management. The guiding role of the parent company was reinforced via 
a transformation process that included a new manual of what could and could not be done, together with new 
policies and related compliance work. This new risk governance order involved members of the group executive 
team sitting in the different business boards. It also meant looking at big remuneration payments more critically.
Risk information management
The problems experienced at many !nancial organisations, such as UBS, Barclays and HBOS, reveal considerable 
informational fragmentation and a failure to consolidate risk information, sometimes even at the simplest level of 
counting types of assets and commitments. This was con!rmed to us during an interview at REG_1. The failure 
to connect up disparate sources of risk information is also dominant feature of the general analysis of disasters 
and accidents (Turner, 1978) and we were struck by the centrality of this theme in many !nancial organisations. 
The issue is not just technological; it is also organisational. We heard that the quality of risk data aggregation 
is a good ‘dip-test’ of the state of organisational risk culture. Monitoring and hygiene work of this kind is not 
glamorous but may be regarded as the foundation of organisational risk culture and a key work stream for the 
oversight units. One of our interviewees made a similar point in relation to keeping Business Continuity Plans 
(BCP) up to date. More generally, the maintenance of risk infrastructure in the form of policies, standards and 
authorities was also seen as an essential component of risk culture, providing central units with standards against 
which to enforce. 
Our enquiries revealed that risk information was not only important in "owing upwards to oversight functions. 
All our participant organisations were concerned to break down silos and to encourage lateral risk information 
sharing in one form or another. In one organisation, this took the form of an open system with the idea of 
repositioning risk reporting and moving it away from the extreme of ‘whistle-blowing’ and transforming it 
into internal knowledge sharing via a central data repository. This journey to openness would be achieved by 
organisation-wide training programmes because it was seen as important to avoid the wrong kind of reaction. 
At INS_1 the centralisation of information created ‘tighter control over big earners’ who were made to understand 
that their own rewards depended on the lower risk-return activities conducted elsewhere in the group. This is 
an example of how risk information centralisation supports a rational portfolio approach to the activities of 
the business as a whole and enables portfolio-relevant discussions with speci!c business units. Indeed, in one 
investment bank, a new oversight unit is actually called a ‘portfolio group’ because its role is to collect different 
information feeds from the business and to construct a group risk pro!le. At a large banking institution which 
escaped the worst exposures of the !nancial crisis, we heard that the micro-risk work on speci!c risk categories 
(liquidity, credit, operational risk, etc.) was well carried out, but that macro-level concentrations within and 
between these risk categories had not been well understood, and that this was now the focus of the new 
oversight unit. In addition, the unit was empowered to take ‘deep dives’ on speci!c issues of importance, using 
the data supplied by the !rst-line risk management function (see Chapter 4). 
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Summary
The !nancial services industry is not the only one in which trends towards greater centralisation are visible. At a 
large global industrial company which had experienced some major accidents in its recent history, we observed 
efforts to enhance central risk control on the basis of a new risk management framework regarded as a non-
negotiable aspect of operational practice, reinforced by videos and presentations by the CEO and CFO. Moreover, 
in the airline context, we learned that clear safety management required a high degree of knowledge based 
centralisation for operational risk management. 
Within !nancial services the pendulum has currently swung in favour of greater centralisation, and boards of 
!nancial entities want to be reassured by strong centralised group functions. However, this section has shown how 
centralisation involves a combination of different things such as new structural relations (e.g. TLD), new oversight 
units and greater integration of risk information. But centralisation is never perfect and stable. For example, 
where central functions are perceived as failing to react appropriately to upward "ows of information, these 
"ows may be inhibited in the future, as the local subsidiary attempts to wrestle back a degree of independence. 
Moreover, the current trend towards centralisation may only be temporary. The following quote, from a senior 
manager in INS_2 illustrates this point vividly: 
“… So you know, it shows that there is no right answer here, which is probably why organisations 
do tend to move from one model to another model. I saw that myself when I worked for [company 
name omitted], in the space of two years we sort of went from a centralised, a decentralised back 
to centralised again … you know and you sort of lost track where you were.”
In the context of this study, these different faces of centralisation provide the broad context for more speci!c risk 
culture change programmes. In the remainder of this chapter, we identify two broad styles of pursuing risk culture 
change and outline the trade-offs at stake in these change programmes. These trade-offs will be addressed in 
more detail in the following chapters.
Risk culture and trade-offs: an overview
There is a considerable variety of organisational approaches to risk culture. In some cases, it has involved incentivising 
desired behaviour by expanding performance metrics. In others changes have more of an ethical "avour. Some 
organisations have used consultants and other advisors while a number of organisations have adopted a do-it 
yourself approach to risk culture. We also have formed the impression that the composition of risk teams and 
their internal networks has become "uid around risk culture. Attention to risk culture involves expanding the list 
of usual suspects in the risk management arena and, speci!cally, human resource and remuneration specialists 
have found a seat at the table.
This observed variety, to be discussed in more detail in the remainder of this report, suggests that !nancial 
organisations are still !nding their way in !guring out their approach to risk culture. It also suggests that ‘risk 
culture’ is not a thing with well-de!ned features but something that organisations perform and pay attention to 
in different ways. We have been very wary of de!nitions in our investigation and we do not view the emerging
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!eld of risk culture as being standardised in the near future, a view that contrasts with some of the practitioner 
actors in this space. Indeed, we have seen that organisations are assembling approaches to risk culture from a 
variety of pre-existing operational elements and managerial routines – employee questionnaires, risk maps, KRI 
enhanced performance management templates (e.g. balanced scorecards) and so on. For some, this means that 
risk culture just becomes a new label for old wine, namely making enterprise risk management work properly. 
From this point of view, risk culture is in fact an empty and far from unique concept which draws heavily on 
conventional management thinking, and is !lled out and literally realised and operationalised by !nancial 
organisations via their established change programmes, a point borne out in our review of practitioner literature 
in Appendix C.
We understand why some academic commentators (e.g. Alvesson, 2002) suggest that culture cannot be managed 
in a conventional way, and as we note in chapter 4, we have some sympathy with this. But we don’t !nd this to 
be a helpful place start our investigations despite its salience. In our study we have preferred to observe, as best 
we could given our methods, the various efforts by organisations, including regulators, to bring risk culture into 
view and to make it real and subject to change. Despite the great variety of ideas and approaches to risk culture 
that we have encountered, we have found a number of patterns in our data. 
At a high level, we have detected a difference between what we call organic approaches to risk culture and more 
formal approaches which we call engineered programmes. These two categories – the organic and engineered - 
are ideal types but they help us to classify risk culture work streams in !nancial organisations at a high level. The 
former tend to be self-driven, over longer timescales, involving the consolidation of existing information sets, and 
a greater emphasis on interaction between risk and the business by organisations who generally have con!dence 
that their risk culture is in good shape. The latter are advisor and regulator driven, with more of a focus on short-
term change, using metrics and performance incentives by organisations who seek to ‘do something’ about risk 
culture.
Below this high level categorisation, we organise our detailed observations in terms of six recurrent tensions 
or trade-offs. Earlier in this report we made the preliminary and simplistic assumption that risk culture could 
be understood prescriptively as the organisational choice and self-understanding of its position in a trade-off 
between risk-taking and control. Furthermore, this trade-off can be thought of in terms of a bandwidth of 
acceptable variation in risk and control boundaries. However, this was simply a theoretical model to give our 
investigations an initial orientation (see our interim report). Our data suggests that organisations operate with 
a much richer set of trade-offs and either consciously or unconsciously adopt certain positions within them. 
The trade-offs that we have observed suggest that risk culture, however operationalised, is not a !xed ideal 
equilibrium for any organisation. It is inevitably dynamic and changing, subject to many different forces. This 
raises the question – to be considered in the conclusion – of whether this dynamic is a force that could be under 
the rational control of organisations or whether these organisations are fated to drift according to fashion and 
the business cycle.
The six trade-offs which concern the remainder of our !ndings are as follows:
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 Trade-off 1: Balancing the commercial and regulatory authority of the risk function
 Trade-off 2: Balancing the use of formal organisational arrangements with interactive approaches
 to risk management
 Trade-off 3: Balancing risk support for disciplined business decisions against the risks of imposing
 excessive controls
 Trade-off 4: Balancing the use of advisors with ‘going it alone’
 Trade-off 5. Balancing regulator and regulated culture
 Trade-off 6. Balancing ethics and incentives as levers over behavioural change 
These six areas where trade-offs are present are not the only possibilities, but they are the most visible from 
our data. We know from the existing practice and academic literature that it is easy to be prescriptive about 
risk culture (and in the period 2011-2013 we have seen an increasing amount of prescription). In contrast, 
consistent with the approach outlined in Chapter 2, we aim to explore the choices made by organisational actors 
within each trade-off, the pressures which shape organisational and individual attitudes and choices and their 
organisational implications. 
The focus on trade-offs also adds texture to the organic / engineered distinction between approaches to risk 
culture. As illustrated in more detail in the chapters which follow, organisational choices around these trade-
offs tend to be aligned to either an organic or a more engineered approach to risk culture. Organic approaches 
focus on risk in the business, involve a more interactive risk management style, allow for judicious risk-taking 
within limits, use consultants less, are more likely to resist regulatory standardisation and will tend to favour an 
emphasis on ethics and mission. Overall, organic approaches imply incremental change to risk culture over longer 
timescales. 
In contrast, engineered approaches favour shorter timeframes for change and are characterised by an emphasis 
on strong centralisation and risk management authority, as well as more formal approaches to risk culture, often 
with the help of external advisors. Engineered approaches may generate more conservative approaches to risk 
which are more closely aligned with regulatory risk appetites and which adopt formal incentives-based levers for 
behavioural change.
Partnership builders Overseers1. Authority of the risk function
Touch point enthusiasts Touch point realists2. Networks and interaction
Sandbox guardians Gold-platers3. Between risk and control
Sceptics Enthusiasts4. Risk culture advisors
Frictional Co-operative5. Regulatory and regulated cultures
Ethics & mission Disciplinary6. Achieving behavioural change
Figure 4: Risk culture approaches and trade-offs
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Figure 4 develops the contrast between approaches to risk culture and provides a way to position our participants 
in a risk culture space, at least provisionally. We do not judge whether one position is ‘better’ that another and 
we certainly do not regard the organic as in any way superior to the engineered approach. Each has its merits and 
drawbacks as with any trade-off. Rather we provide a conceptual map of risk culture change programmes that 
can be useful in highlighting some of the design choices that !nancial organisations must face. 
Finally, the many examples of apparently bad and failed risk cultures have tempted commentators to believe that 
a ‘solution’ in the form of a unique good risk culture can be found. We do not share this view and believe that 
any quest for such a risk culture Holy Grail will not prove fruitful. However, we do think that an understanding 
of the trade-offs organisations face when attempting to ‘manage’ their risk cultures enables the formulation of 
prescriptions, in the form of simple questions for practicing managers and staff, which may be more useful and 
targeted.
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“The second line, it’s very dif!cult to necessarily de!ne exactly what that role should be. So what 
am I? Am I the policeman, am I the friend, am I a critique? And it’s … and because the second line 
has tentacles all over the business and has a good understanding of what’s going on, it’s a very, 
very dif!cult role to actually describe to say well I’m your friend but actually I’m going to do other 
things to you if you don’t do X, Y and Z. And how do you do that is dif!cult. And I imagine most 
risk functions are in that sort of middle ground where they’re trying to … they’ve got to work 
with the audit, the independent and they’ve got to work with the business and it’s facilitating and 
understanding what’s going on.”
Our investigation suggests that a signi!cant aspect of the risk culture debate closely concerns the organisational 
position of the risk function. Interviews with managers who work in risk management raised a number of 
dilemmas regarding their authority, expertise and roles within their organisations. The opening quote, taken from 
our conversation with a CRO, is indicative of this ambivalence – e.g. the ‘policeman’, the ‘friend’ or the ‘critic’ – of 
the risk manager role. And this in turn has signi!cant implications for the interaction between risk personnel and 
other parts of the organisation. The key questions are: what should risk managers be responsible and accountable 
for? How close should the risk function be to the business? Which kind of expertise is desirable to satisfy required 
tasks and responsibilities?
How organisations and individuals address and answer these questions has cultural implications, re"ecting 
different values, norms and assumptions around the way in which an organisation (or different parts of an 
organisation) sees and acts on risks. Moreover, answers to these questions have implications for the expertise 
of risk personnel, a question that represents an open debate for practitioners and scholars (notably the lack of 
authority of their respective risk functions which were identi!ed as issues in the Barclays, HBOS and JP Morgan 
cases highlighted in Chapter 1). At the heart of the issue is the authority of risk personnel, and the degree of 
friction and/or respect between front-of!ce and risk management teams. 
The quote above emphasises the problematic role of the second line, an issue that was already evident in the 
initial interviews that informed our interim report and touched upon in Chapter 3. In the interim report (Ashby, 
Palermo and Power, 2012) we suggested that key issues are played out at the interface between what are called 
the !rst and second lines of defence. Signi!cant challenges in operationalising this interface include the ‘risk’ of 
risk people being captured by business units (‘going native’), and concerns with the reporting of risk issues by 
the !rst line. The perceived challenge is to avoid punitive actions that may prevent managers from openly raising 
issues of concern.
The themes of the authority and expertise of the risk functions are intertwined with other thematic sections of 
our report, especially those on centralisation and interaction (see Chapters 3 and 5). In this chapter we focus 
speci!cally on how attempts to expand the authority of the risk function are interrelated with changes in the 
expertise (or expectations around the expertise) of risk personnel.
Chapter 4:
The Authority of the Risk 
Function
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The literature distinguishes between two types of risk manager (see Power, 2007; Mikes, 2009). On the one 
hand, risk managers can be technical experts of one or several sub-disciplines of risk management (e.g. !nancial, 
safety, information technology risks). On the other, especially with the rise of a holistic conception of risk and risk 
management, risk managers can be seen as change facilitators and business partners. In the latter case, what 
really matters are relational skills rather than ‘technical’ and abstract bodies of risk management knowledge. 
In all our data, we notice the tendency to embrace the second approach, with an emphasis on getting closer 
to being a ‘business partner’ and/or ‘internal consultant’. We consider this !nding signi!cant as we spoke to 
risk professionals occupying different positions in different functional areas of risk management (e.g. Chief Risk 
Of!cers, ERM, operational risk, risk and compliance, risk oversight) across a variety of organisations. Speci!cally, 
we heard of the need for risk people who were experts in the business, a theme which recurs in all our sample 
organisations. We heard in several organisations that risk specialists tend to be “too bogged down in detail” and 
bound up in a data driven organisation, and that there is a need for people who can think laterally about how to 
improve the current control environment, rather than simply collect and process information. 
Nonetheless, we also noticed that this ambition toward ‘business partnering’ can be put into practice in different 
ways, which can be schematically categorised in two ways, which we call ‘partnership builders’ and ‘partnering 
overseers’. We expand on these two categories in the remainder of this chapter.
Partnership builders
Part of our empirical material suggests that the risk function organisational footprint can be expanded by making 
debate happen and by obtaining membership of key committees. This is a pragmatic approach that aims to build 
internal trust gradually and to increase interaction between risk staff, senior managers and front-of!ce personnel. 
Hence this approach can be related to those in favour of stronger interaction, as discussed in Chapter 5.
Several interviewees acknowledged the communications challenge involved in increasing the footprint of risk 
management. Risk functions that waste senior management time lose credibility very quickly. As put by one 
interviewee:
 “I have a two-hour slot with the Group Executive every month. I chose to cancel last month’s 
because I didn’t think I had enough of signi!cance and urgency to utilise their time. It’s a two-way 
street, I get the time I ask for but you need to recognise that as much as I know I’ve got that slot, 
I’m not just going to come in and talk to you unless I’ve got material things to talk to you about. To 
keep their engagement and trust they need to know that I won’t unnecessarily waste their time.”
Another way to expand the footprint of risk management has been to obtain membership of key committees. 
One senior risk manager we met in our initial round of interviews noted that regrettably there had been no risk 
member in one key senior-level committee. This view was reinforced by another interviewee who noted that 
traditional committee structures tended to segment risk thinking whereas ‘good’ risk management was implicit 
in every committee and not just in a ‘risk’ committee:
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“You go to a management meeting and you talk about management issues and then you go to 
a risk committee and you talk about risk issues. And sometimes you talk about the same issues 
in both but people get very confused and I don’t know … I don’t know how right it is but I really 
think you should be talking about risk when you talk about your management issues because it 
kind of feels to me again culturally that’s where we are.”
As for the point raised on communication, membership of key committees is dependent on making sure that 
risk staff can add value to the meetings. At BANK_1 the point was made that the CRO has no ‘divine’ right to 
participate in the big decision-making committees. Paraphrasing one interviewee, you have to add some value 
to get to the table in the !rst place.
The approach embraced by these individuals was clearly focused on improving relations with the business, but 
in a gradual way by building on existing relationships, processes and structures. An indicative example of this 
approach is provided by the efforts of a manager in charge of risk culture change in INS_4 (notably these efforts 
were in addition to a number of other activities that took most of her working time). From our meetings with this 
manager (two over the research period), we noticed what might be de!ned as a pragmatic approach to expand 
the risk management footprint and to instill ideas and values that relate to risk culture within different parts of the 
business (see box 11). This person recognised how, in a cost-constrained environment, it is not always possible to 
change radically the organisational structures or to implement new processes. Nonetheless, organisations do have 
a number of processes, activities and ‘levers’ that can converge on risk culture-related activities. The interviewee 
commented that she would always respond in the following way when colleagues mention that not much is 
explicitly done on risk culture:
“… Most of you are not starting from scratch, you have already a number of things there, what 
you don’t know is how those are connected holistically and where they are facilitating the right 
risk culture … it’s more about creating alignment.”
This means that the skills of a risk manager, who aims to 
work her way through the organisation, involves ‘connecting 
the dots’ between apparently disparate initiatives that may 
have implications for risk culture. Internal staff surveys and 
customer satisfaction surveys may be good sources of data 
readily available to create a set of meta-facts about risk 
culture(s). The risk manager must be skilled in understanding 
what this data is about, but most importantly, she has to be 
able to recognise that much of this data already exists in the 
organisation and that the challenge is to connect it to higher 
level values and norms. In so doing, the risk manager will necessarily interact with other functional experts, such 
as HR staff, and will provide her view on various on-going change initiatives, related for instance to training and 
remuneration. An indicative quote is the following:
Box 11: Questions for the ‘pragmatic’ risk 
manager
“Who is driving remuneration? Are they taking 
the right approach, the right incentive? How 
are we articulating the risk appetite? Who is 
driving the training? Is the training including risk 
capabilities?” (Excerpts from our conversation 
with a risk manager)
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“ … So now we are looking at the remuneration metrics and going through the remuneration 
committee and now is the time to get involved on that. I’m very involved on risk training, so now 
I’m kind of from the risk !nancial perspective, I’m the content expert on the risk training … but in 
HR we have somebody driving all the development programmes, so I just need to work with them, 
challenge them, making sure that they have alignment …”
Partnering overseers
A similar emphasis on business partnering, although via a different approach, emerges from interviews within 
a second group of organisations. Here the emphasis is put on more visible and clearly articulated change 
programmes that aim to clarify risk management-related responsibilities and activities. Among such initiatives we 
notice training programmes and structural organisational changes. Hence this approach links nicely to the issue 
of centralisation discussed in Chapter 3. 
The interesting aspect of risk training initiatives is how they imply a different conceptualization of how to reduce 
the distance between risk and business people. Whilst the ‘partnership builders’ try to get themselves closer to 
the business, obtaining membership in non-risk committees or seeking out who is responsible for non-risk related 
change initiatives that may connect with risk culture change, the ‘overseers’ aim to get non-risk personnel closer 
to the activities and concepts used by risk people. In effect, the ‘overseer’ tries to mould non-risk personnel into 
becoming lay risk managers. 
Two indicative examples of formal training programmes relate to efforts in BANK_3 and INS_4. At BANK_3 
our discussion of risk culture began with a new framework that would clarify exactly what it means for risk 
management to be owned by the business. We were told that ideally, everyone must feel like the CRO of the 
bank and that the central risk management function was there to facilitate. The CRO of this bank felt that the 
UK was far behind other countries in its philosophy of risk training, which reinforces silos rather than trains 
individuals for cross-functionality. The CRO also decided that there needed to be separate training for particular 
regulatory areas (for example, certain operational risks such as fraud and anti-money laundering) and for risk 
culture, which included new initiatives in risk training for non-risk people via a risk academy. The CRO claimed 
that there was little resistance to attending such programmes – perhaps because of the strong focus on training 
in the organisation generally.
At INS_4 there were big changes during and after 2007. Risk personnel worked with HR developing an entirely 
new model, which was considered very much grounded in the TLD model (Chapter 3), thus reinforcing the view 
that ‘overseers’ stress clear articulations of tasks and responsibilities. According to the different interviewees within 
this organisation, what was considered a ‘quite sophisticated’ training and accountability infrastructure was built 
to support risk management policies and standards that set out the minimum requirements expected of the 
business. We were also told that there seemed to be little resistance to the implementation of this infrastructure, 
with good reactions from the !rst participants, coupled to strong leadership support. In addition to the formal 
training plan, the Solvency II regulatory agenda was used to raise the pro!le of risk management and many 
personal objectives and bonuses were made dependent upon delivering the organisation’s risk management plan. 
This was backed up by a big focus on communication, such as a risk-dedicated website which, according to one 
interviewee, attracted the most hits of any portion of the internal site, and the introduction of a risk category into 
the employee engagement survey, to answer four questions about risk management within the company.
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There is little doubt that the structural changes outlined in Chapter 3 are correlated with efforts to increase 
the organisational authority of the risk function, with implications for risk personnel expertise. For example, at 
BANK_2 the decision has been to create a new structure, separate from the more traditional day-to-day risk 
management and reporting directly to the Board. The declared aim of the new oversight unit was to create 
‘lateral thinking’, and more forward-looking activities rather than to focus on traditional and more granular risks 
(e.g. daily liquidity issues). The two risk management-related functions have clearly distinct remits and required 
expertises. According to one interviewee involved with the risk oversight function, the skillset is not just technical. 
It involves an ability to maintain relationships. She went on to observe that risk people with an ‘audit mindset’ 
encounter dif!culties when interacting with the business. They require a more balanced skillset in which they can 
get people to understand that they have missed something or that they ought to think about something. She 
emphasised that the business also needs to be open to this interaction. So you need both the right individuals in 
the oversight function, and also the right individuals on the receiving end, who may have been used to an audit 
culture in the past. 
We also learned that the newly formed oversight team at 
BANK_2 has the authority to do ‘deep dives’ on any part 
of the business (risk, commercial etc.), while the traditional 
risk management function did not have this possibility. Box 
12 provides a brief description of the deep dive as a tool 
implemented by risk experts within the risk oversight team. In 
general, members of the risk oversight team were ‘experienced’ 
risk people, ideally with some business experience. The ability 
to make effective deep dives depended on the presence of 
non-risk related skills, so that different areas and activities of 
the business can become comprehensible to risk personnel 
(e.g. Information Technology).
Contingent factors 
Partnership ‘builders’ and ‘overseers’ share an ambition to expand the footprint of the risk function. In both cases, 
although in different ways, we were able to trace barriers and contingent factors that affect how risk expertise 
and authority develop in !nancial organisations.
First, we heard that risk language is often a barrier to 
the organisational authority of risk management. At one 
organisation, there were efforts to animate risk conversations 
within the organisation using performance-focused language 
that did not use the ‘risk’ word. Similarly, one recognised the 
need for the risk function to invest heavily in relationships with 
the front-line and to help them to take more responsibility. But 
it was not just a question of the front-line. One CRO regarded 
IT and technology as one of the most signi!cant specialisms in 
the organisation with major challenges for the 
Box 12: Deep Dives
There is no formal selection process for a deep 
dive. It depends on a range of external and 
internal factors. As recounted to us, they seem 
to be primarily a response to uncertainty (about 
the reliability of information) and regulatory 
interest (a desire to double check that reported 
information is correct). Deep dives are generally 
initiated by the risk oversight function and can 
touch different functions and organisational 
areas.
Box 13: Risk and operational expertise
Several members of the safety department at 
AIRLINE have been pilots in the past (and still 
do "y in some cases). These people have the 
necessary ‘content and background’ to analyse 
the safety data and participate in business 
decisions.
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risk function. In general, risk managers must be able to speak and understand different languages. Business 
knowledge seems to be a necessary precondition not only to interact with front-line and other staff functions, 
but also to understand which language to adopt to enhance authority and credibility. This authority and credibility 
enables risk personnel to build relationships and networks across the organisation and to aspire to become 
trusted business advisors (Chapter 5). The personal background of safety staff at AIRLINE provides indicative 
evidence on this point (see Box 13).
Second, we found that regulatory prescriptions and models can be a signi!cant barrier to an ambition to expand 
the risk function footprint within the business. The ‘independent role’ of the risk function is usually considered 
an important aspect that has to be preserved. Hence, greater involvement of risk personnel within the business 
can be seen as problematic. It is interesting to note how both approaches address this tension. From an ‘overseer’ 
perspective, formal training programmes aim to get non-risk people closer to the activities and mindsets of risk 
personnel rather than the other way around; while new risk oversight structures separate oversight responsibilities 
from day-to-day risk management, emphasising the difference between ‘!rst’ and ‘second’ line activities. In 
contrast the ‘partnership builder’ approach builds on informal relations without making any visible change in the 
structure of the lines of defence, the idea being to encourage effective risk management by fully integrating it 
into the ‘normal’ management activities of the ‘!rst’ line.
Third, we found that ideas and expectations about the ‘right’ expertise across different organisational levels 
can vary over time. In our survey follow-up meeting at INS_2, discussion among participants suggested that, 
historically, the risk function had placed more weight on compliance while senior leadership was more weighted 
towards the business and its key risks. Over time this perceived gap was decreasing and the risk function was 
becoming more commercial in orientation. According to participants, there is still a compliance element in the 
reporting but the vast majority now is focused on “what are the risks telling us and how should we react?” 
Fourth, in line with our assumptions related to risk culture ‘plurality’ and ‘drifting’ (see Chapter 2), we noticed 
how different approaches characterise the same organisational setting. INS_4 started with an ‘overseer’ approach, 
but then responsibility for risk culture work shifted to a person exemplifying a pragmatic, ‘partnership builder’ 
approach. This point raises an interesting re"ection on the value of formal risk management processes, models 
and frameworks in the context of the somewhat episodic journey of risk management arrangements in speci!c 
organisational contexts. In our interim report, we noticed, with some surprise, the lack of explicit references 
to work related to Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) within the risk culture work streams. We hypothesised 
that ERM was not well aligned with risk culture work. A longer involvement with organisations such as INS_4 
would suggest a different hypothesis, namely that the architecture of ERM can be foundational for risk culture 
work streams and diagnostics. A risk culture programme, no matter how explicit, may help to link together the 
disparate concepts and tools that compose ERM.
Box 14: External networking 
Crystallising safety events, however large or small, were used at AIRLINE to build intellectual capital, including 
the development of relationships with academic safety specialists – all borne out of a desire to learn lessons from 
these events. The emphasis was clearly on a collective process of trying to !nd out what happened and why, 
including, in the case of more minor events and ‘near-misses’, how particular controls may have prevented a 
worse outcome and what might have happened had they not done so. Collaboration with a range of research 
institutions was proudly remarked as a decisive element for safety staff credibility and authority.
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Fifth, risk management expertise can hardly be seen as organisationally bounded. Most of the risk managers 
we spoke to have been involved in a number of networking activities, participating in initiatives promoted by 
professional bodies and consultancy !rms. Some actively participated in the crafting of risk culture guidance 
promoted by professional bodies, subsequently disseminated through blogs and public seminars. The amount 
of contact time with some of the participant organisations suggests that research conducted by academics (and 
also consultants) can be used internally as a lever to expand the risk function authority. This ambition to leverage 
external ‘expertise’ was even more evident from our conversations with safety personnel at AIRLINE (see Box 14).
Summary and Conclusions
Our investigations revealed a wide variety of ways in which the risk function has sought to expand its footprint and 
authority within !nancial services organisations. Though the !nancial crisis has increased business unit receptivity 
to the voice of risk management, many challenges exist on the supply side of this relationship. Our discussions 
about risk culture with our sample organisations have revealed an aspiration for a new, ideal kind of risk manager 
who does not yet fully exist and who must make the journey from compliance towards a more strategic business 
orientation. By compliance we mean something broader than the compliance function as such, with its focus 
on speci!c rules (e.g. client money). Rather we mean a more general compliance orientation to the conduct of 
risk management, with its focus on drafting policy documentation, completing risk registers and taking its lead 
from regulatory policy (see also Chapter 8). From our interviews, we conclude that the new kind of risk person 
must be a number of different things all together: a lateral thinker, business-focused, a trusted advisor; a network 
builder, cross-functional, challenging and decision-relevant. In general, risk managers must be able to speak and 
understand different business languages. Business knowledge seems to be a necessary precondition not only to 
interact with front-line and other staff functions, but also to understand which language to adopt for enhancing 
authority and credibility. This authority and credibility enables risk personnel to build relationships and networks 
across the organisation and to aspire to become trusted business advisors. The personal background of safety 
staff at AIRLINE provides indicative evidence on this point (see Box 13).
Returning to our opening quote, we suggest that risk managers are constantly trying to avoid the ‘policeman’ 
approach, and to !nd ways to become challengers of front-line activities. This can happen in two ways. The 
!rst involves gradual change driven by individuals who aim to connect different activities and projects that they 
consider risk culture-relevant (pragmatists/partnership builders); the second involves a clear and more formalised 
articulation of tasks and responsibilities by means of training programmes and organisational changes (partnering 
overseers). 
We suggest that the former approach aligns more closely to our idea of an organic approach, with cultural change 
happening more slowly and progressively, while the latter aligns to an engineered approach, with more visible 
and rapid modi!cations. It is an open question which of the two approaches is likely to endure in organisations. 
We can envisage how a ‘partnership builder’ approach has the potential to last longer, transforming risk culture-
relevant activities into business-as-usual, although this is dependent on the on-going construction of a fragile 
network of relationships driven by key individuals. An ‘overseer’ approach is more visible and possibly wide-
ranging, although also more at risk of remaining an ad hoc intervention if no sustained energy is instilled across 
the organisation. In short, structural change in the form of new central units can be created in a relatively short 
period of time, but authority-building takes longer. 
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In both cases, a clear tension emerges in relation to the 
ambition to get risk managers closer to the business. 
Problems may arise in terms of relations with regulators, 
who may prefer a clearer distinction between different ‘lines 
of defence’ (see Box 15). Issues of accountability and blame 
avoidance are also at stake. The key question is whether !rst 
line management is doing risk selection, and while second 
line risk personnel remain the risk owner of last resort. To 
paraphrase one of our interviewees: when something goes 
wrong, who do you point to? One possibility, as remarked 
by the same interviewee, is that risk directors, who may not 
receive much of the reward when things go well, will take 
the blame when things go wrong. The creation of networks 
of local risk champions (non-risk specialists charged with 
helping to embed risk management frameworks in front-line 
activities) can also be problematic, although often evoked as 
a solution to the problem of risk management embeddedness. Various interviews suggested that some caution 
should be taken. As put by a CRO we interviewed, the reaction of people in the business would often be: “Oh 
we can relax now because they’re going to take it on.”
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 How would you monitor changes in the internal authority of the risk function? 
 If you don’t want to do this, why?
 Is the current balance between informal relationship building and formal training of the business in risk 
 understood and consciously chosen? Does the risk function have a role in the design and implementation 
 of risk training programmes? 
 Are you recruiting and training risk managers in the different languages of the business or is there still 
 an underlying mono-culture within the risk function? In the latter case, have you ever discussed your 
 perception of such culture with colleagues in the risk function? 
 Do you generate stories of risk management success and value creation and ensure that they circulate 
 within the organisation and with regulators? Considering the last year, how many of these success 
 stories can you recall?
Box 15: Risk authority and the TLD model
The ideal of the risk manager, as business 
partner, points to a signi!cant tension in risk 
culture change processes, namely the need 
for the development of risk management 
capability which cuts across that model. Under 
the TLD approach risk oversight is separated 
from business level risk and control decisions, 
but its authority may be more fragile, because 
of reduced opportunities for collaboration. The 
balance between authority with the business 
and independence from the business is a !ne 
line. Hence, key issues in risk culture are played 
out in the process of determining this balance.
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“And I get more concerned that the risk functions are just not interacting enough and do we really 
know what’s going on? Do we really know how we can help people? We have lots of interactions 
with the same people and I’d like to be having lots of interaction with a range of people.” 
Since the mid-1990s there has been a proliferation of frameworks for risk management. Formalised holistic 
processes, often called Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), have become orthodoxy. Yet these frameworks did 
not generate adequate warnings about the !nancial crisis and both practitioners and academic commentators 
are well aware of the limitations of such formal frameworks, not least in terms of having real leverage over 
behaviour. As mentioned in Chapter 2, sustained organisational interaction is a key theme in the management 
literature, especially work on organisational crises and incidents (Weick, 1990, 1993; Weick and Roberts, 1993). 
This ‘necessity to talk’ is also relevant in work on management accounting and control, where interactive styles 
of management control are discussed as part of the levers that managers can use to manage performance 
and strategic uncertainties. Indeed, drawing on the work of Robert Simons (1999) at Harvard, it seemed to us 
at the beginning of our study that risk management might be more developed diagnostically in terms of its 
technical elements and much less developed as an interactive control system (a more human-centred method of 
control designed to promote conversations about risk), even though all the risk managers and CROs we spoke to 
emphasised the importance of relationships.
The key tension is between the body of formalised processes and procedures that provide the visible structures 
for risk management and control and the multitude of human contact time that inevitably happens within 
organisations. A senior risk manager, whom we met in our initial round of interviews, noted that in her organisation 
there was a very tight [risk] committee structure, with regular meetings and formal minutes, but that this was only 
20% of risk management. The rest was made up of conversations and informal contact time.
Accordingly, our subsequent work has focused on the dimension of interaction or what we call the ‘touch points’ 
between risk management and the business. In short, we think that the type and frequency of interaction are 
revealing of different approaches and expectations around cultural issues. We focused in our interviews mainly 
on the interaction between risk personnel and other parts of the business, although we also collected data on 
the level of interaction between individuals occupying different roles in the organisation (e.g. senior managers, 
managers, staff members). The opening quote in this chapter is indicative of the key issues for risk managers 
re"ecting on the need for more (or less) interaction. Do risk personnel get to know what is happening in the 
business? Can they know more by interacting and meeting with people in the front-line and other specialist 
functions? But, do the front-line and other parts of the organisation actually want to talk to risk personnel?
From our empirical material, in particular through the combination of survey analysis and subsequent follow-up 
focus groups, we had the possibility to appreciate distinct attitudes and expectations about the relevance of a 
‘high touch’ organisation. Hence we distinguish between touch point ‘enthusiasts’ and ‘realists’.
Chapter 5:
Networks and Interaction
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An initial empirical basis for this distinction is provided by our survey material. It is possible to compare results 
from the four organisations that ran a short internal questionnaire. A question asked respondents to rate, over 
the period of a month, the frequency of interactions by phone (or email), in person or through formal meetings 
with colleagues in other functional areas (e.g. group risk) and with their supervisors (e.g. business directors, heads 
of teams). The scale ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (daily). Table 3 shows the frequency of interaction by phone or 
email within the two organisations that returned a signi!cant number of questionnaires across different areas of 
the organisation (risk and non-risk functions) and different organisational levels. Results from the responses from 
staff members only (in parenthesis) suggest that INS_1 (in comparison to INS_2) is a higher touch organisation, 
where even junior people can get access to senior management (e.g. Heads of Business Units). 
Head of BU Supervisor
INS_1 4.7 (4.4) 6.3 (6.4)
INS_2 4.8 (3.3) 5.7 (6.2)
Table 3: Interaction, all responses (staff only)
Table 4 provides further data from the same question, providing information on the level of interaction between 
non-risk personnel (e.g. underwriters, people in the retail business) and risk personnel, either at the group level or 
the local (e.g. business unit) level. From Table 4, it is even clearer how, considering the relation between risk and 
non-risk staff, INS_1 appears as a higher touch organisation. The survey follow-up allowed us to uncover some of 
the expectations and aspirations behind this data, which we explore further below. 
Group Risk Team Local Risk Team
INS_1 3.5 5.5
INS_2 1.9 3.3
Table 4: Interaction, non-risk respondents
Touch point enthusiasts
Touch point ‘enthusiasts’ emphasise the relevance of face-to-face interaction with colleagues, while they are 
more sceptical of the signi!cance of formalised reporting structures and organisational structures as a driver of 
organisational conversations on risks and risk management. In short they prefer to achieve their risk management 
objectives through more informal methods, building trust through regular cross-functional interaction between 
colleagues (not only via scheduled meetings, but also water cooler conversations, etc.). 
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At INS_1, upward interaction in the form of access to senior people was regarded as very important to preserve 
a small company mentality. The CRO felt able to see senior colleagues, including the Group CEO, at any time, 
but tried to use the time wisely. In addition the risk function has regular training slots with the main Board. This 
organisation participated in a further internal survey and follow-up workshop. As anticipated in the previous 
section, results suggested that there was a high (relative to the benchmark) perceived level of interaction between 
risk and compliance functions and the underwriting side of the business. The CRO was content with our survey 
result since she herself was engaged in increasing interaction, of which our focus group, attended by underwriters 
and a range of risk people, was an example. 
The survey follow-up meeting, attended by a range of individuals from different parts of the organisation, 
con!rmed that a lack of personal interaction had been an issue in the past, a point raised by both risk and non-
risk personnel. However, there was a clear willingness to rectify this. As put by one of the workshop’s participants, 
“certainly one of our tensions with underwriting has been both sides feel there hasn’t been enough personal 
interaction.” It was also clear how interaction, even in a context that welcomes contact time, is not frictionless. A 
point that was raised, and commented upon by many, is that who instigates the interaction is a crucial element. 
As put by another participant to the seminar:
“It’ll be interesting to see who instigated interaction. If I’m an underwriter, am I going to see them 
or … because I need to and I want to rather than … Audit have just turned up.”
Hence, there is a difference between interaction which arises as a result of a business invitation and that which 
does not and may be unwelcome (e.g. when contact is initiated by the risk function to complete a process that 
the business perceives little value in). We consider this a crucial issue from an organisational risk culture point 
of view. It is possible to hypothesise that touch point ‘enthusiasts’ can !nd it dif!cult to put their ambition 
into practice in a context where risk-driven interaction is not recognised positively, leading possibly to increased 
friction within the organisation.
Therefore, aspirations for more interaction are intertwined with ways of expanding the authority of the risk 
function and changes in risk personnel expertise. As mentioned in Chapter 4, we envisage two different 
approaches to promote business partnering within organisations. The lessons from the pragmatic, ‘partnership 
builder’ approach, in particular the incremental nature of community building used by the proponents of this 
approach, seems to be valuable for risk managers who aim to get closer to and talk to the business more, even 
in contexts that are not very welcoming for risk personnel or 
organisations where there is no perception of any signi!cant 
risk issues. In such contexts, the careful building of alliances 
over time, with people in HR and other functional areas, who 
are interested in similar objectives, can be seen as a useful 
starting point to get traction for larger scale changes in the 
number and quality of touch points between risk and non-risk 
functions. Interestingly, in the !nancial sector we did not hear 
much about the role of technology as an enabler of interaction. 
Touch point ‘enthusiasts’ seemed to be strong believers of ‘old 
style’ face-to-face meetings. Technology seemed instead to 
play a greater role in the airline company where we conducted 
some interviews for comparative purposes (see Box 16 and 
Box 17).
Box 16: Technology and interaction
At AIRLINE, we observed a highly forensic 
system with a capability to generate red "ag 
events for investigation. The system encourages 
and makes easy interaction between those 
reporting (the front-line) and investigators (the 
second), but the interaction is mainly virtual. 
Investigators can recommend actions and track 
their execution, but rarely meet with front-line 
staff face-to-face. 
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Touch point realists
The practice literature, and most of the academic literature, emphasises the value of organisational talks, open 
communication and personal interaction (Chapter 2, Appendix C). The touch point ‘enthusiasts’ seem to conform 
to this view. Nonetheless, data collected from other organisations, including two that participated in our survey 
and post-survey re"ections (INS_2 and BANK_1) helped to further unpack the tensions, contradictions and 
problematic aspects of greater interaction. In both cases, a more ‘realist’ view of the advantages and disadvantages 
of closer interaction emerged.
At INS_2 we were made aware of the disadvantages of placing too much value on interaction. The following 
comment made by one of the participants to the survey follow-up is indicative of the ‘dark side’ of frequent 
meetings and emphasis on ‘talk’ across a large community of actors:
“… So the way around that of course is to get everybody to be part of the decision in the !rst 
place but getting everybody to be part of a decision in the !rst place takes an awful long time. 
And I think the other driver, if you go back into history, that engendered some of this into the 
DNA, was people not wanting to take accountability for anything unless absolutely everybody else 
had already signed off on it.” 
High levels of interaction in this insurer meant that a large number of people tended to be involved in decisions, 
even those with little materiality. This was driven by a strong desire for consensus in decision-making because of 
some past experiences, where: (a) key decisions were not widely supported; and (b) accountability for decisions 
was not clearly owned. In contrast, the current UK culture was perceived internally as too collaborative, leading 
to slow decision-making at times. At its worst it was pointed out that this collaborative culture can be part of a 
tactic not to take decisions as, paraphrasing one of the participants to the meeting, getting people in a group is 
a good way not to decide.
At BANK_2, a senior manager also highlighted the downsides of a strong network focusing on the risk that 
close relations between the !rst and second lines can cause risk management to ‘go native’ and be ‘captured’. 
She commented on the need to have a balance between good personal relations and the ‘independence’ and 
authority of the second line (an observation also made in the Salz review of Barclay’s culture prior to the LIBOR 
scandal, and in the US Senate investigation into the JP Morgan Whale Trading event). The same person also 
emphasised that in this organisation, risk management was no longer a ‘speed bump’ on the way to a bonus. 
According to the CRO, relationships in the UK are good between the !rst and second line, but risk cannot get 
too close. 
To address the trade-off between interaction and independence, another manager responsible for operational risk 
commented that she and her team were moving to the !rst line and will be close to the business (providing what 
is in effect in-house consultancy), while a separate second line oversight operational risk function is being created 
at the international group level (which links to our discussion of centralisation in chapter 3). In further discussions, 
we observed that this person was very pleased to be leading the part of the operational risk function that would 
remain close to the business so that she could provide ‘real time’ challenge and more tangible strategic value 
through participating in !rst line committees. She hoped that this would help to change any lingering perceptions 
of her role as another compliance function and observed that !rst line departments are more likely to report losses 
and near misses where the level of interaction is high – especially non-monetary events, which are common, but 
can be missed.
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Contingent factors
Whilst we have the support of empirical data, such as survey results on interaction levels within different 
organisations, the distinction between ‘enthusiasts’ and ‘realists’ is primarily based on senior management 
views of the bene!ts and drawbacks of greater interactions. Our data does not allow us to judge the relative 
effectiveness of the two approaches. Yet, and importantly for our focus on risk culture, the two approaches 
disclose a different predisposition to assess the value of personal interaction in complex, growing and changing 
organisations. The former have an almost idealised view that things can be sorted out quickly and effectively by 
meeting in person; the latter are more cynical of the potential for personal interaction to address organisational 
problems and highlight issues of accountability and business capture. 
As for the other thematic trade-offs, the data suggest that the choice between the two approaches depends on a 
number of contingent factors. First, interaction is in"uenced by the physical disposition of of!ces. In organisations 
where some of the teams of risk people sit near to front-line personnel (as in INS_1), one would naturally expect 
more touch points, rather than just consulting the internal manuals and operational procedures. This is not 
surprising, but is perhaps an underestimated issue in a time where technology helps increase contact time. 
Organisational changes can rapidly disrupt what is considered a ‘healthy’ amount of contact time, as seemed 
to have happened in INS_1 as the organisation grew bigger. One person participating in our survey follow-up 
meeting commented that: “A lot of it happened overnight when we moved buildings”. 
Second, and once again, regulatory culture seems to have a strong input on the call for and expectations around 
more interaction. Historically, staff at BANK_1 stated that it has had an informal culture, which emphasised 
networks and relationships over formal processes and documentation. Now they have to bring in more 
documentation and formality, due to regulation. They observed that regulators like formality and documentation, 
as it can be more easily understood, measured and benchmarked – a situation that could challenge the informal 
culture that the bank has developed. Our conversations with various advisors reinforced this point of view. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, regulators tend to prefer clear-cut models such as the TLD and may be sceptical of highly 
‘interactive’ organisations, which rely more on informal relationships which blur the TLD approach. However, a 
formalised governance structure and related accountabilities can also be divisive and hinder the development of 
trust between the !rst and second lines of defence in particular (see Box 17). 
Box 17: Interaction and the TLD model
At AIRLINE, a senior manager emphasised the importance of building respect in the organisation and having the 
capability for strong peer-to-peer communication. For example, if one wants to observe a pilot during a "ight they 
use ‘a mate’ [of the pilot] and not an investigator which enables more detailed information to be elicited. In this 
environment there was very little mention of ‘lines of defence’ since safety was already an operational priority. This 
suggests to us that the TLD model is not risk culture neutral – it is itself symptomatic of some kind of risk culture 
failure and of a very distinctive regulatory model which values independence over knowledge and relationships. 
Interviewees at AIRLINE placed great weight on interaction with the business and were not concerned about any 
dilution or capture risks, the potential for capture not being a concern when risk and the business share the same 
objectives.
Summary and Conclusions
There are no shortages of opportunities for risk personnel to meet their counterparts in other !rms. The large 
consulting organisations run many networking events and there are associational conferences of many kinds. 
In addition, in one of our meetings with the regulators, we had the impression that bank CROs are considered 
guardians of the balance sheet, and therefore indirectly of systemic risk. Hence, forums for knowledge exchange 
between CROs and the regulator have also been established. Not surprisingly, the CRO at a large bank mentioned 
his frequent contacts with CROs in similarly large banks. 
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Yet as valuable as these activities are in generating trans-organisational knowledge-sharing among risk personnel, 
this is different from the interaction that goes on inside !nancial organisations. We distinguish between 
two approaches, based not so much on the actual amount of interaction and its presumed ‘effectiveness’, 
but mostly on the expectations and aspirations around interaction, as a way to manage the business and its 
risks. Touch point ‘enthusiasts’ emphasise the relevance of face-to-face interaction with colleagues. They are 
more sceptical of the signi!cance of formalised reporting structures and organisational structure as a driver 
of organisational conversations on risks and risk management. Touch point ‘realists’ do not underestimate the 
relevance of interaction, but point, even with some cynicism, to its more contradictory consequences, such as 
lack of accountability and slowness in decision-making. Furthermore we did not !nd interaction to be necessarily 
con"ict-free. On the contrary, we suggest that an active touch point culture could be expected to generate more 
organisational friction than one which is passive. We also suggest that this internal interactive capability may sit 
uneasily and even be damaged by a ‘regulatory mindset’ concerning the importance of the TLD approach, which 
is shared by some regulators, advisors and risk managers. 
In terms of our distinction between organic and engineered risk culture change initiatives, we see from our 
empirical data an alignment between those embracing a  pragmatic approach to expand the authority of the risk 
function and touch point ‘idealists’. The latter can be seen as embracing a view that organic processes are a more 
feasible way of changing risk culture. On the contrary, touch point ‘realists’ emphasise issues of accountability 
and the need for formal and visible evidence to show to the regulators, which positions them closer to engineered 
initiatives around risk culture. 
Nonetheless, the theme of interactive capability in risk management is one of the most dif!cult in our study 
because it is the least visible. Therefore, any attempt to model interaction types may result in the stretching of 
our current data. Although we know from the literature that interaction is an important dimension, and most 
of our interviewees con!rmed this view point, we did not !nd any organisations which were explicitly trying to 
track some aspect of their ‘touch points’ with the business; their grasp of this dimension of their activity was 
largely qualitative. While these ‘touch points’ were acknowledged as important, they were not yet regarded as 
salient organisation facts in most organisations – and will not be so until they can be measured in some way. We 
encountered scepticism about the value of interaction as such, and concerns that one can have too much of it 
and either go native or become an irritant to the business. The tension between the widely agreed relevance of 
interaction and the dif!culty in devising and handling measures of it, re"ects the broader tension in the whole 
approach to risk culture discussed in Chapter 2.
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 Can you name one or two individuals doing risk culture relevant work in your organisation? If yes, where 
 are they (e.g. risk, audit, business)? How often have you talked to them? Do you feel you give them 
 enough support? 
 Would you be interested to know whether and how interaction between your risk function and the 
 business is changing? If so, how could you !nd this out?
 Do you track how many times business functions approach Risk for advice and partnering? If not, why not?
 If you have implemented a TLD approach in your organisation, do you think this has made interaction
  between the business and Risk more or less likely? 
 Are you worried about a lack of interaction between Risk and the business? If yes, why? Can you think
  of concrete examples of situations where more interaction would have helped to address business 
 problems? Or examples where too much interaction has slowed decision-making?
 Do you consciously translate risk appetite issues into a language which business units can understand 
 and own?
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“Certain things have rules and procedures and guidelines and … they set the boundaries and we 
empower people within them to make the right decisions … there’s discretion within a set of 
parameters.” 
The issue of appropriate risk-taking has been at the centre of debate since the !nancial crisis. Cases of bank 
failures, along with subsequent scandals affecting the likes of Barclays and JP Morgan seem to provide 
incontrovertible evidence of reckless risk-taking, with disastrous consequences for organisations and the wider 
economy (for example: House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2009; Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards, 2013a; Salz, 2013; Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2013). For this reason, much of the 
tacit understanding underlying the discussion of risk culture in particular and culture in general, has been to !nd 
ways to curb this excess via improved controls and appropriate remuneration structures (see our practitioner 
literature review in Appendix C). Yet, in keeping with our theme of trade-offs developed above, and to maintain 
a symmetry in the understanding of risk culture, the mirror image of reckless risk-taking is excessive control, or as 
we have heard some practitioners call it: ‘gold-plating’. How many times do we hear that risk-taking is necessary 
for value creation without real clarity about how the balance between risk-taking and control in its broadest sense 
is arrived at, a balance which de!nes the net risk position of the organisation?
The idea of risk-taking and control is somewhat abstract and dif!cult to address in practice, although it is central 
to prior work on risk culture (e.g. Bozeman and Kingsley, 1998, Simons, 1999). In our preliminary interviews we 
noticed how the discussion often shifted towards the boundaries and limits around risk-taking. The quote  which 
opens this chapter is illustrative of these re"ections. When asked about issues around risk-taking and control, our 
interviewee – a senior risk manager at an insurance company - brought to our attention notions of discretion, 
boundaries and empowerment. 
We used short surveys, run in four organisations, to elicit further re"ections and discussion about risk-taking 
and its limits rather than assessing and comparing different levels of ‘actual’ risk-taking. Speci!cally, the survey 
questions explored perceptions around different aspects of risk-taking. Respondents were asked to express 
their view on the following statements: ‘Most employees are not hesitant to take risks’, ‘Judicious risk-taking is 
positively recognised’, ‘Risk-taking affects positively compensation/career advancement’. We noticed variations 
in the response to these questions, but most importantly variations in the discussions stimulated by these results. 
Speci!cally, two approaches seem to be culturally relevant, with implications for the role and authority of the risk 
function.
While some of our participants addressed the topic of risk-taking in terms of the articulation and enforcement 
of trading limits, a speci!c dimension of risk appetite, others approached the issue in terms of the reach of 
compliance into the organisation. This difference may seem rather small but we think it is culturally signi!cant 
and re"ects very different starting positions for thinking about risk culture. Is the risk culture essentially focused 
on the quality of business decisions, bounded by limits? Or is it essentially focused on the limits themselves and 
compliance with them? This is a subtle difference but it re"ects a difference between what the risk management 
function places in the foreground and what is in the background. We describe this difference in terms of two 
contrasting expressions we heard during our interviews, namely the role of risk management as a ‘sandbox 
guardian’ or as a ‘gold-plater’ of rules and regulations.
Chapter 6:
Between Risk and Control
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Sandbox guardians
Paraphrasing the CRO during the survey follow-up meeting at BANK_1, risk-taking is considered OK providing it 
remains within the stated risk appetite. All participants concurred that discussions on risk-taking should be phrased 
in terms of clarity of risk appetite. As stated by a senior manager, the key question would be “Is risk appetite 
well de!ned?” If the answer is no, then the follow-up questions would be “Is it too conservative?” and “Is risk 
management embedded in the business?” Another participant in the meeting underlined this point using the 
metaphor of the ‘sandbox’. According to this person, “people can play within the sandbox”; senior management 
and the directors are the “guardians of the sandbox and the toys within it”. We found the metaphor interesting 
and culturally signi!cant. For example, it may be important for the identity of the risk function to think of the 
traders as children liable to misbehave when left to themselves, rather than as superstars. The CRO went on to 
add that there is a very strong limit culture in her organisation – much stronger than at many banks. But there is 
freedom within these limits, as the company is in the business of taking risk. However, she agreed that BANK_1’s 
risk appetite is lower than many banks and more homogenous across the group. In terms of our bandwidth 
model of risk appetite (see Chapter 2), this organisation seems not to have aggressive business units which push 
at the limits. Moreover, our conversation in this organisation touched on a speci!c element – business growth and 
acquisition strategies – that makes the risk-taking and control notion quite practical (see Box 18).
We found a similar story about the centrality of limits to risk-taking at a number of the other organisations. For 
example, a senior risk manager we met in our initial round of interviews told us about the various risk policies in 
force which specify what can and cannot be done, and for which policy owners must demonstrate compliance. 
This organisation was characterised by a signi!cant number of policies and procedures which affected many 
aspects of the business – re"ecting a strong desire to limit the potential for risks that could signi!cantly threaten 
its mutually owned assets. 
At INS_1 we learned that authorities and limits for each individual underwriter around the world are set by a 
group of individuals. There is a similar investment oversight committee for traders. It is regarded as completely 
unacceptable for people to act beyond their authorised plans, even if they make money. However, every effort 
is made not to micro-manage risk pro!les. Insurance markets are dynamic and naturally create challenging 
discussions about limits. During our survey follow-up meeting within this organisation, discussion focused on the 
balance between discretion (in be able to accept certain risks) and compliance. This company felt that it permitted 
more discretion than other organisations but this was really discretion within certain boundaries and operating 
guidelines. Risk-taking was regarded as too emotive a term and we were informed that it was important to 
distinguish between “taking a chance” as compared to “calculating something and then accepting the risk and 
controlling it.” This suggests that limits may be well-developed for well-understood risks, with strong foundations 
in data which can be routinely calculated, as compared with emergent and more idiosyncratic risks. As put by a 
participant to the meeting:
Box 18: Risk-taking and acquisition strategies
Acquisition strategies can give rise to problems of cultural digestion. A quick way to expand in new businesses is 
to acquire entire teams, but then it is hard to know what you are bringing in (a potentially destructive risk sub-
culture). New people may bring new clients with them which is positive, but their motivations are also important. 
Often people are hired on a probation period to !nd as many clients as possible in one year – which could promote 
a short-termist attitude and reckless risk-taking. This suggests that an important aspect of risk culture and one of 
the so-called ‘moments that matter’ is the point at which new entrants join an organisation and how and whether 
organisations really understand what this does to the risk pro!le of the organisation. 
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“… It depends what you mean by risk-taking, as an underwriter I would say we know what we’re 
doing, it’s calculated, well-judged, so we’re not taking a risk. I would mark myself quite low for 
that reason.”
In summary, the ‘sandbox guardian’ use of limits re"ects a more organic way of thinking about risk culture. 
The limits are formal devices of course, but they are there to enable risk-taking business as usual. This involves 
leveraging risk appetite as a key control at the centre of risk culture rather than allowing layers of control to 
build over time into a default compliance machine. However, we do not pretend that any of our participating 
organisations were pure ‘sandbox guardians’ in this sense, but the concept provides a useful contrast to gold-
plating discussed below. 
Gold-plating
At INS_2 we were informed that risk-taking and control were driven from a broader range of cultural elements, 
such as how many people you want to engage in a decision, how much capital you’re prepared to lose and so 
on. At the survey follow-up within this organisation, our discussion of the balance between risk and control was 
framed primarily in terms of attitudes to compliance. Survey results suggested that the local risk culture was more 
focused on compliance compared to the benchmark companies in our sample. It was agreed that, while the 
Group as a whole has a compliant culture, the local culture tends to be even more compliant than the rest of the 
Group. One participant in the workshop argued that she was ‘a little bit concerned’ that the score was low for 
external regulatory pressures, but that it was high for internal group policies.
The idea of ‘gold-plating’ was mentioned several times by the participants in the workshop. As put by another 
senior manager: “I think as a senior team we do recognise that we gold-plate or platinum-plate at times, quite 
a lot of the time.” This was explained in broader cultural terms such as a British tendency to follow the rules. 
For example, the local unit has fewer risk management policy waivers or concessions than any other part of the 
Group. Although managers may complain about, and challenge, rule-making at the design stage, there is a 
general acceptance of outside rules once they have been established. 
One explanation offered during the meeting for a lack of risk-taking, despite a perceived no-blame environment, 
was that risk-taking can be a dif!cult thing and takes effort: “because by its very nature you’re doing something 
different to the norm”. We !nd this comment illuminating from a cultural point of view. Drawing on our preliminary 
work and large scale survey !ndings, we suggested that regulatory pressures are having a considerable effect on 
risk-taking, favoring a risk-averse mindset. The discussion around platinum-plating suggests that organisational 
cultures can be part of the story. Risk aversion and a precautionary approach to the business can be, at least in 
part, self-imposed by organisations who mistakenly blame it on the regulator. As put by one participant in the 
workshop:
“… If you look on the intranet and all of the communications we put out to people you know, 
the vast majority of them are around processes, procedures, do this, do that. And the balance in 
terms of looking outward and our customers had got lost at a point. I think it’s changing now but 
nevertheless. And it comes in from all sources. It’s just constant I think.”
Our survey also suggested that senior levels of management perceived a high degree of compliance-orientation 
and less empowerment which might impact on how escalation mechanisms would work. This compliance 
orientation could be explained by its emphasis within training programmes. It was recognised that more could be 
done to reinforce perceptions around the potential upsides from risk-taking (risk-taking was generally perceived 
as a negative). It was also admitted by one participant in the survey follow-up that they needed to apply more 
‘common sense’ and achieve a better balance between creativity and control. The CEO expressed concerns that 
compliance requirements (both internal and external) were limiting the creativity of senior management and their 
willingness to take risk.
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In summary, the essence of ‘gold-plating’ is the expanded and expanding reach of compliance into the 
organisation. This is a trend easily associated with our concept of an engineered approach to risk culture but is 
also itself in danger of drifting as new layers of compliance activities and policies increase through ad hoc change 
programmes initiated by regulators and central group functions. As with ‘sandbox guardians’ we do not pretend 
that organisations are pure cases of gold-platers. These are two ends of a spectrum and most organisations will 
be a mix. However, we think it matters greatly to risk culture whether the ‘voice’ of one is more prevalent than 
the other, and where in the organisation this is found. 
Contingent factors
Our observations are necessarily contextual and dependent on the speci!cities of our participating organisations. 
In the context of our discussion on risk-taking, we wish to highlight three elements. First, issues of scale are always 
important. UK subsidiaries of overseas groups may tend towards more of a strong compliance based approach 
to risk culture, perhaps re"ecting the necessity of strong central group control, coupled to, in one case, a British 
approach to rules. From this point of view, risk culture is imagined and realised as a form of control mechanism, 
rather than an enabler for effective risk-taking. Risk appetite in such a setting comes to be conceptualised primarily 
as a system of constraints on decision-making. At the group level of another less international and more compact 
insurance organisation there was clearly more "exibility to have discussions about limits and appetite.
Second, an important contextual factor for insurers is the need to distinguish life insurance from general insurance. 
For example, there may be more preparedness to take certain market and pricing risks by life insurers, partly out 
of a need to generate positive long run returns for investors, and partly out of necessity, because in the case 
of life insurance, pricing and investment decisions can be problematic for decades (as Equitable Life learned to 
its cost in the guaranteed returns it offered on certain pension and endowment products). We also heard that 
underwriters in general insurance were somehow perceived as the ‘real men’ (an expression used with irony) in 
the sense of being the only real risk takers in general insurers, thus they generally dominated these businesses. In 
contrast risk specialists in life insurance, who are largely actuaries, do not have such an elevated status internally, 
as risk-taking is more pervasive (and perhaps also because actuaries have less of a front-facing, new business 
acquisition role than underwriters). So, risk-taking is also dependent on the type of product, market and expertise 
group. For de!ned product risks (e.g. well understood products such as motor insurance), then there may be tight 
controls and clear rules. But for other less well de!ned risks such rules are dif!cult to specify and more generic risk 
exposure limits, rather than explicit controls on decision-making, become much more important.
Third, often discussion of risk-taking seemed to be framed in terms of a contrast with other organisational 
settings that became exemplar negative cases. Hence, perceptions, values and expressions around risk-taking 
were far from being context neutral. Stories of ‘reckless’ risk-taking pervaded the language used by participant 
organisations in describing their own areas of responsibility. A side comment to the survey’s questions on risk-
taking in one organisation is indicative: “Adoboli took risks...look where that got him.” Moreover, the case 
of Lehman Brothers was mentioned very often as a point of contrast in our discussions, since some of our 
interviewees had worked there and so had inside knowledge. One of these individuals accepted the idea of 
‘judicious’ risk-taking (understood as an appropriate degree of risk for an appropriate return) which contrasted 
with the strong returns (revenue generating) emphasis at Lehman Brothers. According to this person, the front-
of!ce at Lehman had been free to make both money and a “mess”, which others had to “clear up”. As a 
contrast, in her current organisation not reporting to the board and failing to keep them in the picture would be 
“unimaginable” and would lead to someone being !red straight away.
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Summary and Conclusions
Our discussions about risk, control and how limits work in banks and insurers reveal a complex set of issues and 
raise more questions than we are able to answer in this study. It is clear that banks and insurers are different 
from one another, but different parts of each may be more similar and others more different in terms of !nding a 
balance between risk-taking ‘sandbox guardianship’ and ‘gold-plating’ conservatism. Moreover, how risk culture 
is de!ned in risk appetite policies and practice is at the core of the issue, not least the extent to which policies on 
limits and or procedural controls have real traction over actual behavior. There is little doubt that the current public 
discourse about risk culture implicitly associates ‘good’ risk culture with risk conservatism (although debates in 
2013 about bank lending to small business may be disturbing this view). Talk about risk culture becomes a code 
for giving more authority to risk management, as we saw in a previous section, so trends towards ‘gold-plating’ 
of rules and regulation may be understandable. This tendency is reinforced by collective and individual memories 
of highly deviant risk cultures in which CROs were simply yes men. Indeed, an important and variable dimension 
of risk culture is how organisations, including regulators, preserve the memory of bad practice. We saw above 
that one way this can be achieved is by the memory of individuals who worked in failed organisations, but this 
is largely accidental. 
The setting of limits and boundaries via clear authorities for !rst line activity, and the monitoring of these limits, 
was a universal aspiration in all our organisations. This suggests that the problem of risk culture may be as much 
about recovering clarity and enforcement capacity over organisational activities as it is about changing mindsets. 
To repeat the observation made elsewhere in this report (in particular, see the practitioner literature review, 
Appendix C), we did not detect a cultural longing for a more solidaristic and communal organisation, in which risk 
sub-cultures are not tolerated, though such a uniform view of culture is something which we !nd is often implicit 
in some consulting templates for risk culture, as well as regulatory pronouncements of the topic.
Our view of trade-offs suggests that deviant risk management behaviour within organisations is not really 
about the level of risk-taking as such. If we take the example of NASA, where risk-taking is essential for space 
exploration, events like the Challenger shuttle disaster might be reasonably expected from time to time even 
if not at all desired. Indeed, they may be necessary for organisational learning. While the Challenger launch 
decision is famously cited as an example of ‘organisational deviance’ (Vaughan, 1995) it is also the case that space 
exploration is a risky experiment and ‘"ying with "aws’ is accepted. Similarly, !nancial services limits and risk 
appetite ‘levels’ can be set anywhere that an organisation wishes and have been subject to signi!cant regulatory 
scrutiny for some time now. Hence, the deviance that was apparent in many !nancial organisations prior to 2008 
had more to do with lack of transparency about the net risks taken and their contagion effects in the event of 
crystallisation (Power, 2009).
Our neutralist view of risk culture suggests that it is this organisational transparency and understanding of 
operational limits and boundaries of risk-taking which is critical, not necessarily the actual nature of the limits. In 
principle the limits can be anywhere. For us a bad risk culture is not one characterised by high risk-taking as such 
but one in which this is not clear to all parties (both within and outside the organisation) so that informed capital, 
risk mitigation and regulatory decisions can be made. We shall return to this point in our conclusion.
There was universal emphasis on the importance of limits and tolerances and their enforcement and there can be 
little doubt that the actual operation of such limits, rather than policies as such, characterises the quality of risk 
culture at the !rm level. Yet our research suggested a big difference between those risk management functions 
focused on what goes on inside the limits – the risk-taking within the ‘sandbox’ so to speak – and those focused 
on the enforcement of limits as such, with the risk of ‘gold-plating’. The difference is a subtle but important one. 
The former orientation is more sensitive to risk-taking and value creation while the latter is more
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focused on compliance with limits as a system of rules. It is the difference between being sensitive to what is inside 
the limit and focusing on the limit itself. One takes risk management into a potentially productive relationship 
with the business, the other leads its work in the direction of rigid rule-compliance. The nature of risk culture 
hangs on this difference. So while it is true that risk appetite and risk culture are necessarily two sides of the 
same coin – namely, having legitimate and agreed limits which are enforced – attitudes to and perceptions of 
the meaning and nature of these limits by risk management vary in subtle but crucial ways along a continuum. 
In terms of our distinction between organic and engineered approaches to risk culture change, we suggest that 
the so-called ‘sandbox guardians’ are more aligned to the former, while the ‘gold-plating’ champions are closer 
to the latter. Sandbox guardians leverage risk appetite to make risk-taking decisions part of business as usual 
activities; while gold-platers are likely to be heavily involved in ad hoc change initiatives that aim to implement 
and !ne-tune new controls and processes. Interestingly, a conversation with senior risk managers in a large bank 
suggested a third approach that is even closer to our organic concept of risk culture. In this organisation, a more 
dynamic view of limits and boundaries around risk-taking emerged from the words of the interviewee (see Box 
19). In short, drawing on the example of changes in the housing market, it seems that a sensible discussion on 
risk-taking is not only about the discretion within the set limits, but also about the discretion around the limits. 
Finally, in all our discussions about risk-taking, limits and tolerances we heard very little about another key 
dimension of risk culture, the other limit of the bandwidth, namely, what some have called the ‘propensity for 
control’ (Anderson, 2011) This is as much a part of risk culture as risk appetite but receives far less attention. 
We gained a strong impression of concerns about too much 
control and a compliance culture (with blame often directed 
at the regulator), but these views were not supported by any 
intellectual framework other than general notions of ‘respect 
for control’ and a desire to avoid ‘gold-plating’. The propensity 
for control may also re"ect a propensity of an organisation to 
develop knowledge about the risks it faces (see Box 20) but it is 
also hard to grasp for two reasons. First, it is inherently dif!cult 
to characterise the propensity for control in many operational 
areas. Second, in regulated industries it is not wholly under the 
control of the entity itself. In a number of operational areas, 
such as anti-money laundering, organisations have little choice 
but to invest what is necessary; degrees of control are not seen 
as part of a local ‘appetite’ but are a function of perceived 
regulatory expectation. We suggest that !xing and enforcing 
risk appetite across organisations does not necessarily impose 
a similar discipline over control investments.
Box 19: Risk-taking and changing the limits
“If you look at the housing market at the moment there’s clearly a greater demand for buy-to-let mortgages than 
you might have expected because fewer people are able to afford deposits, more people are renting so there’s more 
demand for buy to let. Therefore given that change in the marketplace it’s right to look at your risk appetite where 
you’d severely constrained your buy-to-let within your overall mortgage portfolio. So it’s right to have that debate 
to look at the risks and decide okay can we move our risk appetite to allow more buy-to-let given the changes 
that have taken place out there? You lay down some constraints, you lay down some criteria. You have a sensible 
discussion and you reach an agreement that allows the business to grow and accommodate some of that demand 
for buy-to-let while still maintaining the overall risk appetite for the group.”
Box 20: Lessons from safety risk
Stated zero tolerance for safety risk issues? 
This makes the airline’s internal discourse 
      around limits very clear - no tolerance for
      risk.
Such a zero tolerance is necessarily 
      supported by an ambition to log every 
      small safety relevant event via the safety
      management system.
This means that investments in risk 
      knowledge are also a matter of risk 
      appetite; how much an organisation 
      wants to know about risk also de!nes its 
      risk culture
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Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 How do you get assurance that the risk function is focused primarily on supporting business decisions?
 Do you know which areas of the business are ‘gold-plated’ in terms of risk management and control? If 
 not, how will you !nd this out and what will you do about it?
 When risk limits and tolerances are changed, is the risk function a leader or a follower in this decision?
 Do you understand the appetite for acquiring risk knowledge in your organisation? 
 Have you ever discussed internally the implications for risk-taking and/or for your desired level of risk 
 appetite in acquisition strategies, in particular if you plan to buy entire teams from other organisations?
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“I wonder if some of that is to do with the emphasis that certainly some of the consultancy !rms 
I’ve come across will have focused very much on Solvency II related activity. And then we’ve seen 
as that’s fallen away there’s been a bit of a move back to a sort of much more wide ERM brief. But 
it … means they took their eye off the ball vis-a-vis risk culture.” 
As we have noted elsewhere in this report, the increasing focus on risk culture since 2010 has created signi!cant 
challenges within !nancial organisations as to how they can respond to pressures for change, pressures from 
their own Boards, from regulators and from the climate of debate created by each successive public report (see 
Chapter 1). An important dimension of this challenge is whether and how to take advice. Indeed, the use or non-
use of advisors can be informative about an organisation’s risk culture and the con!dence of the risk function in 
its authority and capability to execute change (see Chapter 4).
In our investigations, we engaged with a number of consulting !rms (both the Big 4 and non-accountancy !rms) 
about risk culture and the related advisory platforms which they had or were trying to develop (primarily these 
were risk culture assessment tools). We also heard from many of the corporate actors about how and when 
they involved consultants in their risk culture thinking. Approaches within the organisations we visited varied 
considerably, from a preference to solving issues largely privately, to utilising and customising external risk culture 
survey instruments, to engaging consultants to advise on programmes of signi!cant risk culture related structural 
change. 
It was argued by some that risk culture change programmes must be developed and owned internally to be 
successful and that the role of outsider advisors was therefore limited. This chapter’s opening quote is indicative 
of the degree of scepticism in some organisations about the ability of consultants to develop tools that address 
the speci!cities of risk culture. As exempli!ed in the quote, we met a number of individuals who saw consultants’ 
products reproducing (or re-selling) more or less standardised compliance tools that have already been on the 
market for some time. Yet others saw risk culture advisory work as an indirect by-product of advice on business 
strategy and on the development of risk oversight structures, including enhancements to risk committees.
Overall, we found little consensus both about the use of consultants and their role and focus, but we did detect 
two broad clusters of opinion in play, which we label ‘consulting sceptics’ and ‘consulting enthusiasts’. This is yet 
another form of trade-off which is at stake in the risk culture space and not surprisingly our distinction mirrors 
in part, but not perfectly, the difference between organic and engineered orientations to risk culture change. 
However, we also observed that some consultants were beginning to gravitate to advisory services of a more 
organic nature and this could be a topic for future investigation.
Chapter 7:
Risk Culture and Advisors
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Consulting sceptics
We conceptualise ‘consulting sceptics’ as those organisations which have tended to adopt a pragmatic and 
organic approach to risk culture change by seeking to leverage internal resources, especially in relation to the 
assessment of their cultures, rather than relying on consulting organisations to do this for them. On the positive 
side, these organisations perceive the bene!ts of a high degree of customisation (in relation to the design of risk 
culture surveys, for example), together with an opportunity to develop models from internal and existing data 
which can track and measure their risk culture in some way. For instance, in two large banks we were told about 
internal change programmes producing ‘red "ags’ and ‘leading’ indicators that might show whether people 
treat risk management seriously. These metrics were becoming part of divisional and personal performance 
management systems. In both cases, the ambition is for simplicity in developing the right set of indicators. 
An insurer, which had also conducted its own internal survey processes, noted that the internal debates were fun 
and enjoyable (“people love it”) but found that actionability was harder. Paraphrasing the CRO at this organisation, 
the struggle was what to do with the results of the internal survey processes. So for this organisation the point of 
risk culture metrics seems to be more to create internal conversations across different parts of the organisation, 
rather than to measure risk culture ‘performance’, something that is largely at odds with the audit- oriented 
approaches adopted by many consultants, at least to date.
Less positively, there was scepticism about the quality of advice 
(see Box 21). For example, INS_2 admitted that it was probably 
not an easy organisation to which advisory services could be 
sold. It perceived consultancy organisations as trying to resell 
Solvency II work as risk culture tools. As put by a senior risk 
manager participating in our survey follow-up meeting:
“So yes, the people I’ve had the conversation with 
and been discussing where we’ve been going in those 
areas started mentioning risk culture, yes. They had been a bit at a loss to offer things in that 
space. They’re trying to resell Solvency II related activity in a way.” 
Consulting ‘sceptics’ can be partly de!ned as those risk management groups who perceive a high degree of 
bene!t in being able to link risk change programmes with other organisational parts. Their view is that this 
internal networking work is the optimal way of ensuring that any change becomes business as usual because it is 
more likely to be owned. A key source of data, in the absence of adhoc risk culture surveys promoted by external 
parties, was HR-related work. As put by a senior risk manager we met in a large bank:
“We’ve had plenty of presentations on how you could do a risk culture survey from plenty of third 
parties but within the group we have a well-established employee survey that’s done on a full 
basis once a year and on a pulse basis in the intermediary six months. So you have a wealth of 
data already available from the employee survey.”
In so doing, consultants’ sceptics are often closer to what we called ‘partnership builders’ (Chapter 4) and touch 
point ‘enthusiasts’ (Chapter 5). In all three cases, the approach of this category of people is closer to an organic 
way to change or manage risk culture.
Box 21: CII survey
The CII survey indicated that those !nancial 
organisations tending to use consultants 
initially were motivated by regulatory concerns, 
but equally there was some suspicion amongst 
respondents of advisors merging Solvency II 
and risk culture work.
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It is important to note, however, the limitations of such an approach to change. Similar to the arguments about 
‘pragmatists’ in Chapter 4, it requires more time for risk management to build its authority, while change initiatives 
can be fragile and tentative, supported by fewer resources. At one insurer, for instance, a change agent within risk 
management could only devote 10% of his time to risk culture. Furthermore, self-directed organic approaches to 
change offer fewer opportunities for external benchmarking and challenge, which consultants can provide. 
Consulting enthusiasts
A number of our respondent organisations did use consultants. At BANK_4, a consulting organisation had initially 
helped them to develop a red "ag process based on a diagnosis of key errors in the wake of the crisis. This 
diagnostic approach helped to reveal some key themes. Over time, this organisation has owned and run the risk 
culture change programme and reported in 2013 that it no longer uses the consultant for this work stream. 
Another bank used the same consultant to conduct a large group-wide (cross country and business unit) risk 
culture survey. This consulting organisation was chosen for its reputation in the area and the fact that they have 
good access to benchmarking data. The survey was a customised version of a standardised offering and enabled 
drilling into pockets of the organisation. This was not a stand-alone risk culture product, but part of a broader 
business review commissioned by the Board. According to our respondents at this bank, there were not many 
surprises arising from the survey which in fact con!rmed the prior view of the ‘strength’ of the risk culture. Indeed, 
the CRO noted (with some pride) that the consulting organisation had reported that their survey results were the 
‘strongest’ seen in terms of alignment between risk function and business. The survey had produced evidence of a 
close correlation between the business and risk function in terms of their perception of risk and risk management. 
The survey results were widely distributed to a range of internal committees to help raise awareness around 
cultural issues and, in part, to tell a story of the bank’s cultural ‘success’.
A senior risk manager we met at the beginning of our investigation in an insurance company af!rmed that a 
consulting !rm had also been asked to look at their risk culture. The manager felt “actually quite pleased” about 
the results as the consultants argued that risk management was “very well embedded” in the business compared 
to peers. However, the advice had a strong regulatory footprint: the advisor had suggested that the company was 
not good at “writing it down” and moving from conversations to “having things in the minutes”. 
Indeed, in our survey of CII members it was clear that regulation !gured strongly in decisions to use external advisors 
on risk culture, and those who chose advisors for this reason reported a high level of satisfaction with advice, we 
think because their expectations were limited to regulatory compliance. This result of our survey suggests that a 
compliance and regulatory based approach to risk culture may have been a necessary starting point in this space, 
although one which has less traction on behaviour than the more dif!cult arena of ethics and incentives, to be 
discussed in Chapter 7. It also suggests a tighter !t than is often assumed between regulatory interest in risk 
culture and advisory work in this space. Advisors have seen an opportunity to work partly or wholly as extensions 
of the regulatory process, not least, in the context of insurance, because of the signi!cance of Solvency II risk 
management advisory work. However, our research also showed how this was changing over time. Advisors who 
had obtained a client foothold in risk culture work were keen to evolve beyond the regulatory starting point, even 
to the point of developing long term partnering relationships with !nancial organisations.
We should not assume an either/or approach to consulting scepticism or enthusiasm. Organisations using advisors 
were not always full enthusiasts and those who were sceptical also sometimes used advisors in order to get new 
projects and change initiatives moving. For example, BANK_4’s use of an advisor initially helped to reinforce internal 
resources dedicated to risk culture and internal networking – thus obviating the further need of the advisor.
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In general, we suggest that when organisations are consulting enthusiasts, even if only temporarily, they seem 
more likely to adopt an engineered approach to risk culture change involving the internal leveraging of external 
models. In addition, they already have some con!dence that their risk culture would ‘score’ well in any survey 
instrument. Bearing in mind these remarks, the use of external consultants is undoubtedly a key feature of 
an engineered approach to risk culture, re"ecting ad hoc interventions where surveys and metrics are used by 
organisations who seek to ‘do something’ about risk culture.
Contingent factors: advisors and their struggles
A more or less enthusiast approach towards consulting services depends on a number of factors, including the 
perceived amount of regulatory pressure, con!dence in the organisation’s knowledge and expertise, the perceived 
knowledge and expertise of consulting !rms, and the breadth of change programmes. We focus here on one 
particular contingent factor that relates to the supply side of the advisory market, and in particular the struggles 
that consulting !rms face in the design of ‘new’ risk culture products. We suggest that part of the reason for a 
range of consulting enthusiasts and sceptics is due to the many different perceptions and understandings of the 
object itself, namely risk culture. And these differences translated into struggles for advisors themselves. 
It is often said that consultants are quick to exploit market opportunities around new issues and debates. However, 
we observed that risk culture, as an advisory object, posed signi!cant challenges for the advisors we met. Indeed, 
advisors faced many of the same problems as !nancial services !rms in turning the general debate about risk 
culture, and observations about failure within the industry, into a clearly de!ned ‘advisable object’ that can be 
operationalised. There were obvious pioneers in thinking, like McKinsey who were early to develop a risk culture 
tool (Levy et al., 2010) in conjunction with their clients who were ‘consulting enthusiasts’. This tool models the 
multidimensional nature of risk culture across a number of factors or pressure points. All of the other consulting 
products we came across adopt a broadly similar design approach, though the factors they choose often vary, 
depending on the perspective they adopt (see Appendix C). 
As more advisors entered the risk culture market we saw a multiplicity of efforts involving very different forms of 
expertise (as highlighted in our practitioner literature review, see Appendix C). Culture and risk culture were often 
evoked in our discussions, but in the same breath admitted to be fuzzy and dif!cult. We sensed that advisors were 
confronted by two speci!c issues. First, what is the right expertise base of the advice platform? Second, can risk 
culture advice be sold independently from a range of other advice platforms?
At two meetings with representatives from two different consulting organisations we met human capital advisors 
and !nancial services specialists, including remuneration consultants. This provides evidence of how new cross-
discipline advisory con!gurations are taking shape around the risk culture problem. We learned that a number 
of consulting organisations were employing psychologists and other non-accounting specialists, also suggesting 
a shift in the way that governance more broadly is being thought about, and the kinds of expertise being 
introduced, even within !nancial institutions. For example, we were informed that a major bank is hiring risk staff 
from the airline and oil industries. And, as we note below, in the case of risk culture, measurement of some kind 
remains hugely important but it is not the measurement traditionally associated with accounting and !nance.
Despite the salience of the topic, a number of advisors admitted to struggling to present risk culture “as something 
that the market can buy”. Not only was it a ‘"uffy’ issue but also standardised risk frameworks seemed to 
inhibit the advice process. We encountered considerable dissatisfaction with ERM models which were generally 
recognised as poor at capturing people risk aspects and were insuf!ciently company-speci!c. Yet the view was 
expressed that more company speci!c approaches adopted by some consultants may not work so well if the 
company’s strategy changes.
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Staff at CONS_1 confessed that cultural work streams were 
dif!cult to sell as a stand-alone service and had to be linked 
to other services such as business planning or board KPI 
development. They were trying to combine culture and risk 
models, using HR simulations to put individuals under decision-
making stress. Yet there was also unease about having too 
many cultural KRIs in the HR space. The key issue was to 
understand the “points of crystallisation” and “what can be 
used to generate action”. As we have noted elsewhere, there 
was widespread agreement that ‘how decisions are reached’ 
is critical. One interviewee suggested that while regulators are 
“exhausted with frameworks (and are) now focusing on risk 
culture”, they also need “something tangible” that can impact 
on behaviour. This is perhaps the essential tension and trade-off about metrics in the risk culture advice !eld (see 
Box 22). 
In response to increasing numbers of customer enquiries, one advisor was in the process of developing an 
enhanced risk culture scorecard tool from an existing database of 200 questions. Another consulting !rm did not 
advise on risk culture separately but provided advice in combination with ERM, intellectual capital and employee 
morale surveys. Rather than having a clear risk culture instrument, this !rm sought to use and blend a mix of 
existing capabilities, such as HR or change management. At this !rm which mixed risk, !nancial services, employee 
bene!ts and human capital expertise, there had initially been low interest in cultural advice. Yet, while demand was 
increasing, they felt that clients were also sceptical of consultants’ offerings and did not see it as a straightforward 
product. In our own research we found our focus groups more informative than the large scale surveys. Yet the 
focus groups were also productive because they were preceded by a short survey to stimulate discussion.
CONS_2 also saw survey work as providing a way to hear the voice of employees and, indirectly, customers since 
this was at the heart of risk culture and criticisms of banks (e.g. the Salz Review). Yet these surveys pose challenges 
of operationalisation, not least because of their frequency and competition for space in more generic staff mood 
surveys. Survey fatigue is something we heard from many parties in our research. For example, BANK_3 reported 
that they preferred to embed risk culture relevant questions in the annual employee survey rather than using a 
stand-alone instrument. There was broad recognition that while surveys lend themselves to quantitative data and 
the ability to track performance over time, they were less good at conveying how risk issues landed in the business 
and how risk is discussed in daily decision-making. Another consulting organisation has made explicit the need 
to focus on risk culture as revealed and made visible in behaviour which can be tracked, rather than focusing on 
corporate norms and statements. This consultant has developed the idea that cultural reinforcers and moments 
that matter need to be identi!ed within organisations as a focus for attention, rather than culture in general. For 
example, such ‘moments that matter’ might be the key ‘challenge conversations’ and where they happen in the 
business.
Summary and conclusions
There is clearly a wide variety of ways in which our sample organisations have sought to engage with external 
consultants on the topic of risk culture. We suggest that organisations with a more organic approach to risk culture 
will tend to use consultants minimally, if at all. Organisations which have wide ranging change programmes for 
risk and risk management are more likely to use a consultant at some point in the process, perhaps because their 
perspective on risk culture has more in common with the approaches offered by consultants. Minimally this may 
involve addressing risk culture as a dimension of regulatory expectations, rather than any desire to support business 
decisions or to increase operational ef!ciency.
Box 22: Safety metrics
Interviewees at AIRLINE commented that the 
desire to quantify can be problematic and 
sometimes misleading. The organisation found 
that where measures are requested by the 
regulator, then there can be spikes in reporting 
due to misclassi!cation. As put by the manager, 
“context is crucial”; it is important to have time 
to sit back and re"ect as much as to collect and 
analyse data. 
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Yet for all this variety in approach, the tracking and 
benchmarking of the visible aspects of risk culture is common 
across the board. All organisations, their consultants and 
regulators share a common ambition to make risk culture 
visible and actionable, and this necessarily involves shrinking 
it in some way down to a set of key factors and their related 
metrics, which capture the ‘respect for internal control’ 
or other ‘moments that matter’. As boards are made more 
explicitly responsible for risk culture, then we can expect to see 
an expansion of these reductionist approaches which create an 
evidence base for risk culture and enable it to be monitored. 
However whether this will help to improve the ‘management’ of risk culture, or render a low resolution and 
potentially misleading picture of the actual risk cultures of !nancial organisations remains to be seen. 
Despite the apparent success of consultants’ survey instruments, as judged by increasing demand for their use, 
these advisors have struggled to shape the risk culture agenda in any consensual fashion and, at the time of our 
research, have been engaged in developing practice, but not cementing it. Many consultants face an epistemic 
tension between their traditional knowledge base in internal audit, performance measurement and decision 
support, and the softer dimensions of risk culture. Furthermore, the risk culture space is amenable to many 
different kinds of expertise. For example, remuneration consulting by HR specialists is becoming steadily more 
behavioural in focus. It is signi!cant that the potential for risk culture work has forced the creation of new internal 
alliances within consulting organisations, as they try to match a hybrid and messy object with hybrid intellectual 
resource. However, we saw no evidence of any willingness to engage with professional anthropologists, who 
might reasonably be regarded as experts on culture (e.g. Bonisch, 2012). Indeed, we sensed very little engagement 
with academics as risk culture advisors. This compares with our comparator airline (see Box 23)
All these struggles at the client interface have not inhibited a large number of client-facing events on risk culture 
and related topics, not least general topics on ethics and ‘doing the right thing’. Such events, often attended 
by non-executive directors, provide an opportunity to distil the knowledge of practitioners and to build up new 
forms of practice inductively from the client encounter.
Finally, most advisors working on risk culture explicitly reported to us that they were highly dissatis!ed with 
regulatory compliance as a starting point for thinking of risk culture, even if this has shaped early experiments by 
many companies. Their concerns suggest that there is a strong regulatory footprint on risk culture work streams 
which we address in the next chapter.
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 Does your organisation essentially have respect for advisors? Are you open to advisory propositions? 
 How often have you been contacted by advisors in relation to risk culture in the last three months? How 
 often have you found their proposals novel or of any interest?
 Do you have processes to discuss the kind of expertise you may need, internally and externally, to 
 progress risk culture change? Do you have an appetite for benchmarking with external entities? 
 What have you done about it?
 Have you ever approached the topic of risk culture in meetings attended by people from both HR and
 Risk? If you are a member of Risk, do you have access to raw data from internal staff morale surveys? Or
  customer satisfaction surveys?
 Is your organisation open to exchanges with research organisations like universities? If not, are you sure 
 of the reasons? If so, when was the last time there was such an exchange?
Box 23:  Airline versus !nancial services
AIRLINE appears to have:
More openness to the external world
Much respect for external advisors, 
      especially academic experts
More use of, and engagement with, 
      external research to validate and accredit 
      their internal work
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“… I love that phrase, bureaucratisation, for risk management … it just describes exactly what 
regulation is becoming […] and that is one of the frustrating things that so much effort is put into 
producing things of limited worth.” 
This  quote highlights the regulatory challenges that !nancial organisations can face when trying to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of less tangible risk management activities. The challenges could well increase given that 
regulatory organisations are taking considerable interest in the cultural dimensions of risk-taking and its mitigation. 
As noted in our background section (Chapter 1) and practitioner literature review (Appendix C), a number of 
of!cial reports have highlighted ‘failures’ in risk culture. Speeches by senior regulators and related publications all 
point to a new regulatory focus on risk culture involving efforts to understand its more visible components (such 
as staff remuneration). 
The challenges for regulators are similar to those of consultants discussed in the previous chapter, namely to 
encourage the design of credible interventions and tracking mechanisms for risk culture which can be evidenced 
for regulatory purposes. Yet it is unlikely that this regulatory attention to risk culture is neutral. Drawing from 
the existing academic research on the aims and effects of !nancial regulation (e.g. Danielsson, 2003; Barth 
et al, 2006; Laevan and Levine, 2009; Eling and Schmeiser, 2010) we have every reason to believe that the 
interests of regulators in improving risk culture will have both intended and unintended consequences. Indeed, 
our investigations suggest that !nancial regulation is itself a kind of cultural force which shapes the way that 
!nancial organisations respond to pressures to understand their risk cultures more explicitly (see Box 24). From 
this point of view, the challenge for regulators is to !nd ways to understand their own in"uence on how risk 
culture is  operationalised in !nancial organisations, including their impact on risk appetite and their propensity 
to expand documentary traces which may give an ‘illusion’ of good risk culture.
Chapter 8:
Regulatory Culture
RISK CULTURE IN F INANCIAL ORGANISATIONS |  A RESEARCH REPORT63
Chapter 8: Regulatory Culture
Box 24: CII member survey
The analysis of our CII member survey results revealed a strong regulatory in"uence on risk culture work. Here 
regulatory requirements and expectations were found to be the strongest drivers for risk culture initiatives, as 
illustrated in the Table below (1=strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree):
The main drivers of the ‘risk culture’ change programmes were ...    Mean
1) Regulatory requirements        5.2 
2) Critical events and/or near misses       4.5 
3) Expectations of !nancial analysts       4.4
4) Expectations of shareholders       4.5 
5) Losses and/or organisational crises       4.2 
6) Expectations of regulators       5.2
The survey also highlighted that the bene!ts of risk culture work was perceived to be regulatory in origin 
(1=strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree)
The ‘risk culture’ change programmes …      Mean 
1) Generally received positive feedback from employees     4.6
2) Helped improve performance in my area of responsibility (eg fewer errors)  4.8 
3) Helped to ensure that my area of responsibility is compliant with regulation  5.3 
4) Improved the quality of my company’s external disclosures    5.0 
In addition, we found a link between respondents who emphasised the regulatory bene!ts of risk culture 
work and those who used consultants. This link suggests that those organisations whose risk culture is most 
in"uenced by regulators are also those that are more willing to use the tools and risk culture products offered by 
consultants. Hence it is likely that regulatory interest in insurers risk cultures is also encouraging them to become 
more ‘engineered’ in their approaches, for better or worse.
In relation to the cultural force of regulation, the trade-off for !nancial organisations is the extent to which they 
preserve their own local habits of risk management or whether their own risk culture is essentially an extension 
and mirror image of the regulator. We doubt that senior members of organisations are fully conscious of this 
trade-off and its actionable possibilities. There is more likely a situation of organisational drift (Alvesson, 2002) 
in which regulatory and organisational cultures become intermingled and indistinguishable; the issue is not even 
seen as a ‘trade-off’. Although the phenomenon requires much more investigation, our investigations did reveal 
some variation across our sample organisations, suggesting how this invisible trade-off between regulator and 
regulated risk culture nevertheless has some visible traces. We identi!ed two broad clusters which we label 
‘frustrated’ and ‘co-operative’ approaches to regulation. 
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Frustrated
This cluster of !nancial organisations tended to adopt a more frictional attitude to regulation; we heard quite a bit of 
negative comment about the effects of regulation during much of our work. A large proportion of these complaints 
focused on the regulatory demand for evidence as a distraction from ‘real’ (i.e. value generating) business activities. 
Documentation
Several interviewees noted that risk culture poses some unique problems of documentation in trying to make soft 
factors visible and measurable. Indeed, evidence and metrics are at the heart of the many trade-offs and tensions 
involved in making risk culture real for management and regulatory purposes. As we have already discussed (see 
Chapter 2 and Appendix C), risk culture may be tracked and measured in visible ways. But the very instruments which 
exist to do this e.g. staff surveys and other tools, provide only indirect observations of behaviour at best. Furthermore, 
the process of writing things down has its own effects; academic research suggests that behaviours can be ‘crowded 
out’ by the need to create audit trails (Power, 2013). In one organisation we heard that they were comfortable that 
the risk culture was good, but it was hard to demonstrate this, especially for areas of their business which tended to 
be highly ‘action-oriented’. The initial quote at the start of this section illustrates this problem.
Another CRO con!rmed that the organisation was “not good at writing things down” but Solvency II is making 
“us write a lot more down than previously”. This organisation has a small risk team but felt that regulators come 
with preconceptions of what can or cannot be done. As put by the interviewee, interactions with the regulators are 
“changing the dynamic I think of what we would do ourselves naturally”. For example, according to the interviewee, 
this organisation had a small, good quality risk team that worked well for a relatively small organisation: “it’s relatively 
easy to turn the dial on things like performance metrics and the way we do business.” This may all change because 
of the regulatory pressure to do things in a certain way.
At INS_1, it was argued that Solvency II documentation requirements were substantively affecting underwriting 
decisions, i.e. making underwriters more risk-averse. One interviewee (already quoted in our interim report) put it 
rather bluntly:
“It’s bureaucracy gone mad and is destroying the culture we have. The pressure on individuals is 
phenomenal and has a negative impact on morale. They don’t blame the company but just looking 
at what was being asked of them it was very clear it has limited real value to us or the regulator.” 
The same person went on to suggest that while the company was able to explain why it does what it does, it was 
also being asked to explain why it does not do other things, a requirement which necessarily expands documentation 
signi!cantly. Solvency II was particularly criticised, not only because of its perceived damage to competitiveness but 
also its impact on insurance work. We heard that the company has lost employees to roles where they have been 
guaranteed no Solvency II work. The company was also particularly concerned about bureaucratisation and had 
counted the number of sheets of paper sent to regulators. In meetings with the regulator, they felt that a KPI was 
needed in order to be satis!ed that something is how people say it is. However, they also perceived the regulators as 
being under pressure to deliver ‘results’, especially in the light of the !nancial crisis.
Interviewees at INS_3 also commented on the paradox of increased formalisation created by regulation. They were 
aware of organisations that became much better at documenting, but did not improve their underlying ‘culture’. 
They reported that regulators are less interested in the substance and more in what is written down. The CRO noted 
that the need for good ‘secretarial skills’ is increasing as the pressure to have strong minutes in governance sensitive 
committees rises. The essential problem with regulators was reported as one of balance. Too much effort goes into 
writing things down and less into the substance of what has been done. Writing things down is not necessarily bad 
and may help to preserve organisational memory. However, in a context of increased regulatory pressure, there is 
a clear trade-off between writing minutes for regulatory purposes only and writing things down to make sure that 
organisational actors debate what they think they should debate.
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Several consultants were also sceptical about the effectiveness of regulatory intervention. Staff at CONS_2 observed 
that insurers had become more prudent and the CRO was now stronger. This consultant runs an ERM survey within 
insurers each year and noted how the risk culture element is becoming more prominent, with insurers feeling 
the need to demonstrate action in this area. Yet they observed that risk culture work remains a struggle and that 
risk appetite statements fall between being a kind of ‘vision statement’ produced primarily for regulators and a 
detailed description of the business as it is. We sensed that some organisations may have lost con!dence in how 
to frame ‘policy’ documents as they perceive the regulatory environment to be more adversarial.
Another consultant spoke of their experience with their clients. A tacit risk culture can be good but it is impossible 
to assess how robust this is. One organisation may have a ‘worse’ risk culture than another but is better able to 
document what they are doing, thus appearing ‘stronger’. They raised the question of what exactly the purpose 
of documenting the components of risk culture might be. On the one hand it may be good for organisational 
memory, but the issue is to understand how such measures would actually be used. Who is leading the production 
of documentation? Is it led by the risk department? Where is risk information owned? How can it be used? 
Our discussion suggests that the process by which documentation about risk management is produced may itself 
say more about the risk culture of an organisation than the documents as such. For this reason we draw no !rm 
conclusions about documentation. Evidentiary processes can be a signal of a determination to challenge and 
understand risks in the business. In short, they can make for a more empirically informed risk culture when the 
motive for documentation is internal and clearly understood. Equally, documentation demands experienced as 
imposed for external veri!cation purposes are seen as an extension of regulatory compliance.
Risk aversion and ‘opportunity crowding’
Managers at INS_2 spoke of their relationship with the regulator as driving a cautious mindset, involving the 
documentation and checking of everything. Paraphrasing a participant in the survey follow-up meeting, if you 
do something different you’re an outlier and that draws the attention. The Solvency II programme is intense and 
the regulator keeps coming back to prove that particular methodologies and models are appropriate. Compelling 
evidence is what the regulators constantly look for. We heard that other parts of the group refer to this as the 
‘English disease’, namely the need to write everything down in terms of processes and evidence. While it was 
admitted that this has a positive dimension in terms of the quality of business cases submitted, there is less ability 
to take opportunities.
At a survey follow-up meeting, it was commented that the volume of regulatory change is unprecedented. In 
addition, central risk and compliance projects can also put pressure on the local team – central deadlines can 
be very demanding and at times they can be swamped with group initiatives (although they did not seem angry 
about this – more resigned). We sensed that there was a perceived ‘crowding out’ of local value creation where 
time spent on compliance creates an opportunity cost by limiting the time available for actual risk management 
and more creative thinking in conjunction with the business. The CEO was especially concerned about the !ndings 
from our survey that suggested a compliance-dominated focus within risk management.
We also heard that a few years ago (prior to the !nancial crisis) regulators were pressuring insurance companies to 
manage risk more like the banks, for example by using risk capital models. They were told by the Financial Services 
Authority that they should look at, and learn from, risk management in the banking sector. The suggestion was 
that there were good models there, and that insurers could learn from banks about the measurement of tangible 
effects. The result was a perceived loss of focus on the softer aspects of risk management, which are now returning 
to view under the label of risk culture. It was noted with some amusement that the modelling approaches adopted 
by the banks had not really helped them manage the effects of the !nancial crisis.
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Finally, a large global bank was critical of the regulator for being too focused on the old CRO/CEO model and too 
sceptical of their new ‘three and a half lines of defense’ even though the Board !nds it very attractive. At a second 
meeting we learned that the regulator was still unsure about their desire to split the risk function between !rst and 
second line functions. The original intention was that these functions would have separate risk reporting lines, but 
the lead supervisor vetoed this. In effect, a regulatory risk culture based on the TLD model !nds it hard to digest 
any deviation from, and innovation to, this model.
Overall, our group of ‘frustrated’ organisations were largely but not exclusively insurers, and we noted that they 
were more likely to be aligned with an organic approach to risk culture change involving longer times scales and 
working with existing internal resources. They tended to be fearful to varying degrees that the external in"uence 
of regulators would damage their internal approaches to risk management and risk-taking. 
Co-operative 
In contrast to the ‘frustrated’ cluster, we also found organisations – mainly banks – that were far more accepting of 
the regulatory mandate. For example, the CRO in a large bank suggested that they had an ambition to align with 
regulators’ expectations. The !nancial regulator was a given and if one didn’t like it, then one should go to work 
in a different industry sector. So their philosophy is that developing resistance is unlikely to be a fruitful strategy 
and thus a waste of resources, though the CRO emphasised that the business still needs to fully recognise that 
compliance with regulatory requirements has a cost in terms of time and resources. ‘Conduct’ risks are a ‘pain’ 
(in recognition of increased regulatory attention from the new Financial Conduct Authority), but it was argued 
that they need to be thought of as an opportunity also. Furthermore, it was commented that the business must 
recognise that conduct risks will have a hit on pro!ts if they are not managed properly.
At the survey follow-up meeting at BANK_1, the attendees accepted that the business has had to cope with 
increasing regulatory pressure, especially at a senior level (they try to leave traders/risk-takers free to do their job). 
As an example, the local risk team now have a specialist group which responds to regulatory requests, when only 
a few years ago this work was simply absorbed by the business. This change and its associated costs have become 
business as usual and are simply accepted. 
Interestingly, it was also reported that regulation had enabled some groups to argue for speci!c investments in 
technology, so that there are some internal winners from regulation. This organisation, like others, also highlighted 
tensions with regulators regarding its TLD approach. The regulator had expressed concerns about the closeness of 
the second line risk function with !rst line business operations. So being ‘co-operative’ is not without tensions and 
there was also scepticism about the very possibility of measuring and reporting on risk culture. One participant to 
the workshop exclaimed that it was ‘insane’ that they had to be scored on certain dimensions. Overall, the ‘co-
operative’ set of organisations tended to have much less concern about where regulatory culture ends and their 
own risk culture began. Indeed, at the extreme they are indistinguishable. An interesting contrast is provided by 
AIRLINE (see Box 25) which appears to be co-operative to the extent of having an explicit partnership with the 
regulator, including shared technology.
Box 25: Regulators and Trust
CAA of!cials are respected as ex-industry people and former pilots. 
A symbol of this positive relationship was that the CAA was given direct access to screenshots from 
      internal safety reporting systems. This arrangement clearly requires a high degree of trust but it also fosters 
      industry awareness and learning about incidents. 
The airline example illustrates how technology can in principle be used to support a partnership with the 
      regulator, providing a platform for more meaningful interaction. 
RISK CULTURE IN F INANCIAL ORGANISATIONS |  A RESEARCH REPORT67
Chapter 8: Regulatory Culture
Contingent factors 
Regulatory pressures can be seen as a macro contingent factor affecting a number, if not all, of our trade-
offs. Our sample of banks and insurers is small but the data suggests that insurers and banks differ in their 
acceptance of, and attitude to, regulatory intervention. We heard many insurers, particularly the smaller ones, 
expressing frustration that they were being regulated like banks. In contrast, the banks seemed to accept that 
recent experience in the industry had given the regulator a mandate to intervene. Indeed, our results must be 
placed in the context of the aftermath of a banking crisis in which regulatory authority has increased. Overall, we 
found that the ‘co-operative’ group tended to model their risk culture change programmes according to regulator 
needs. While there was still some frustration expressed, there seemed to be more pragmatic acceptance of the 
regulatory in"uence. 
Our observations remain tentative and subject to a number of further quali!cations. Much depends on size and 
the capacity to absorb regulatory costs. There may also be a distinctive ‘UK effect’ in terms of a jurisdiction which 
has been hit harder than many others by the crisis in banking. The culture of risk management in UK banks has 
little choice but to work very closely with regulators. Relatedly, organisational attitudes to regulation may be 
shaped by speci!c historical experiences of crisis.
Reactions to regulatory pressures also depend on internal structural organisational arrangements and cultural 
predispositions. At INS_1 we observed that junior staff members ‘suffer’ less from increases in compliance checks 
and policies – the burden is largely borne by senior people. As put by one interviewee, junior people in this 
organisation are to be ‘protected’, while, in the context of increased regulatory pressure, “it’s getting tougher 
on the more senior people.” In contrast, INS_2 deliberately chose to avoid having senior management buffering 
regulatory pressure for more junior people. As put by one interviewee:
“We’ve deliberately prevented senior management from being that buffer because we wanted 
everybody right through the organisation not just to know what they were doing but why they 
were meant to be doing it.”
We found this contrast particularly relevant from an organisational culture point of view. It shows how presumed 
‘external’ pressures, and the con"icts that may arise as a consequence of them, are indeed dependent on internal 
organisational arrangements, values and norms related to the ways in which an organisation copes with such 
pressures. Therefore, prescriptively we can hypothesise that an important dimension of risk culture is how and 
whether regulatory demands are buffered from operations, and which personnel absorb increased regulatory 
activity.
Summary and Conclusions
We do not regard regulator unpopularity as being in itself indicative of regulatory failure of any kind. Indeed, 
regulatory theory suggests that such unpopularity is a necessary feature of escalated regulatory activity. So 
we draw no conclusions from unpopularity per-se. However, we think the nature and source of that apparent 
unpopularity deserves more attention than we have been able to give it in our work so far. Our research to date 
provides suggestive evidence that one of the biggest factors in"uencing risk culture in organisations is regulation 
itself. By this we do not only mean that the regulator has become explicitly interested in culture as the foundation 
of safe and consumer-facing !nancial services. We highlighted this in Chapter 1 already. Rather it appears to us 
that the existing regulatory footprint is often so signi!cant that it can be dif!cult to determine where regulation 
ends and internal policy begins. In short, risk culture is already highly institutionalised. Regulation pervades 
!nancial organisations and is already a feature of their risk culture – hence our categories of the ‘frustrated’ and 
‘co-operative’.
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It is perfectly reasonable that external regulatory organisations require a way to observe the actions of regulated 
entities. For example, !nancial returns are an important window on solvency and liquidity. Yet as documentary 
demands increase they generate a ‘writing-down’ orientation which is not simply neutral in its effects. Our 
interviews and survey work suggest that these documentary demands expand a compliance-style and engineered 
approach to the culture of risk management and favour those aspects of risk culture which are easier to evidence 
(but not necessarily more meaningful) than others. This in turn may lead to more risk conservatism in organisations 
and more standardised approaches to risk culture (e.g. the TLD approach to governance). 
However, we should be careful not to associate documentation growth with risk conservatism too simplistically. 
Banks in the mid-1990s were subject to strenuous documentation processes in many parts of their business, but 
this did not prevent reckless risk-taking in some places. We conclude that the main effects of regulatory demands 
for evidence may be distraction and ‘crowding’ in terms of what the risk function spends time on. One sign of 
crowding is a potential disconnect between documentation and action, or what one CRO has called “management 
by observation”. Another would be the experience of having less space for discretion and judgment, and how this 
is distributed across risk management and business functions. This effect of regulation, including documentation, 
on trust in local managerial judgment and discretion is only suggested by our research and would be an important 
topic for future research.
Finally, a number of our themes in this report point in the direction of a pervasive regulatory culture in !nancial 
services. This is best understood as a ‘mindset’ and value system which is shared by organisational actors within 
regulators, companies and consultants (including external auditors), and is reproduced by the movement of 
people and careers across all three organisational boundaries. Regulators are part of this ‘regulatory space’ but 
are not its sole inhabitants. We have observed some other actors who would not consider themselves to be 
‘regulators’ are nevertheless part of a powerful but invisible community which reinforces key elements of this 
regulatory culture. 
In essence, based on our !ndings, we hypothesise that a number of risk managers in !nancial organisations, 
supervisors in regulatory bodies and advisors in consulting !rms essentially share a view about what good risk 
culture looks like, and derive authority and resources from each other. For example, we heard at one bank that 
regulation has strengthened the hand of risk people; “the regulators have provided the tools we always wanted.” 
And although all the speci!c consultants that we have met have been very thoughtful and re"ective about 
emerging risk culture advice, elsewhere in their own advisory organisations frequent assignments are undertaken 
on behalf of regulators under section 166 of the Financial Services and Market Act (‘skilled persons’ report on 
a !rm addressing an area of regulatory interest or concern). Of necessity this skilled persons’ work tends to 
reinforce this regulatory culture. 
Figure 5 synthesises these preliminary re"ections on what we can call a ‘trans-organisational’ regulatory culture. 
The letters stand for individuals. A, B and C who work for !nancial organisations, regulators and advisors 
respectively, are likely to have more working habits in common than with others in their own organisations (P, Q, 
R). A, B and C are often interchangeable, and move between corporate organisations, regulators and advisory 
!rms. The ‘inner circle’ characterises a less visible ‘shadow organisation’ or space, in which the regulatory culture 
described in this chapter is reproduced. Individuals within this space share values of due process, audit trails and 
compliance, and speak a similar language. Within this shadow organisation, we suggest that:
 A increasingly treats B as a client, while C is an agent of B
 B is dependent on both A and C, suggesting elements of ‘regulatory capture’, but equally our research
 suggests extensive in"uence of B on A and C. This results in a dynamic self-reproducing ‘regulatory 
 culture’
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In conclusion, while our ideas are very underdeveloped, we think that this self-reinforcing network is poorly 
understood yet is responsible in part for the durability of what one our respondents call the ‘English disease’, 
namely the idea that unless something is written down it did not happen. It also suggests that, for all the 
complaining about regulators, there is a much wider industry of regulatory agents that cuts across organisational 
boundaries. It is this trans-organisational regulatory culture, which we have only glimpsed in this research but 
which we are convinced exists and is a more powerful force than any organisation-speci!c manifestation of it, or 
indeed any speci!c !nancial regulator. This will be a subject for future research.
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
 Does your organisation genuinely respect the public objectives of the regulatory function? Do you have 
 positive ‘regulation conversations’ internally? How often? Who is participating in such conversation (e.g. 
 business, risk, compliance; senior or junior members of staff)?
 Do you push back and challenge the regulator? If not, do you know why not? 
 If you think regulatory demands for documentary evidence are excessive, do you have a clear conception 
 of what you would require in the absence of regulation?
 Do you have ways of tracking the extent to which regulation is ‘inside’ your organisation? Do you have 
  any processes to track the impact of regulation on work habits and internal attitudes to risk? Would you 
 like to know?
 Do you know how compliance experts are regarded in your organisation? If so, do you want to change 
       that? If not, do you want to know?
Organization (P)
A
CB
The Advisor (R)The Regulator (Q)
Figure 5: Trans-organisational Regulatory Culture
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“Too many bankers, especially at the most senior levels, have operated in an environment with 
insuf!cient personal responsibility. Top bankers dodged accountability for failings on their watch 
by claiming ignorance or hiding behind collective decision-making. They then faced little realistic 
prospect of !nancial penalties or more serious sanctions commensurate with the severity of the 
failures with which they were associated. Individual incentives have not been consistent with 
high collective standards, often the opposite […] Remuneration has incentivised misconduct and 
excessive risk-taking, reinforcing a culture where poor standards were often considered normal. 
Many bank staff have been paid too much for doing the wrong things, with bonuses awarded 
and paid before the long-term consequences become apparent. The potential rewards for "eeting 
short-term success have sometimes been huge, but the penalties for failure, often manifest only 
later, have been much smaller or negligible. Despite recent reforms, many of these problems 
persist.” (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, 2013b: 8-9)
A prominent feature of the post-crisis commentary and analysis has been the call for a new ethic in !nancial 
services, broadly encapsulated in a recent speech by Justin Welby, the Archbishop of Canterbury. He urged 
bankers to be ‘essentially’ good (Welby, 2013) and in the spirit of the Good Samaritan asked them to remember 
their neighbours, whether this be ful!lling the needs of their customers or society at large. In addition, more 
‘earthly’ organisations, such as the CBI, CII and Which?, have also emphasised the importance of ethics in !nancial 
services, as evidenced by their testimony to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (2013c). 
Equally prominent has been a focus on remuneration and incentives throughout !nancial organisations as another 
lever on behaviour, a theme that is especially popular with politicians and regulators (see our practitioner literature 
review, Appendix C). There have already been general reforms in remuneration reporting and disclosure, and 
pressure for a shift to long term incentives. Speci!cally, both the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee 
have been active on the issue of remuneration (e.g. Basel Committee, 2010), and much has been done at the 
European level to ‘reform’ incentive arrangements; as a result many regulators, including those in the UK (FSA, 
2010, 2012) expect !nancial organisations to manage ‘incentives risk’ much more explicitly, and remuneration 
arrangements in general can be subject to comprehensive supervisory reviews.
These two strands of the public debate – ethics and incentives – represent opposite ends of a continuum in 
which !nancial organisations must manage trade-offs in their approach to behavioural change. On the one hand, 
the post crisis emphasis on the need to be ‘good’ as opposed to ‘greedy’ demands that people within !nancial 
organisations must change their fundamental orientation and rediscover a mission for service. On the other hand, 
we observe a focus on re-designing performance metrics to drive appropriate behaviours. Changing people’s 
motives is not the point. Can these two approaches – ‘ethical’ and ‘disciplinary’ - to behavioural change coexist? 
And at which organisational level may they be most effectively applied?
Chapter 9:
Between Ethics and 
Incentives
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Ethical approaches to behavioural change
We sensed that ethics and culture can be code words for a tight sense of organisational identity. For example, 
we learned of a strong sense of community in the people working for INS_3 re"ected in very low staff turnover: 
“And all these people that went to [the same] University and now they work there [at the Group 
Head Of!ce] and they’ve always worked there and their parents work there, their uncles work 
there, their aunts work there, you know. There’s a supermarket, there’s a business school … 
Hairdressing, dentistry, I mean the whole lot, it’s just one community, it really is.”
More commonly, the discourse of cultural reform in 
organisations has involved the renewal and re-articulation 
of mission statements to emphasise a focus on clients. The 
risk dimension of this involved efforts to validate what is 
called a ‘speak up’ culture where every employee has an 
opportunity to raise concerns. One insurer claimed to have a 
“no-blame culture” (reinforced through meetings and senior 
management talks) with clear support from the CEO, meaning 
that it was ‘safe’ to make mistakes. 
We also came across the phrase “respect for internal control” 
here and in a number of different places (see Box 26), 
suggesting the in"uence of a speci!c advisor, who may have 
adapted this from Weick (see Levy et al., 2010). ‘Respect’, 
usually a concept involving relations between people, has 
been unusually extended to the relationships between people and systems. Indeed, respect for control implies 
that the system should be thought of as a kind of organisational person itself, as being a critical part of the 
organisational personality. At the survey follow-up meetings at INS_2 there were the following comments:
“With respect, respect is an interesting word in there because for me respect is a very different 
word to compliance […] I think people who respected a system of internal control would challenge 
it […] It’s more adult.”
While it is perhaps easy to dismiss the many efforts at renewing corporate internal narratives as mere sloganising, 
we did encounter a seriousness of will in making them actionable in some way, for example in training programmes. 
From this point of view, we think that the voice and authority of risk has been the channel through which abstract 
narratives of doing the right thing land in the wider organisation. In essence, risk is the vehicle for ethics. They 
are not two different things. 
From this point of view, risk training can be viewed as an enculturation vehicle to promote the ethics of risk 
control, as well as being technical in nature. For example, at BANK_3 the CRO felt that risk training had tended to 
be dominated by technical regulatory issues in the UK, rather than the communication of corporate narratives (for 
example to reinforce corporate values), but they commented that this was changing. They had developed a “risk 
academy” involving risk training for non-risk people. At another bank, training was supported by the slogan “risk 
is me”. A large insurer was also focused on making risk more prominent in training and internal communications. 
There was a big focus on communication about Solvency II and what it means to people in practice, and this was 
supported by a “risk in action” website. According to our interviewee this section of the website has attracted 
the most hits of any portion of their internal site. This organisation won an award for communication expertise in 
relation to its “risk in action” work, even though there had been a mixed internal response, due to the perceived 
child-like nature of the approach, which included linking the organisation’s risk appetite to different foods. Some
Box 26:  Just culture and respect
At our comparator airline, we heard the phrase 
‘just culture’ used to mean that individuals 
would be treated fairly, but that this did not 
mean it was a no-blame environment. Staff 
should feel safe to report adverse events and 
near misses. But they also must be clear about 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior. At a 
large industrial company we visited the new 
mission statement referred to ideas of courage 
and respect.
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people “loved it”, while others found it “puerile”. But, paraphrasing the interviewee, the key point was that risk 
managers were interested in ways of animating the risk conversation in the organisation.
So it would seem that it was the debate that mattered to the organisation, rather than the technical content 
of the training. Despite the mixed response, the risk director was satis!ed, because this debate helped to raise 
awareness of important risk issues, such as risk appetite.
Disciplinary approaches to culture change
In contrast to efforts to promote some kind of ethical renewal, through mission statements and training, we also 
observed in some organisations a strong emphasis on effecting behavioural change via new performance metrics 
and associated incentives. 
Indeed, there was some blending of approaches in so far as we observed that one organisation monitored how 
many people attended risk training sessions and began to use this as a behavioural-level indicator for risk culture. 
But equally, the organisation was also trying to see whether training sessions were achieving their technical 
objectives by assessing whether people left with the right ‘toolkit’. 
Remuneration structures are widely regarded as being at the heart of the culture debate but the picture at a 
number of insurers was complex. For example, at INS_1 the CRO stated that the bonus culture was modest. It 
was noted that if the group as a whole doesn’t make money, then people do not get anything more than small 
budgeted bonuses. This philosophy had created some pushback from the higher earners. The CRO acknowledged 
that the bonus culture in other organisations was different but noted that few people have ever left INS_1 for 
higher gains. Over the years, the organisation has tended to have “quite a bit of loyalty” though as the company 
grew, staff turnover had increased slightly. But we also heard from another CRO that staff turnover can be too 
low: at 2% per annum they couldn’t get new blood and ideas into the organisation.
This reveals another trade-off in thinking about risk culture which underlies the ethics-incentives approach 
to behaviour change. Very low staff turnover rates may positively re"ect a strong sense of belonging in an 
organisation on the one hand, but equally the organisation can be all-encompassing. Dissent and challenge are 
not suppressed explicitly but are overridden by strong group values. History also has many examples of strong 
groups doing bad things, a factor picked up in the Parliamentary Commission report on HBOS (Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards, 2013a). For this reason we are cautious about the enthusiasm of some 
commentators on the !nancial crisis for a renewed sense of corporate community. 
On the other side, high staff turnover can point to a workforce that is constantly restless and seeking to optimise 
personal gain. From this point of view, incentive risk does not simply reside in the clauses of formal employment 
contracts but in the climate in which those contracts operate. Put differently, it is impossible to read likely behaviour 
simply from such contracts, even allowing for the risks of short-term performance targets. For example, we heard 
that the-long term view is not simply a matter for the remuneration contract; it was dif!cult to have formal 
incentive plans for longer than 5 years, even if a longer time horizon was desirable. The latter requires softer (e.g. 
social) mechanisms of aligning people with the long-term mission of the organisation.
The overall organisational context of remuneration also matters. In many industry sectors high quality workers 
are attracted despite the modest levels of pay and often the absence of performance related pay and bonuses 
(e.g. nursing and teaching, although this is changing). This is a salient point even for !nancial institutions where 
the relative modesty of remuneration and bonus arrangements is offset by the use of other less pecuniary values. 
We observed this at a regional building society, where part of the ‘reward’ for working there was a less pressured 
and more family-oriented working environment. Another CRO, whose heritage was similar, reported that the 
remuneration structure in the investment business has been stretched only a little bit. People know and accept 
that they are not going to get big bonuses as there are clear caps in place.
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In terms of performance management within INS_2, metrics relating to Solvency II had been introduced in 2012 on 
an experimental basis. However, the overriding impression from talking to insurers was that individual employees 
had generally self-selected into organisations where they knew that they would not be making large bonuses. 
In the banks within our sample, we saw more attention to building risk-related performance criteria into reward 
systems. This distinction between banks and insurers again highlights a potential relationship between ethics and 
remuneration. It may well be that high remuneration and bonus arrangements attract people with a different 
baseline ethical perspective, or even that these arrangements provide a reinforcing mechanism for more self-
centred behaviours. This issue is highlighted in Appendix B of the Salz Review of Barclays, where it is noted that: 
“There is a body of evidence which shows that extrinsic rewards, like bonus payments or contingent 
pay, dulls creativity, narrows focus and slows our capability to solve problems. Deci’s famous 
‘Soma Cube Experiment’ required groups of people to work together to complete complex 
puzzles, some for reward others not. Deci played with multiple con!gurations of reward and 
multiple con!gurations of group. In each, the result is the same. The rewarded group consistently 
produced fewer solutions, were less engaged in the task, and were less socially engaged with 
their colleagues. The results are completely counter-intuitive. The conclusion is that when people 
are motivated intrinsically, they perform better and more consistently than when motivated 
extrinsically.” (Salz, 2013:191)
In our investigation we also found that metric-driven behavioural change initiatives may have unintended, though 
potentially positive, consequences for the level of interaction between the risk function and other parts of the 
business. In BANK_4, a risk culture change initiative started with a ‘stick’ approach that evaluated, on a quarterly 
basis, the performance of front-of!ce managers (starting with a single business unit) against a set of risk culture 
metrics. Not meeting expected targets could have serious consequences in terms of compensation and career 
advancements. A year later, in our second meeting in this organisation, we were told that this metric driven 
change initiative had been extended to other business units. Interestingly, the person dedicated full time to this 
project recognised how the risk culture change initiative had enabled her to get closer to a number of other 
important strategic level projects, which were not explicitly related to risk culture change. Similar to our !ndings 
in Chapter 5 on interaction, risk culture change programmes – no matter what their initial focus and intended 
outcomes – seem to open ‘new doors’ and to increase the interaction of risk staff with front-of!ce personnel and 
other teams of risk specialists.
Contingent factors
We do not ourselves have any direct evidence to support the observation in the Salz review that intrinsic motivations 
generate superior performance over extrinsic motivations like bonuses. However what evidence we do have 
suggests that incentives are complex across different !nancial organisations and that, while remuneration and 
tight performance management are undoubtedly important levers of behavioural change, they are unlikely to be 
suf!cient on their own. For example, we strongly suggest that there is considerable variation in how the trade-off 
between harder and softer approaches to incentives might be managed across organisational levels and across 
divisions.
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Behavioural change through metrics may be more relevant (and feasible) at lower organisational levels. As 
put by one of our interviewees, metric-driven change is fundamental with the “boys and girls that sit on the 
counter in a branch.” Behavioural change is assumed to be more value-driven at higher organisational levels. 
For example, despite the great public and regulatory focus, senior executive remuneration schemes may be blunt 
instruments of behavioural change where issues of network reputation, and organisational mission !gure strongly 
as motivators. Equally, for reasons of career self-selection, speci!c trading desks with mobile trading personnel 
may be entirely immune to ethical nudging and far more responsive to naked incentivising. Accordingly, there 
are many contingent factors at stake and it is no surprise that organisations have been experimenting with a 
mix of approaches with different emphases towards ethics and 
incentives respectively. 
Summary and Conclusions
We have identi!ed two discourses of reform in !nancial 
services that are rather different even though we !nd them 
inter-mingled in many organisations. As ideal types we label 
them ‘ethical’ and ‘disciplinary’ approaches to behaviour 
modi!cation. The former assumes that individuals can 
internalise a sense of mission and collective responsibility. The 
latter deeply believes that individuals are naked optimisers of 
their personal short-term !nancial return, unless controlled via 
an enforceable contract. The CRO at one bank in our sample 
articulated our ideal types in terms of two complementary 
formulas to ‘strong risk culture’ (see Box 27).
The CRO went on to note that the two approaches, and 
their respective work streams, have different timescales, suggesting another kind of trade-off facing risk culture 
change programmes – the quick !x versus enduring change. The disciplinary, incentives-based approach can be 
achieved relatively quickly while ethical transformation is a slower change process consistent with much of the 
organisational culture literature that we reviewed (see Chapter 2). The CRO emphasised that you cannot train 
culture but leaders can ‘push it down’. In terms of our framework of analysis outlined in Chapter 3, the former is 
part of an engineered approach to risk culture change; the latter re"ects what we call a more organic approach. 
In conclusion, we note that it may surprise readers of this report that ethics and incentives are not a more 
prominent part of our !ndings. This is especially the case given that the restoration of public trust in !nancial 
services, along with the issue of remuneration, have been prominent themes in public discourses about the 
future of !nancial services (see Chapter 1). Yet many of the themes considered in other chapters – centralisation, 
authority, interaction, risk-taking, advice and regulation were far more evident in our open-ended discussions. In 
conclusion we suggest that there may be some interesting reasons for this apparent gap between the external 
and internal debates.
Box 27:  
Two approaches to behavioural change
1. Long term organic change: Tone from the 
top or a focus on ethics. Such an approach 
emphasises the renewal of values in the 
organisation, in particular an ethos of client 
service.
2. Short term engineered change: A zero 
tolerance approach to compliance and other 
limit breaches with consequences for bonus, 
progression etc. Such an approach brings 
more and more imposed risk discipline and 
can be associated with an intense regulatory 
environment
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First, issues of both ethics and incentives have become compressed into, and operationalised by, the risk 
management agenda. Paying attention to the culture of risk-taking and control is the way in which these issues 
are translated into organisation practice. ‘Respect for control’ is an example of this translation. Indeed, such 
translation is arguably necessary because notions of ‘doing the right thing’ are otherwise simply abstractions. This 
process by which risk management is ethicised is not about making, for example, bank employees into ‘good’ 
people in some general and fundamental sense of that concept. It is rather about energising and authorising 
capacities to challenge and escalate, to build risk naturally into decision-making processes, and to welcome the 
risk manager as a colleague. This is really a matter of changes in speci!c institutional norms; ‘doing the right 
thing’ has little organisational traction unless it is made operational by such norms.
Second, other than in speci!c parts and levels of organisations, senior risk management personnel don’t 
believe that formal incentive structures provide much by way of general leverage over what regulators now call 
‘behavioural risk’. From this point of view much of the external remuneration debate has been animated by 
levels of pay and bonuses, but simpli!es, for political effect no doubt, the complex motivations of many actors in 
!nancial services !rms.
Third, the CROs and risk managers with whom we interacted were necessarily very pragmatic and operated with 
an eclectic range of practices to de!ne risk culture, seeking to in"uence and facilitate better practices, using 
metrics to initiate conversations, and expanding their footprint in their own organisations. Ethical statements or 
incentives risk analysis, though prominent externally, were in fact a small part of their internal change programmes. 
In sum, while !nancial organisations consciously and unconsciously managed a trade-off between two different 
kinds of approach to bringing about behavioural change, evidence from the other chapters suggests that this was 
itself part of a much richer way of thinking about how to  operationalise changes in risk culture.
Risk culture challenges for CROs, CEOs and Boards
Do you understand where in the organisation behavioural change is most necessary? 
      If not, how will you get it?
Which combination of levers is most likely to be effective in bringing about that change? Is such a
      combination different in different parts of the organisation (e.g. functional areas or hierarchical levels)?
How are you monitoring and measuring ‘respect’ for internal control and risk management?
Our investigations show that many organisations are taking issues of risk culture very seriously and are engaged 
in a variety of change programmes. Yet words like ‘culture’ and ‘risk culture’ are very deceptive. They are proxies 
for many different things. Rather than ask ‘what is risk culture?’ it is better to ask about the diverse range of 
things – instincts, attitudes, habits and behaviours – that make it up, what in"uences these things and how, if at 
all, they can be managed and reported on. 
In our research, we have taken this line of questioning in reverse order. In essence, we have started with how the 
meaning of risk culture is revealed in the work programmes of !nancial organisations. Instead of answering the 
question ‘what is risk culture?’ directly, we have tried to answer another i.e., ‘how is the nature of risk culture 
revealed in efforts to manage it?’ In addition, both from our prior assumptions developed from desk research of 
practitioner and academic writings and from our data, it is clear that ‘good versus bad’ risk culture is far too binary 
a view of what is at stake. Rather, we focused on how organisations seem to deal with a number of explicit and 
implicit trade-offs underlying the bandwidth between risk-taking and control.
This line of enquiry into trade-offs has led us not to the traditional inner core of culture – the attitudes and habits 
of individuals – but to a different and equally interesting set of interlocking building blocks: designs for oversight 
structures; efforts to enhance the organisational authority of risk management, interactive and networking 
capabilities, the real organisational life of risk appetite in the form of limits and tolerances, the openness of 
organisations to outsiders of various kinds in progressing change, the extent of the footprint of the regulator on 
organisational processes and choices in designing leverage over behaviour – ethical renewal or new performance 
management disciplines.
We do not pretend that our focus on these issues is either exhaustive or uniquely original. It is simply that these 
issues, and the choices they posed, seemed to be at the centre of our open-ended discussions with organisations 
about their approach to risk culture. They are simply what we observed. 
It is said that culture is not about the messages organisations send to their participants, but how they are received. 
From this point of view, we admit the limitations of our research, being focused primarily on the risk function, 
which is more in the position of ‘risk culture’ diffuser and in"uencer. How risk culture really plays out in what is 
now called the ‘First Line of Defence’ is clearly important but we were only able to have limited insights into this. 
Clearly there is a need for more work to understand how risk culture change programmes have landed. Relatedly 
we picked up many differences between banks and insurers, some obvious and some less so, and this deserves 
more analysis in the future.
Chapter 10:
Conclusions
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Although we talked to individuals in individual organisations, including advisors, we are conscious that these are 
not the only relevant levels when discussing risk culture. We strongly suspect that there is a trans-organisational 
regulatory culture which is not organisation-speci!c and which can be characterised by a range of shared attitudes 
to rules, compliance, evidence and due process. This phenomenon also needs more analysis. Although it will 
not be easy to investigate, its existence helps to explain the institutional durability of practices, despite their 
widespread criticism. Taking the issue of levels even further, it has been said that !nancial services is a ‘bubble 
industry’ disconnected from the rest of society. Critics say that the industry thought it was bigger than society. 
From this point of view, the focus on risk culture is symptomatic of a desire to reconnect !nancial organisations, 
as a totality, to society via their clients and also via the reconstructed pride of their employees. 
We have investigated risk culture at a particular point in time and phase of the business cycle. How some of the 
changes described in our report fare as market and economic con!dence returns are open questions. We also 
cannot rule out the possibility that the regulatory focus on risk culture and oversight has been a kind of temporary 
substitute for more stringent interventions to break organisations into smaller units. Only time will tell.
We have not sought to position our work explicitly as another advisory offering, preferring to !nd things out 
and display the variety of what we have encountered. However, we have taken the opportunity to pose some 
challenges to !nancial organisations, to CROs, CEOs and their boards. The challenges are not easy to address, 
but we see them as a kind of path to greater awareness of what is at stake in sustaining a risk culture, with all its 
trade-offs, that the organisation and its stakeholders actually desire, rather than one that just somehow happens.
Finally, we repeat our thanks to the many individuals in banks, insurers and advisory organisations who responded 
to our request for engagement. It is probably part of the culture of !nancial organisations and their advisors that 
they are not naturally open to admitting external researchers. Too many issues are understandably proprietorial. 
We have been unusually fortunate in all our participant organisations for the access they have afforded us, for 
their trust in our processes, for their time and candour in interacting with us, and above all for accepting the idea 
that reports like this might be for public rather than private bene!t.
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Appendix B: Methods
As outlined in Chapter 2 of the main report our aim was for collective knowledge production – working together 
with Chief Risk Of!cers and other relevant organisational actors to arrive at a shared view of the cultural factors 
that drive risk-taking and control within banks and other !nancial institutions. To achieve this end, our research 
combined qualitative and survey methods. Figure 6 summarises the methods that we used.
Our research began with initial interviews in nine organisations, from across the !nancial services sector. These 
interviews provided a breadth of perspective, ranging from large providers of various types of !nancial services 
(e.g. insurance, investment and retail banking) operating on a global scale to much smaller organisations operating 
locally in the UK. A total of !fteen individuals were interviewed, of which ten held a senior position in the risk 
management area of the organisation (e.g. CRO or deputy CRO). Furthermore, we enriched our understanding of 
the !eld with two additional interviews with senior representatives from relevant regulatory organisations.
Initial interview(s)
with main contact(s)
Description of the project and research structure
Potential interests and concerns
Interviewee(s) perception of risk culture(s)
Presence of relevant projects in the area of risk culture
Availability survey?
Yes No
Yes
Availability / further interviews?
List of potential contacts
2nd round interviews (perception
risk culture(s) & drivers)
Survey administration & sampling
Survey results analysis
2nd round interviews &
feedback on survey results
(interviews, roundtables,
focus groups)
Feedback on interview results
(interviews, roundtables,
focus groups)
Key Insights for !nal
event & report
Large-scale surveys, data collection and analysis
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Figure 6: Research Model
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These initial interviews were supported by an outline agenda 
(see Box 28), to provide a degree of structure and focus to 
the proceedings. However, we were "exible in the use of this 
agenda, allowing the discussion to "ow into any other areas 
that the interviewees perceived to be of importance. Where 
permitted, the interviews were recorded and transcribed, to 
allow more detailed data analysis and the use of accurate 
quotations from the respondents to convey their meaning 
and intentions more fully. Where recording was not permitted 
contemporaneous notes were taken and added to a set of 
post interview observations. In all cases at least two of the 
main researchers were present for each interview, often all 
three. The researchers took turns in leading the interviews to 
prevent any speci!c interviewer bias.
The analysis of these interviews provided a rich array of themes, plus a number of further research questions, 
as outlined in our Interim Report (Ashby, Palermo and Power, 2012). These themes and questions were then 
investigated further using a combination of internet-based short survey instruments (using the distribution tool 
‘Survey Monkey’) and follow-up face-to-face sessions. Two broad surveys of !nancial services professionals were 
taken from the CII and CIMA UK membership bases, as well as four organisation-speci!c surveys looking at risk 
culture within a sub-set of the organisations visited as part of our initial research interviews.
The purpose of the large scale surveys was to highlight broad industry themes regarding risk culture, and to provide 
some benchmark results against which the organisation-speci!c surveys could be compared. Each survey used a 
Likert-scale approach which gauged the extent to which the respondents agreed with the statements that were 
provided. These statements explored factors such as the organisation’s attitude to risk and risk management; the 
importance assigned to risk control processes and procedures, compliance and regulation; its ability to respond 
to loss events and the use of performance measures. In addition the respondents were asked to indicate the 
amount of time they spent on certain risk related activities (e.g. risk reporting and regulatory compliance) as well 
as the frequency of interaction between actors such as business risk takers and the risk function. Copies of the 
two surveys are available on request.
In total the CII survey yielded 2,258 responses, while the CIMA survey yielded 89 responses. The CIMA survey was 
sent out to 5,000 members who work in !nance including a range from very senior members to newly quali!ed 
members. The CII survey was sent out across its membership base, covering areas such as broking, underwriting, 
claims and the London Market, as well as the more general !nancial services sector including !nancial advisors, 
bancassurance, mortgage advisors, and life and pensions. The survey was mailed to approximately 80,000 people. 
The total number and response rate of the CIMA survey was more limited than the CII survey, which may be 
symptomatic of its large and diverse membership base. Unfortunately this means that while we have a stronger 
set of data on which to benchmark the short surveys which we undertook in insurance organisations, we do not 
have the same for the banking organisations.
In terms of the organisation-speci!c short surveys, our aim was to capture the different aspects of their risk-
taking and risk control activities, using similar questions to those included in the industry surveys. Each survey 
was customised to a degree to meet the needs of the cooperating CROs, so their results are not always directly 
comparable. However we do not see this as a limitation. Our willingness to permit customisation increased the 
level of support we received and in any case the main purpose of these surveys was to enable further discussion 
based on the survey’s results by means of a feedback and focus group session.
Box 28:  Initial interview agenda
Description of the project and research 
      structure. 
Your support for the project and any 
      concerns or questions that you might 
      have. 
Risk culture in your organisation: your 
      organisation’s perspective on risk culture; 
      current organisational priorities; past, 
      present and future projects; etc. 
The core drivers of your organisation’s 
      risk-taking and control activities.
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To date, feedback and focus group sessions have been completed within three of the four cooperating 
organisations to which surveys were distributed. Time limitations and the availability of key organisational actors 
have prevented a similar session in the fourth organisation, but we expect that this will be complete by the end 
of October 2013. In two of the three completed sessions we were able to record and transcribe the discussion. 
In the third this was not permitted, necessitating the taking of contemporaneous notes. In all cases post meeting 
observations and re"ections were also recorded by the researchers to add further context. Once again at least two 
of the main researchers were present at each session, usually all three. 
In addition to the surveys and follow-up feedback and focus group sessions, we have continued to conduct a 
range of interviews to further check and validate our analysis and increase its longitudinal relevance. Follow-up 
interviews were completed with all but two of the organisations with which we had initial meetings, as well as 
further meetings with relevant regulatory actors. As our thinking developed we also complemented our work 
with a number of meetings with some consulting organisations that are currently active in the area of risk culture, 
having developed or being in the process of developing risk culture products for their clients. 
Interviews were also completed with risk management specialists from within and also outside the !nancial 
services sector. This included an organisational psychologist who worked with !nancial institutions and a number 
of safety experts from the aviation and other industries. A full summary of all the individuals that we interviewed 
is at the end of this appendix, including the number of interviews and the total amount of formal contact time. 
Note that the level of information is necessarily restricted to ensure the anonymity of our interviewees and their 
organisations.
Overall, we built four complementary sets of empirical material. The !rst relates to organisations where we had 
an initial meeting with key actors (e.g. CROs), administered an internal short survey, and !nally ran a follow-up 
workshop/focus group with managers representing various areas of the business (e.g. CEOs, CROs, Business 
Managers, Heads of Compliance, Internal Auditor, HR partners). The second relates to organisations where we 
met with various organisational actors over the period of the research. In all cases, we were able to meet at least 
twice at least one of our informants. Hence, we were able to get a sense of the progress around risk culture 
change initiatives in these organisations. The third is constituted by various interviews with relevant actors in 
the !eld, including corporate senior managers, consultants and regulators. We were able to meet with some of 
the consultants, who are currently developing tools around risk culture, more than once over the period of the 
research. Hence, we developed an understanding of the issues that the advisory market faces in the design and 
implementation of risk culture tools. We also have some material from outside the !nancial services sector (see 
Table 5 and Table 6). 
Finally our research activities were informed by an on-going review of the academic and practitioner literatures, as 
well desk research of pertinent publicly available documents. We especially note the growth in public institutional 
interest in the topic of risk culture (i.e. regulators, politicians, professional/trade associations) where during the life 
of this project a wide range of reports, policy documents and good practice guides have been produced. These 
documents, along with all the other pertinent literature are reviewed in Appendices C.
RISK CULTURE IN F INANCIAL ORGANISATIONS |  A RESEARCH REPORT87
Appendices
O
rg
an
is
at
io
n’
s 
co
de
 a
nd
 d
es
cr
ip
ti
on
In
te
rv
ie
w
s
Cu
st
om
is
ed
 
su
rv
ey
s
Su
rv
ey
 f
ol
lo
w
-u
p 
se
m
in
ar
N
o.
 p
eo
pl
e 
m
et
 
(h
rs
 c
on
ta
ct
 t
im
e)
M
ul
til
in
e 
sp
ec
ia
lis
t c
om
m
er
ci
al
 
in
su
re
r a
nd
 re
in
su
re
r. 
Pr
im
ar
ily
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
Ll
oy
ds
 m
ar
ke
t
IN
S_
1


Ju
ne
 2
01
2:
 C
RO
Ja
nu
ar
y-
M
ar
ch
 2
01
3:
 
84
 re
sp
on
se
s
M
ay
 2
01
3:
 7
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
in
cl
. C
RO
, E
RM
, C
om
pl
ia
nc
e,
 
un
de
rw
rit
in
g 
an
d 
ot
he
rs
7 
(3
.5
)
U
K 
lif
e 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 o
f a
n 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
ng
lo
m
er
at
e
IN
S_
2


Ju
ly
 2
01
2:
 H
ea
d 
of
 E
RM
, 
   
   
H
ea
d 
of
 C
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e
Ja
nu
ar
y-
M
ar
ch
 2
01
3:
 
45
 re
sp
on
se
s
M
ay
 2
01
3:
 1
0 
pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
C
EO
, C
RO
, C
O
O
, 
H
R 
st
af
f a
nd
 o
th
er
s 
ris
k 
st
af
f
12
 (4
)
U
K 
in
ve
st
m
en
t b
an
ki
ng
 s
ub
sid
ia
ry
 
of
 a
 la
rg
er
 b
an
ki
ng
 g
ro
up
BA
N
K_
1


N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
2:
 H
ea
d 
of
 
   
   
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l R
isk
 (b
y 
te
le
ph
on
e)


Ju
ly
 2
01
3:
 H
ea
d 
of
 O
pe
ra
tio
na
l R
isk
Ja
nu
ar
y-
M
ar
ch
 2
01
3:
 
18
 re
sp
on
se
s
Ju
ne
 2
01
3:
 4
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
C
EO
, H
ea
d 
of
 
M
ar
ke
t R
isk
, O
p 
Ri
sk
4 
(3
)
M
ul
tin
at
io
na
l b
an
ki
ng
 a
nd
 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
gr
ou
p
IN
S_
3


Ju
ly
 2
01
2:
 C
RO
, H
ea
d 
of
 R
isk
 
   
   
an
d 
Re
gu
la
to
ry


Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
01
3:
 a
s 
ab
ov
e
M
ay
-J
un
e 
20
13
: 
27
 re
sp
on
se
s
Sc
he
du
le
d 
fo
r O
ct
ob
er
 2
01
3
2 
(3
.5
)
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l i
ns
ur
an
ce
 
co
ng
lo
m
er
at
e
IN
S_
4


M
ay
 2
01
2:
 G
ro
up
 R
isk
 D
ire
ct
or
, 
   
   
H
R 
D
ire
ct
or
, S
ol
ve
nc
y 
II 
D
ire
ct
or


Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
13
: G
ro
up
 R
isk
 D
ire
ct
or


Ju
ly
 2
01
3:
 G
ro
up
 R
isk
 D
ire
ct
or
, H
R 
   
   
pa
rt
ne
r, 
En
te
rp
ris
e 
Ri
sk
 D
ire
ct
or
 
N
/A
N
/A
6 
(3
.5
)
In
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 a
ct
iv
e 
ba
nk
, 
fo
cu
sin
g 
on
 re
ta
il 
ba
nk
in
g
BA
N
K_
2


Ju
ne
 2
01
2:
 C
RO
, D
ep
ut
y 
C
RO
 


Ju
ne
 2
01
3:
 a
s 
ab
ov
e
N
/A
N
/A
2 
(2
.5
)
In
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 a
ct
iv
e 
ba
nk
, 
fo
cu
sin
g 
on
 re
ta
il 
ba
nk
in
g
BA
N
K_
3


Ju
ly
 2
01
2:
 C
RO
, E
A
 to
 C
RO


Ju
ly
 2
01
3:
 R
isk
 C
hi
ef
 O
pe
ra
tin
g
   
   
O
f!
ce
r, 
O
pe
ra
tio
na
l R
isk
 D
ire
ct
or
N
/A
N
/A
4 
(2
.5
)
In
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
 a
ct
iv
e 
ba
nk
, 
fo
cu
sin
g 
on
 re
ta
il 
an
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
ba
nk
in
g
BA
N
K_
4


A
pr
il 
20
12
: G
ro
up
 C
RO


Ju
ne
 2
01
3:
 G
ro
up
 C
RO
,
   
   
‘R
isk
 c
ul
tu
re
 c
ha
m
pi
on
’
N
/A
N
/A
2 
(2
.5
)
Ta
bl
e 
5:
 D
at
a 
co
lle
ct
io
n 
- P
ar
tic
ip
an
t O
rg
an
isa
tio
ns
RISK CULTURE IN F INANCIAL ORGANISATIONS |  A RESEARCH REPORT 88
Appendices
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
In
te
rv
ie
w
s 
an
d 
M
ee
ti
ng
s
N
o.
 p
eo
pl
e 
m
et
 (c
on
ta
ct
 t
im
e,
 h
ou
rs
)
C
RO
 a
t i
ns
ur
an
ce
 c
on
gl
om
er
at
e,
 fo
cu
sin
g 
on
 
re
ta
il 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
pr
od
uc
ts
1 
(1
)


Ju
ne
 2
01
2
C
RO
 a
t r
eg
io
na
l b
ui
ld
in
g 
so
ci
et
y
1 
(1
.5
)


M
ay
 2
01
2
Ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
di
re
ct
or
 a
t U
K 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 a
ge
nc
y 
(R
EG
_1
)
1 
(1
)


Se
pt
em
be
r 2
01
2
Po
lic
y 
ad
vi
so
rs
 a
t U
K 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 a
ge
nc
y 
(R
EG
_2
)
2 
(1
)


Se
pt
em
be
r 2
01
2
Va
rio
us
 s
ta
ff
 a
t a
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
on
su
lti
ng
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
an
d 
au
di
to
r (
C
O
N
S_
1)
6 
(6
)


Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
13
: S
en
io
r M
an
ag
er
, F
S,
 D
ire
ct
or
 
   
   
H
um
an
 C
ap
ita
l


M
ay
 2
01
3:
 S
en
io
r M
an
ag
er
 F
S,
 D
ire
ct
or
 F
S 
Ri
sk


Ju
ne
 2
01
3:
 p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 d
in
ne
r f
or
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
C
RO
s


Ju
ne
 2
01
3:
 S
en
io
r M
an
ag
er
 a
nd
 M
an
ag
er
, F
in
an
ci
al
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
   
   
Pr
ac
tic
e;
 S
en
io
r M
an
ag
er
, H
R 
C
on
su
lti
ng
 P
ra
ct
ic
e
St
af
f a
t a
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
on
su
lti
ng
 
or
ga
ni
sa
tio
n 
(C
O
N
S_
2)
2 
(2
)


D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
2
St
af
f m
em
be
r o
f a
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l !
na
nc
ia
l 
se
rv
ic
es
 p
ro
vi
de
r a
nd
 c
on
su
lti
ng
 o
rg
an
isa
tio
n 
(C
O
N
S_
3)
1 
(2
)


Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
13
Va
rio
us
 s
ta
ff
 a
t a
irl
in
e 
in
du
st
ry
 (A
IR
LI
N
E)
6 
(7
)


M
ay
 2
01
3:
 H
ea
d 
of
 S
af
et
y,
 H
ea
d 
of
 S
af
et
y 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
, 
   
   
Sa
fe
ty
 s
ta
ff
 (x
4)
St
af
f a
t i
nd
us
tr
ia
l c
om
pa
ny
2 
(2
)


Ju
ly
 2
01
3 
– 
H
ea
d 
an
d 
D
ep
ut
y 
H
ea
d 
of
 G
ro
up
 R
isk
Ta
bl
e 
6:
 D
at
a 
co
lle
ct
io
n 
– 
A
dd
iti
on
al
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s 
an
d 
m
ee
tin
gs
RISK CULTURE IN F INANCIAL ORGANISATIONS |  A RESEARCH REPORT89
Appendices
Appendix C: Risk culture in practice
As noted in our report, discussion and debate about risk culture is more advanced in the !eld of practice than 
it is in academia. This Appendix supports our main report by providing a critical review of a number of relevant 
practitioner contributions and outputs with the aim of highlighting some of the key themes and assumptions they 
make, both concerning the nature of risk culture and the capability of organisations to manage and intervene in it.
This review is divided into two main sections. In the !rst part we review the various opinion pieces, white papers, 
surveys, marketing materials and assessment products that have been produced by a wide range of specialist 
consulting !rms on the subject of risk culture. Consulting !rms are very important actors in shaping organisational 
responses to regulation and in developing benchmarks of best practice. Having privileged access to a wide range 
of organisations, they are often the !rst to identify emerging issues and to provide new conceptualizations – 
often visual in form – to characterise these issues. Consulting !rms compete with each other to be at the cutting 
edge of management disciplines and to position themselves as credible advisors. The context of risk culture, and 
organisational culture more generally, is a perfect illustration of the role and power of consulting organisations 
like McKinsey who have helped to ‘discover’ and shape organisational receptions of the concept (Bower, 1966). 
Similarly, in a related area such as risk appetite, consulting organisations have developed an extensive literature in 
comparison to the relative paucity of academic work (see: Ashby and Diacon 2012; Power, 2009). This academic 
neglect is interesting in its own right but is not the subject of this review.
In the second section we review the work that has been produced by regulators, politicians, professional institutes 
and industry associations on the subject of risk culture. This mostly relates to a range of consultation papers, 
published speeches and reports, some speci!cally on the topic of risk culture, and others referring to it in relation 
to other areas, such as the maintenance of effective governance and risk management frameworks. In terms of 
the regulatory papers and political reports it is probable that some of their content will become regulatory policy 
in the future.
Consulting Organisations
The literature from consulting organisations can generally be organised into three main categories: 1) surveys of 
!rms that include questions that relate to risk culture; 2) papers and opinion pieces on the de!nition, role and 
importance of risk culture, along with the elements of a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ culture and 3) risk culture assessment 
and management tools. The following tables (Table 7 and Table 8) highlight a selection of signi!cant documents 
produced on the topic by consulting organisations. Table 8 re"ects elements 2 and 3 together since many 
documents combine the two.
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Source Title
Deloitte (2010)
Deloitte (2011)
Deloitte (2011)
EandY (2011)
EandY (2012)
EandY (2012)
EIU (2009)
IRM (2011)
KPMG (2009)
KPMG (2009)
KPMG (2010)
KPMG (2010)
KPMG (2013)
Marsh (2012)
Protiviti (2012)
PWC (2011)
Risk intelligence in the energy and resources industry enterprise risk management 
benchmark survey
Global !nancial services risk - Management Survey
Global risk management survey
Making strides in !nancial services risk management
Progress in !nancial services risk management – A survey of major !nancial institutions
Turning risk into results – How leading companies use risk management to fuel better 
performance 
Beyond box-ticking - A new era for risk governance
Risk management embedding and risk culture – survey
Never again? Risk management in banking beyond the credit crisis
Operational risk management (ORM) - US insurers
Risk Management - A driver of enterprise value in the emerging environment
Highlights from the 2010 KPMG Singapore Enterprise Risk Management Survey Brie!ng
Expectations of risk management outpacing capabilities – it’s time for action top eight risk 
management imperatives for the c-suite in 2013
Risk management benchmarking survey results
Risk culture: not a tick box exercise – !ndings from a survey of the UK insurance industry
Raising the bar for risk management: Benchmarking risk management practices in the 
banking industry in EMEAI
Table 7: Selected surveys including questions on risk culture
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Source Title
Deloitte (2009)
Deloitte (2010)
Deloitte (2010)
Deloitte (2011)
Deloitte (2011)
Deloitte (2012)
EandY (2011)
EandY (2013)
IRM (2011)
IRM (2012)
KPMG (2008)
KPMG (2009)
McKinsey (2010)
McKinsey (2013)
PWC (2007) and 
(2012)
PWC (2009)
PWC (2011)
Towers Watson (2012)
Solvency II and SST - Beyond quantitative 
models
Insurance Learning-on-the-Go
Remuneration policies in the !nancial sector
Human capital advisory services
 
Risk and regulatory review - The risk return 
proposition
Cultivating a risk intelligent culture – 
Understand, measure, strengthen and 
report
Growth in uncertain times - The need for 
dynamic risk management
The cultural revolution in risk management
Risk guidance paper appetite and tolerance
Risk culture - Resources for Practitioners
Understanding and articulating risk 
appetite
What is your company’s risk culture?
Taking control of organisational culture
Managing the people side of risk
The risk culture survey
Building a risk aware culture for success
Building effective risk cultures at !nancial 
institutions
The need to build a strong risk culture is 
growing – Effective diagnostics support a 
positive culture 
Road map for Solvency II - including a risk 
culture item
Risk and solvency assessment (ORSA) - 
including a risk culture framework
Providing a risk culture framework
Toolkit to include risk culture in performance 
assessment and reward
Toolkit on “How to make a strong risk culture 
your competitive advantage”
Toolkit and framework for assessing and 
managing risk culture
 5 steps to “Understand and drive the right 
risk culture”
Paper in EandY’s house journal (The Journal of 
Financial Perspectives) that proposes a model 
for assessing and strengthening risk culture.
Risk culture diagnostic within risk appetite 
guidance document
IRM risk culture framework
Framework on risk appetite including a risk 
culture item
Offers advice on the factors that can affect an 
organisation’s risk culture and the elements of 
a strong culture
Risk culture framework and risk culture 
diagnostic approach 
Offers advice to organisations on how to 
create a ‘powerful’ risk culture
US speci!c risk culture diagnostic tool – 
discusses the value of risk culture surveys and 
outlines the PWC US practice’s risk culture 
model
Global GRC marketing document outlining 
how PWC can help organisations to assess risk 
culture 
A framework where “risk culture forms one of 
the underlying foundations for managing risk”
Risk culture diagnostic tool, built around the 
assessment of a risk culture questionnaire
Table 8: Selected guidance and toolkits on risk culture
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We should emphasise that it is not our intention to single out speci!c consulting organisations for praise or 
criticism for their approach to risk culture. Rather, we think it more useful at this stage of development of the 
advisory !eld to highlight some of the common elements in this practitioner literature, as these have helped to 
inform our own analysis and !ndings in the main body of this report. We also raise a few notes of caution about 
the overall general direction of this advisory work and the validity of some of the more popular assumptions that 
are made. 
We organise observations and analysis of the practitioner work on risk culture around the following key themes:
The role of risk culture
Reductionism, positivism and auditability
The risk culture ideal
Structures versus behaviours
Manipulating risk culture: project orientation
Theme 1: The Role of Risk Culture
From our review of the literature it is striking but understandable that consulting organisations perceive risk 
culture positively as an enabling force which helps to improve the effectiveness and embeddedness of risk 
management processes and procedures, along with associated risk governance and internal control frameworks. 
Indeed, on this view risk culture is the child of the COSO conception of ‘control environment.’ It embodies 
an aspiration for improved risk management decisions and risk governance to ensure that an organisation’s 
decision makers maintain an appropriate level of risk control. In this regard risk culture is very commonly closely 
linked to an organisation’s risk appetite policy statement, since this statement is taken to be the tangible and 
formal representation of the implicit limits that decision makers will impose on themselves (both individually 
and collectively). Risk appetite and its internal enforcement are therefore regarded, with good reason, as the 
visible manifestation of risk culture. In addition, many consulting documents and frameworks emphasise the 
need to ‘align’ risk culture to formal risk management frameworks/practices. This is implicit and often explicit 
acknowledgment that the gap between the two lay at the heart of many problems in !nancial organisations. 
Frameworks must be accepted, understood and operationalised by employees and this alignment necessarily 
makes human factors a much more important element of risk management than hitherto. Indeed, as we note 
elsewhere in this report, the interest in risk culture is largely driven by recognition of the need to reconnect 
!nancial risk management to an understanding of human behaviour and motivation. 
A good example of the enabling and embedding role of risk culture comes from Protiviti (2012). In a survey of 
insurance !rms Protiviti conclude that risk culture is a “vital component” in the effectiveness of risk management 
processes and practices that can help employees to understand and accept that risk management is “everyone’s 
responsibility”. Protiviti also stress the importance of ‘aligning’ risk culture with a !rm’s risk management 
framework and practices.
Several of the larger audit/consulting !rms such as KPMG and PWC also share this view. In the case of KPMG their 
position is developed in two key papers. Farrell and Hoon, (2009) emphasise the behavioural and internal control 
aspects of risk culture, suggesting that it is a means to ensure that employees are “doing the right thing” and that 
they “understand risk and compliance rules”, leading them to make appropriate risk-taking and control decisions. 
KPMG (2010) goes even further, using a cross-sector survey of organisations to show how risk management 
can ‘drive’ enterprise value. Here risk culture is said to form the foundations for effective risk management – 
underpinning three more tangible and procedural pillars for effectiveness: risk identi!cation and assessment, risk 
quanti!cation/mitigation, and risk monitoring/reporting.
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Similarly PWC (2012) links risk culture to ‘effective’ and ‘sustainable’ ERM suggesting that an effective risk culture 
helps employees to understand the level of ‘acceptable’ risk along with how risk information should in"uence 
their decisions. PWC even make the claim that there are studies which show that a strong risk culture can lead to 
a reduction in loss events, along with better performance management. No evidence however is provided to back 
up this claim. Indeed, the practitioner literature generally argues from examples of ‘deviant’ risk cultures which 
led to problems, rather than providing evidence of the positive bene!ts. This is consistent with a point we make 
elsewhere in this report, namely that many conceptions of risk culture within practitioner documents are implicitly 
conservative and precautionary in substance.
On the relationship between risk appetite and risk culture Ernst and Young (De Jonghe et al., 2013) provides one 
of the more developed practitioner views on this topic. In this paper the authors argue that risk appetite and risk 
culture are closely related ‘reinforcing’ mechanisms. The mechanism for this relationship is that an organisation’s 
stated risk appetite should affect decision-making behaviours and hence risk culture; while an organisation’s 
risk culture helps to determine whether its stated risk appetite is embedded and accepted. So in this respect risk 
appetite is seen to represent a more formal and tangible perspective on risk attitudes; risk culture a more informal 
and implicit one. The authors go on to suggest that a ‘strong’ risk culture will allow organisations to achieve an 
appropriate balance between risk and return, while those with ‘weak’ risk cultures will either take too little or 
too much risk – though excessive risk-taking is assumed to be the most common case, which again points to an 
implicit conservatism in the representation of risk culture.
So for the most part, and with the partial exception of Ernst and Young, it would seem that risk culture is largely 
articulated as a brake on ‘pure’ downside risk. Implicitly, whether intended or not, many consulting !rms frame 
risk as a bad thing that is to be controlled (reduced) via the ‘mechanism’ of risk culture. Risk culture provides a 
natural constraint on ‘bad’ behaviours (excessive risk-taking) and ensures that risk management processes and 
procedures are accepted and performed in an effective manner. Thus, notwithstanding the signi!cance attached 
by advisors to risk culture, it is largely conceptualised as a mechanism for controlling the behaviours of decision 
makers. In this way, risk culture is implicitly linked to very traditional ideas of risk management as a mechanism 
for ensuring an appropriate degree of risk aversion, rather than as a means of adding direct value to organisations 
via the exploitation of strategic opportunities. 
Theme 2: Reductionism, Positivism and Auditability
All of the consulting organisations that have chosen to comment on the topic share the view that risk culture is 
something that can be distilled down into a relatively small number of factors. These factors are then categorised 
further (usually into 4 main elements or dimensions) and are often presented in the form of a wheel. Table 9 
provides a summary of the main categories of factors that have been identi!ed by those consulting organisations 
which have developed relatively formal ‘models’ of risk culture. For comparison purposes the Institute of Risk 
Management’s ‘Risk Culture Aspects ModelTM’ is also included. 
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Factor Categories Deloitte
Acknowledgement of risk 
(potential for over con!dence, 
level of challenge)
Communication (regular risk 
reporting and escalation of risk 
issues) 
Compensation and 
performance management
IT Systems
Leadership (‘tone from the top’)
Relationships (between employees)
Respect for risk (potential for 
gaming the system)
Responsiveness to risk (ability to 
react to risk issues)
Risk competencies (of employees)
Risk facilitation (status of risk 
function and ability to support 
business)
Risk management processes and 
procedures
Risk ownership (clear 
accountabilities)
Structure of organisation 
and governance
Ernst and 
Young IRM 
1 KPMG McKinsey PWC
Towers 
Watson
From Table 9 it is clear that there are considerable surface differences between the various ‘models’ of risk 
culture provided by these organisations. Unsurprisingly, the most common factor across the advisors is leadership 
and ‘tone from the top’ in particular, a concept borrowed from the mainstream literature on organisational 
culture and in particular Schein (2010). Also popular are categories relating to compensation and performance 
management – the idea being that risk culture is re"ected in large part by the !nancial motivations of employees. 
Similarly organisational structure and governance is a popular category, as is risk communication and reporting. 
This category further reinforces the notion of risk culture as a control tool – it being re"ected in how employees 
are constrained in terms of their decision-making (through monitoring, incentives, etc.). This is consistent with 
what we what observe elsewhere in this report, namely that while ethical and behavioural issues are part of the 
public debate about risk culture, internally organisations seem to be addressing these issues with new structures, 
renewal of existing processes and revised performance management systems.
Table 9: Summary of risk culture model factors by organisation
1 The IRM’s 4 categories of ‘Tone at the top’, ‘Decisions’, ‘Governance’ and ‘Competency’ are quite broad and cover more than 4 of 
the factors listed here. The same is also the case for PWC and Towers Watson.
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Perhaps the most dominant common feature of all these models is a general aspiration to measure risk culture. 
Many consulting organisations have developed formal risk culture assessment tools and it is common for them to 
generate percentage risk scores for the identi!ed risk culture factors, scores which are usually then RAG rated as 
‘Red’, ‘Amber’ or ‘Green’. No public information is provided on the mechanisms used to generate these scores or 
the means by which RAG thresholds have been determined. However we presume that the idea here is to help 
organisations to somehow quantify and track risk culture in terms of measured factors and to prioritise those that 
seem to require attention. An improving risk culture is re"ected in increasing the factor scores over time. 
We have no doubt that advisors recognise the complexity and richness of cultural issues in organisations. The 
issue is not one of naivety on their part. Indeed, from our discussions with several advisors it is clear that quite 
the opposite is true. Rather, it re"ects a deeply held view that something like risk culture simply cannot be made 
actionable without being reduced in some way to a few visible characteristics. This is another way of stating the 
persistent managerial notion, which we heard many times, that ‘if it can’t be measured, it can’t be managed’ a 
quote often misattributed to the management guru Prof Peter Drucker2 and even repeated in the IRM’s work on 
risk culture (IRM, 2012: 13). However, a fuller investigation of the works of management thinkers such as Drucker 
or Deming shows that they do not share the notion that management requires measurement. Indeed Deming 
explicitly warned against running a company on visible !gures alone in his seven deadly diseases of management 
(Deming, 1986). 
This question of reduction and measurement seems to be one of the most fundamental issues in the entire risk 
culture debate at the practitioner level. Without some kind of tool, advisors feel insecure having only words and 
qualitative judgments to offer. Yet we also observe that there is another force at work in the !eld of risk culture 
in !nancial organisations, namely regulatory demands for auditability.
From a reading of practitioner documents combined with our own investigations, we conclude that efforts to 
attempt to categorise and score risk culture re"ect a strong desire to demonstrate that something is being done 
and to make it auditable by regulators and, potentially, internal auditors. The auditability imperative has two 
parts. First, the thing in question – risk culture – must leave durable traces in the form of scores etc. which can be 
checked by others (Power, 2013). Second, these traces of risk culture, however imperfect, must be benchmarked 
against a set of agreed criteria, allowing a comparison to be made of an ‘actual’ risk culture against some kind of 
ideal. This permits ‘gaps’ to be identi!ed which can then be the subject of further interventions to improve the 
scores/traces next time. We discuss further below the ideals which make this gap analysis possible. 
Theme 3: The Risk Culture Ideal
From our review of the relevant literature there appears to be an underlying agreement among consulting 
organisations that there are clear differences between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ cultures. This implies that there is some 
kind of ideal to which !rms should aspire. However, just as with the risk culture factors identi!ed in Table 9 above, 
there is less consistency over the precise elements attributed to a strong or weak culture.
One observation that is common to most consulting organisations relates to the generic nature of the elements that 
are identi!ed as typifying a strong culture. Many of these elements have more in common with good management 
practice in general, than anything speci!c in terms of risk culture. Indeed, this blurring of focus is quite common 
in discussions of risk culture, suggesting that it is an abstraction from a wide range of interconnected processes.
2 See: http://thedx.druckerinstitute.com/2013/07/measurement-myopia/ .
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A good example of this blurring and merging of advisory agendas is the ‘Risk Intelligent Culture’ framework 
proposed by Deloitte. This work highlights various ‘enablers’ (for example: leadership commitment, communication, 
measurement and reporting and programme management) to help strengthen an organisation’s risk culture and 
to promote “continuous cultural improvement” (Deloitte, 2012: 4). Here we observe close parallels with the 
managerial concept of Total Quality Management and the philosophy of Continuous Improvement.
In contrast Ernst and Young (De Jonghe et al., 2013) draw more from the !eld of corporate governance (particularly 
Ernst and Young’s own 2011 survey of risk governance practices), emphasising the following elements of a strong 
risk culture: a consistent ‘tone from the top’, appropriate metrics that are monitored regularly, effective escalation 
processes and an ‘open’ culture in which employees feel able to raise concerns and the consistent enforcement 
of process/limit breaches. This governance positioning of risk culture is shared by Protiviti (2012) who use survey 
evidence to emphasise two key factors: non-executive challenge on a !rm’s risk management activities and the 
frequency of board discussions on risk management. 
Similarly both KPMG (Farrell and Hoon, 2009) and McKinsey (Levy et al., 2010) add some common examples of 
good risk management practice to those of good governance: 
 Leaders/managers who set a clear risk strategy and support their organisation’s risk management policies 
 and procedures, so their teams know that non-compliance will not be tolerated (again this implies risk 
 culture as a control mechanism)
 The clear and consistent communication of an organisation’s values and ethical codes of conduct by 
 management
 Incentives to behave appropriately and ‘do the right thing’ from both a risk management and an 
 ethical perspective
 Having a consistent process for considering risk when making decisions
 Recruiting the right staff who are compatible with the prevailing risk culture
The fact that consulting organisations often identify different elements for a strong or weak risk culture, and in 
some cases even have different conceptual foundations for these elements, suggests that there is no clear or 
precise agreement in this area. In addition speci!cations of risk culture necessarily over"ow into more general 
understandings of culture, governance and management. This fuzziness seems to be an essential feature of risk 
culture debates by advisors and challenges the idea that there is some kind of ideal benchmark for examining risk 
culture strength that needs to be ‘discovered’. Our own !ndings presented elsewhere in this report also highlight 
the plurality of aspects at stake in risk culture change programmes in !nancial organisations, and provides further 
reason for caution in attempting to de!ne precisely the dimensions of risk culture strength even though there are 
common elements. The same pluralism is visible in academic analyses of organisational and safety culture (e.g. 
Schein 2010; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) and to date there is no common view. 
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Theme 4: Structures versus Behaviours
Mirroring the academic literature on organisational culture and safety culture (see Chapter 2) certain consulting 
organisations emphasise a range of structural factors when assessing risk culture or discussing the elements of a 
strong culture, while others are more behaviorally focused.
Table 9 suggests that PWC and Towers Perrin adopt more structural approaches to modeling risk culture, 
emphasising factors such as the design of an organisation’s risk management policies and procedures, along 
with communication and governance structures. In contrast Deloitte, KPMG and McKinsey have more apparently 
behaviorally orientated approaches, as does the IRM’s ‘Risk Culture Aspects ModelTM’. Behavioural approaches 
emphasise factors such as employee risk competencies, ‘tone from the top’ and risk function behaviours, the aim 
being to ensure that employees ‘do the right thing’ and understand risk and compliance rules. 
And yet the snapshots provided in Table 9 do not mean that particular approaches are exclusively behavioural 
or structural, just that some are further along one spectrum or the other. Indeed, we would expect this since, as 
we have stated at numerous points in our report, the explosion of risk culture re"ects an interest and desire to 
reconnect process/structure to behaviour in the risk management !eld.
Theme 5: Manipulating Risk Culture: Project Orientation
The !nal theme that emerges from the literature produced by consulting organisations relates to the way in which 
they believe that risk culture ‘management’ should be organised. All of the consulting organisations we have 
reviewed recommend the following basic structure to risk culture management (see Figure 7).
This structure has strong parallels with a typical audit and evaluation process. However it is also interesting to 
note that most of these consulting organisations further recommend that the !nal stage in this process should 
be organised in the form of a change management project, although we have identi!ed broad differences in our 
study between those adopting an organic approach to change and those with a more engineered programme.
Figure 7: Manipulating risk culture
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The notion that risk culture should be managed in the form of a project is entirely logical from a managerial point 
of view and shows how advisory !rms build on their existing knowledge and experience in other areas when 
address new objects of interest. For example, popular management philosophies such as TQM have been applied 
to the area of risk culture. These and other approaches imply that risk culture, like quality perhaps, is something 
to be managed for a discrete and relatively short period of time, as with any other project. This assumes that risk 
culture is something that can be changed in an organised and structured way, making it into a bounded ‘problem’ 
that can be solved in isolation from the day-to-day management of the organisation.
These constructions of risk culture sit uneasily with an understanding of it as an organic phenomenon that 
pervades all aspects of organisations risk-taking and control activities and is frequently changing and evolving, 
even without the active intervention and direction of management (see Salz, 2013). Organisations have always 
had risk cultures in some sense without being self-conscious about them. This means that this collection of ways 
of risk-taking and control may not be amenable to heavy re-engineering through the implementation of a time 
and space-bounded change project, unless perhaps this follows a period of signi!cant organisational disruption 
and dissonance (e.g. following a crisis of some kind) that opens the organisation up to the potential for major 
cultural change. It is for this reason that we build our contrast in the main body of the report between organic 
and engineered approaches to risk culture. While many advisors recognise the reality of the former, they are 
institutionally committed to viewing risk culture through the lens of the latter. This is a signi!cant dilemma for 
consultants and the organisations they advise, which we address in our !ndings. 
Regulators, Politicians, Institutes and Associations
In comparison to the consulting literature, there is relatively little output on the subject of risk culture from 
regulators, politicians, institutes and associations. However the level of interest and commentary from these 
organisations is growing quickly. In particular there has been a signi!cant growth in output since 2009 and 
especially during the life of this project (2012-13).
Regulators
From a UK perspective this work can be divided into international and domestic (including EU) output, with the 
majority of the consultation papers and reports that discuss the topic of risk culture being at the international 
level.
The growth of international level political and regulatory attention to risk culture began in 2009 following the 
!nancial crisis, a major development being the recognition by the Basel Committee on Banking Standards (the 
main international body for negotiating cross-border banking regulation) that culture has a key role to play in risk 
management. In the initial post-crisis reforms of the Basel II Accord (so called Basel 2.5) the Committee stated 
that: “risk management must be embedded in the culture of a bank” and went onto say that risk culture should 
be a “critical focus” of all decision makers (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009) this statement being 
all the more signi!cant given the Basel Committee’s more remote stance on risk management practices in the 
original Basel II Accord: 
“It is not the Committee’s intention to dictate the form or operational detail of banks’ risk 
management policies and practices.” (Basel, 2006: 2)
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In terms of managing risk culture the Basel Committee offered some initial thoughts in its 2009 reforms of the 
second Accord, which are then developed further in the guidance it produced on the governance of internationally 
active banks (Basel, 2010b) and the management of operational risk (Basel, 2011). Predictably, and in common 
with what we observe in consulting outputs discussed above, this guidance has a strong focus on the more 
tangible internal control aspects of risk culture, with the committee highlighting factors such as compensation 
policies (suggesting they should be long term and linked to clear risk management objectives) and the role of risk 
culture in helping to cement the TLD approach to governance (e.g. by helping decision makers to understand and 
accept their roles and those of the other three lines). However, this structural emphasis does not mean that the 
Basel Committee ignores the more behavioural aspects of culture, though the mechanisms it proposes to ‘control’ 
behaviour remain highly tangible and procedural. Notably in the governance paper (Basel 2010b) the Committee 
calls for the development of corporate cultures that highlight and embed appropriate norms and incentives for 
professional and responsible behaviour, linking this to the creation of an appropriate ‘tone from the top’ and 
the setting of professional standards, values and incentives that promote integrity and clarify appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviours. This view is reiterated in the operational risk paper (Basel, 2011), where Principle 1 
makes it clear that a bank’s ‘risk management culture’ must embody professional and responsible behaviours and 
that standards and incentives must be set to ensure that these behaviours are adopted. The paper also suggests a 
link between a bank’s risk management culture and ethical business practices. While this is not developed further 
it provides more evidence of a regulatory desire to re-ethicise organisations via their risk management process in 
some way.
A similar procedurally focused approach to risk culture is adopted by the Basel Committee’s sister organisations 
- the Joint Forum (which covers matters that relate to the joint regulation of internationally active banks, insurers 
and securities trading !rms) and the Financial Stability Board (which co-ordinates national and international 
regulatory efforts in a bid to maintain international !nancial stability). Notably the Joint Forum in a recent paper 
on !nancial conglomerates (Joint Forum 2012) suggests that an appropriate group-wide risk management 
culture should be created. It also goes on to outline various elements of an appropriate culture including: risk 
management training, independence of the risk function, incentives, risk awareness and whistle-blowing. In 
addition, the FSB (FSB, 2012, 2013a and 2013b) links the idea of a strong risk culture to good governance and 
suggest that metrics, such as unclosed audit issues and employee survey results, should be used to monitor the 
risk cultures of !nancial organisations – both by management and supervisors. In fact the FSB even goes as far as 
to suggest that supervisors should be actively involved in assessing risk culture.
The FSB also makes some interesting observations on the relationship between risk appetite and risk culture. 
These are developed in its very recent paper on risk appetite (FSB, 2013b). As with some of the consulting 
organisations (see Theme 1 above), the FSB suggests a two-way relationship between culture and risk appetite, 
where an effective risk appetite framework is said to help “reinforce a strong risk culture”, while the paper also 
suggests that risk culture can help to embed prudent risk-taking and to support risk reporting and escalation. So 
in this regard culture and risk appetite are seen as mutually reinforcing. However the implicit conception of risk 
culture is conservative, on the risk-avoiding aspects of risk appetite, the idea being that risk is something that 
needs to be limited.
From the perspective of international insurance regulation much less has been said on risk culture. However the 
topic has not completely escaped the attention of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 
Here the IAIS’s Draft ComFrame regulations (its proposed international regulations for insurers, see IAIS, 2012a)
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talks about developing a risk management system that is embedded into a !rm’s culture and suggests that the 
risk function has a role to play in “setting” an insurers risk culture. In addition the IAIS’s Insurance Core Principles 
(IAIS 2012b) suggest that boards/senior management should promote a culture of sound risk management (and 
compliance), and even suggests that internal models can help to better embed a company’s risk culture, though 
the reason for this is not made clear.
Closer to home the EU’s recently published Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) includes a new regulatory 
requirement on risk culture, stating that:
“Member States should introduce principles and standards to ensure effective oversight by the 
management body, promote a sound risk culture at all levels of credit institutions and investment 
!rms…” (DIRECTIVE 2013/36/EU, paragraph 54)
This statement highlights in European law the importance of risk culture for banking and securities organisations, 
but provides no further detail on the nature of such cultures. As is customary under the Lamfalussy process of 
European regulation3 this is left for the European Banking Agency (which replaced the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors)4 and the various local regulatory agencies such as the Prudential Regulatory Authority and 
the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK. 
In terms of UK regulation neither the PRA nor the FCA (or the former FSA) has produced speci!c regulation on 
risk culture. However both the PRA and FCA have indicated that culture and risk culture are areas they intend to 
look at from a supervisory perspective and they are developing guidance. Once again the link between culture 
and prudence is evident, with the PRA making clear that to meet its ‘Principle of Safety and Soundness’ banks and 
insurers must have a culture that supports this (PRA, 2013a and 2013b), though it does not have any particular 
‘right culture’ in mind. The PRA also states that it expects banks and insurers to minimise incentives for excessive 
risk-taking via: appropriate incentives, ensuring that responsibilities for risk management are considered as a 
central part of front-line management and through risk and control functions that carry ‘real weight’.
The FCA provides even fewer speci!cs, but has laid out its position in a speech by Clive Adamson (Adamson, 
2013). Here Adamson suggests that the FCA will not assess or legislate on culture directly but that it will “join the 
dots” using a range of inputs/information (such as how a !nancial organisation deals with the regulator). However 
Adamson does make it clear that the FCA wishes to encourage ‘positive culture change’ and to link culture to 
‘driving behaviours’. Adamson also identi!es three main cultural drivers: tone from the top, business practices 
and ways of behaving in the organisation below the top management level and performance management via 
incentives/training.
Understandably, regulatory pronouncements are long on ambition and short on detail. In many respects it is clear 
that regulators will rely on organisations and their advisors to specify detail and operationalise risk culture. We 
also suspect, but have no systematic evidence, that regulators themselves use advisors. It is for this reason that 
our main report begins to explore the idea of a ‘regulatory culture’ which extends across organisations, advisors 
and regulators and which plays a very signi!cant role in shaping the reality of risk culture change programmes 
(Chapter 8).
3   See: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/international/european/lamfalussy 
4   Notably see CEBS (2010), which provides further European level guidance on risk culture in its high level principles for risk manage-
ment. This includes the importance of creating a “strong, institution-wide, risk culture”, as well as an enterprise-wide risk function 
that covers all risks and is independent. So again there is a strong internal control theme.
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Politicians
As with regulators, political interest in risk culture has grown since the !nancial crisis. From an international 
perspective this interest has been manifested in the G20’s support for the work of organisations such as the FSB 
and Basel Committee. However that does not mean that politicians have been silent on the topic at a domestic 
level. In particular UK political interest in the cultures and risk cultures of banks has been signi!cant, !rstly 
by the Treasury Select Committee (Treasury Select Committee, 2009a and 2009b) and more recently by the 
Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS, 2013a and 2013b), where its views on cultural reform 
form a central part of its analysis and recommendations. Once again the focus is on the internal control and risk 
limiting aspects of risk culture, with attention devoted to the prevention of cultures that promote excessive risk-
taking, via mechanisms such as longer term incentive arrangements, independent risk functions, the creation and 
enforcement of codes of conduct and professional standards, clear whistle-blowing policies, and the ‘tone from 
the top’. Regulators and advisors have been important contributors to these enquiries and it is no surprise that 
there is considerable commonality across the political, regulatory, advisory and organisational domains. 
Institutes and Associations
In terms of Institutes and Associations two main organisations have been active in providing guidance on the 
role, assessment and management of risk culture: the Institute of Risk Management (IRM) and the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF). Both of these organisations have produced dedicated and detailed papers on risk 
culture.
The IIF paper (IIF, 2009) provides a !nance industry trade association’s view on the topic. The paper covers a 
range of issues, including the de!nition of risk culture, elements of a weak versus a strong risk culture, and the 
assessment of risk culture. The IIF also provides a number of recommendations for !nancial organisations in 
relation to the management of their risk cultures.
Despite being a trade association it is interesting to note that the IIF appears to share a similar perspective on 
risk culture to the regulatory and political opinions outlined above. Speci!cally there is a particular emphasis on 
control, and the elements of a strong risk culture are closely related to how risky decisions are governed and 
controlled. These elements of a strong culture include: incentives, an effective governance structure with clear 
accountabilities for risk and risk tolerance limits, escalation of risk issues, tone from the top, etc. So the IIF only 
reinforces the view that risk culture primarily exists to limit risk-taking, not to facilitate it.
In contrast, the IRM’s work on risk culture takes a more neutral view on risk culture and its relationship with 
risk-taking/control, explaining that a ‘successful’ risk culture may re"ect the organisation’s stance on both, rather 
than simply risk control (IRM, 2012). This view may in part be due to the fact that the IRM’s work is not speci!c 
to !nancial organisations. It may also be because the IRM consulted widely, across a range of practitioners from 
different industry sectors, consulting organisations and academics. 
However, despite a more symmetrical stance on the relationship between risk culture and risk-taking and control, 
the IRM’s work has many similarities with that of the consulting organisations outlined above. In particular the 
IRM strongly promotes the assessment of risk culture. It also provides its own reductive model of risk culture in the 
form of a ‘Risk Culture Aspects Model TM’ centred round the factors highlighted in Table 9 above. So while the IRM 
does not seek to limit risk culture to a governance and control role, it understandably adopts a strong managerial 
perspective, seeking to assess and control risk culture in an organised and relatively mechanistic fashion.
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Conclusions
The practitioner literature makes an important contribution to our understanding of risk culture in !nancial 
organisations, partly offsetting the slower development of academic interest in the topic. While the various 
pronouncements by advisors, regulators and other bodies differ in emphasis and speci!cation of the elements 
that make up an organisation’s risk culture, there is also considerable continuity in the approaches. In particular 
there is an underlying general belief that risk culture is something that can and must be assessed and managed, 
and that it must therefore be captured and tracked by instruments of various kinds in a structured fashion. 
However, our investigations reveal that there are organisations which approach the management of risk culture 
in more organic and less structured ways, rather than via the managerial and control orientated approaches 
advocated by consulting organisations and many regulatory agencies. So we conclude that one of the major 
critical challenges in the !eld of practice may be to ask whether current trends are towards a mono-risk culture 
which all organisations should have. If all organisations tend to adopt the same approach because they copy 
what they perceive to be legitimate best practice, is this desirable? And if not, what are the limits of pluralism and 
diversity in the cultural dimensions of risk-taking and control? No one has the answers to these questions yet. 
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